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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Without recognizing
recognizing that
that it has done so,
so, the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court
created a category
category of constitutional
has created
constitutional rules
rules of criminal
criminal
procedure
that
are
all
in
a
peculiar
format,
conditional
procedure
are all
peculiar format, conditional rules.
rules. A
conditional rule
rule depends
depends on some future
determine
conditional
future event to determine
whether one has
hasfailed
it. In aa wide variety
variety of contexts,
contexts,
whether
failed to honor
honor it.
if
officer, prosecutor,
or defense attorney
attorney does
does
if a police officer,
prosecutor, judge or
something that
that the Constitution
Constitution regulates,
regulates, one cannot
determine
something
cannot determine
if
violated or not until
until some
if the constitutional
constitutional rule has been violated
point
point in the future.
future.
has used three methods to create
rules. One
The Court
Court has
create these rules.
requires an
an evaluation
evaluation at
at the end of the
looks to prejudice,
prejudice, and requires
trial
process to see if
hadan adverse
adverse effect on the
trial process
if what happened
happened had
result. Another method creates
creates rules
rules that depend
depend on the reaction
reaction
result.
of someone else, typically the defendant,
defendant, to trigger
trigger the violation.
violation.
The last
last way the Court
has
created
conditional
rules
Court
created conditional rules is to
aggregatethe time frame in which to make a judgment
aggregate
judgment about
about the
legitimacy of the actor's
that it must await
awaitfurther
actor's behavior,
behavior, so that
further
behavior
exercising governmental
governmental
behavior by the same actor
actor or someone exercising
power toward
toward the same end.
end.
These rules
superficially resemble applications
applications of the
rules superficially
harmless error
doctrine or
or examples of waivers of rights,
harmless
error doctrine
rights, but
they differ
differ in fundamental
are far
of
far less protective
protective of
fundamental ways. They are
the rights
of
defendants
and
they
send
a
much
different
message
rights defendants
a
different message
about the limits
limits of government power to those who control
control the
about
criminal
create confusion,
criminal justice
justice system. They create
confusion, fail
fail to guide the
Law, Boston
Boston University
University Law
School. Invaluable
Invaluable assistance
in completing
completing this
article
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Law School.
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Constitution
behavior
behavior of the government actors
actors whose power the Constitution
limits, stand
stand as barriers
barriers to institutional
ante
limits,
institutional efforts at ex ante
prevention,
public about
their rights,
prevention, mislead the public
about the scope of their
rights,
and often do not take into account
values
and
account any of the symbolic values
Constitutiongoverning
that lay behind the provisions
provisions of the Constitution
governing the
state'spower to use a criminal
criminalsanction.
state's
sanction.
"Sentence first-verdict afterwards."
afterwards." Lewis Carroll,
"Sentence
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,
Wonderland,in The Illustrated
Illustrated Lewis
Carroll 99 (Roy Gasson
Gasson ed., 1978).

THE Quiz
QUIZ
If you are reading this article, it is a fair assumption
If
assumption that you are
familiar, at least in a general way, with the basic constitutional
constitutional rules
that govern the criminal
criminal process
process in the United States. You know that
the privilege
against
self-incrimination
privilege
self-incrimination prevents
prevents the prosecutor
prosecutor from
State.'1
the State.
witness for
trial as
criminal trial
in aa criminal
calling the defendant
defendant in
as aa witness
for the
You're acquainted
acquainted with the fact that the Supreme
Supreme Court used the
privilege
Miranda v. Arizona as the basis for requiring
requiring police
privilege in Miranda
officers to warn suspects in custody
custody of their right to remain silent
before
particularly well versed,
before interrogating
interrogating them. 2 And if you're particularly
you may know that if
if a defendant
defendant remains silent after receiving a
Miranda
prosecutor
Miranda warning, that Doyle v. Ohio prevents
prevents the
prosecutor from
from
3
3
guilt.
defendant's
the
of
evidence
as
fact
that
using
as evidence of the defendant's guilt.
You are almost certainly aware
aware that the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures
seizures and probably
probably know that the
Supreme
Terry v. Ohio required
Supreme Court's decision in Terry
required police officers to
have reasonable suspicion
suspicion that a suspect
in
suspect was involved in a crime
crime in
4 You know that
order to detain the suspect briefly
in
a
public
setting.
briefly
public
1. See u.s.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)
I.
(1974) ("[T]he constitutional
language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply
apply only to situations in which the
prosecution seeks to
to call
call a defendant
defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not
prosecution
been so limited.").
2.
v. Arizona,
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-68
(1966).
2. Miranda
Miranda v.
436, 467-68 (1966).
3.
610,635
(1976).
635 (1976).
3. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
4. Terry v.
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
1,30 (1968).
(1968).
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guarantees defendants the right to be
the Sixth Amendment
Amendment not only guarantees
be
represented by an attorney but imposes
imposes an obligation on the state to
provide lawyers for the indigent. 55 You surely have some sense that
the same right to counsel provision has additional implications for the
way the system implements it in practice. The prosecution, you might
well believe, cannot
cannot listen in on privileged
privileged conversations between
between the
6
lawyer and his client. And, you might remember that there is some
of
effective assistance of
quality control mechanism, the idea of effective
competence level of a defendant's
defendant's
counsel, 7directed toward the competence
7
attorney.
You may have a vague memory from law school about the famous
Brady case that prohibits the prosecutor
prosecutor from hiding exculpatory
8
evidence. And if Brady ever led you to think at all about the
prosecutor
Compulsory Process Clause, you may believe that the prosecutor
the defendant from having access to a potential
cannot prevent
9
witness. 9
I am quite confident that you are familiar with the concept
concept of the
presumption of innocence, though you may not be quite sure where in
the Constitution
Constitution it appears. I have to admit, though, that it is
unrealistic to expect you, the casual reader, to be aware at all of the
implication
requiring a defendant to appear
appear
implication it has for the practice of requiring
lo
1
0
in front of the jury in prison clothes. I trust, however, that you can
see the problem.
The stage having been set, it is now fair to ask you to hazard a
guess about whether the examples
examples that follow describe situations
situations in
which there is a violation of the constitutional
constitutional rule that governs in
each case. And, yes, for each of these examples, there is a rule that
controls.

5.
5.
6.
7.
8.
8.
9.
10.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
(1963).
335, 348
348 (1963).
Weatherford
(1977).
Weatherford v. Bursey,
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560 (1977).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Strickland
(1984).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
83, 86 (1963).
(1963).
United States
Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982).
(1982).
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
501, 512-13 (1976).
(1976).
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1. A police officer
1.
officer comes upon someone
someone standing in the street
and with no reason at all to think that the person is involved
in criminal activity, other than the fact that the person is
wearing a hooded sweatshirt, the officer pulls out his gun
move."
and announces: "Don't move."
2. The prosecutor
prosecutor in a bank robbery case does not reveal to
defense counsel
counsel that an eyewitness to the crime told the
police that a third person, not the defendant, was the culprit.
3. The judge presiding over the arraignment of a defendant
3.
defendant
charged
charged with assault and battery, a misdemeanor
misdemeanor that has a
maximum
maximum sentence of two and one-half
one-half years, refuses to
appoint
defendant
appoint a lawyer to represent her even
even though
though the defendant
insists she is going to take her case to trial in front of a jury.
4. After the defendant
defendant testifies on direct that he was just an
innocent bystander
bystander and not an active participant
participant in the crime,
the prosecutor asks on cross-examination:
cross-examination: "Isn't it true that
after the police gave you a Miranda
remained
Miranda warning, you remained
silent and never told them you were an innocent bystander?"
bystander?"
5. A police detective
detective gives a Miranda
Miranda warning and hears the
5.
suspect's
suspect say he wants to remain silent. Ignoring
Ignoring the suspect's
statements, the detective
continues
to
question
him and
detective continues
elicits a confession.
6. Prior to trial, the defendant's court
6.
court appointed attorney has
spoken to him for only one-half
one-half hour. In that time, the
defendant did manage to tell his lawyer that he had an alibi,
corroborate his
and identifies the friends who would corroborate
whereabouts
whereabouts at the time of the crime. The defense attorney
attorney
does nothing to investigate
investigate the alibi.
7.
The
judge
orders
a defendant brought into the courtroom
7.
courtroom for
trial, in front of the jury, knowing that the defendant is
wearing distinctive prison
prison clothes.
clothes.
8. An undercover
8.
undercover police agent is indicted as a codefendant,
though the prosecutor
prosecutor never intends to place him on trial,
and, pretending to be on the defendant's
defendant's side, attends a
meeting
meeting between
between defendant
defendant and his lawyer where they
discuss trial strategy.
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enforcement authorities
9. Law enforcement
authorities deport a person in their custody
custody
who was arrested at the same time as the defendant and who
is
was a joint venturer
venturer in the crime with which the defendant is
charged, making the person unavailable to the defense as a
witness.
of
You suspected
suspected some sort of trick, didn't you? Of course, none of
the examples
examples has obvious answers. In each and every case, the
constitutional rule
correct answer is: you cannot tell if the relevant constitutional
enough
has been violated or not. In none of the examples do you have enough
information to be able to answer
each
answer the question. What's missing in each
case is something that will only happen in the future.
governs each
The reason for this, in a nutshell, is that the rule that governs
conditional rule. There are three elements that define a
situation is a conditional
conditional
conditional rule. First, there must be some actor whose behavior is
the target of the rule. Second, the actor must engage in some
predicate behavior that triggers the rule. And third, there is some
predicate
future consequence
consequence that defines
defines a violation of the rule.
evaluated by
Each of the examples has an actor whose behavior
behavior is evaluated
a constitutional rule: a judge, prosecutor, policeman, or defense
defense
attorney. Each actor has engaged
engaged in the predicate
predicate behavior
behavior that
examples has the story unfolded
triggers the rule. But in none of the examples
to allow you to determine
consequence that defines the
determine if the consequence
violation has occurred.
The police officer in the first example
example may end up violating the
Fourth Amendment, but if the sweat-shirted suspect shows foolhardy
valor and runs away, the officer
officer is guilty of doing nothing more than
displaying extraordinary
extraordinary incivility. The prosecutor in the second
second
example may never reveal the troublesome eyewitness, but if the
sufficiently strong, she may get in
introduces at trial is sufficiently
evidence she introduces
evidence
trouble with the ethics authorities in her jurisdiction
jurisdiction but certainly
certainly will
not have violated
violated the constitutional right of the defendant. And the
judge who refuses to appoint a lawyer for the misdemeanor defendant
defendant
facing two and one-half years in jail can insulate himself from any
any
sentencing the defendant
defendant to pay a
possibility of reversal on appeal by sentencing
incarcerating him. As you read
fine if he is convicted rather than incarcerating
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through the rest of this discussion, you'll see that you can tell a
similar story about all of the others. Their behavior
behavior on its face may
not be laudable. But unless some future event unfolds in a certain
way, they will have done nothing that violates the Constitution.
Part I of this article
article first explores the different methods the Court
has used to craft
craft conditional rules. It describes them in roughly the
incorporated
order in which they appeared. First came rules that incorporated
prejudice, in terms of having an adverse effect on the outcome
outcome of the
consequence that defined
defined the violation. Next are
case, as the future consequence
rules that depend on the person whose interests the rule protects
predicate behavior. And last are cases in
reacting in some way to the predicate
consequence is some subsequent behavior by the
which the future consequence
actor or someone else working in concert with the actor.
of
Part II of this article attempts to evaluate the phenomenon
phenomenon of
conditional rules from the point of view of their desirability
desirability as policy,
both pragmatic
pragmatic and constitutional. First, it discusses
discusses the
disadvantages of these types of rules. It considers their efficacy in
disadvantages
shaping the behavior
behavior of the actors that conditional rules regulate. It
discusses the effect conditional
conditional rules have on the ability
ability of courts to
serve as vehicles for institutional
institutional reform of the agencies that are
regulated by the rules and the practices
practices they engage in. It notes how
conditional rules can be misleading about the limits placed on the
exercise of power in the justice system. And, it explores the problems
exercise
with rules that rely on a showing of prejudice.
The discussion in Part II then examines
examines the reasons that a
conditional rule might be preferable. The first two are the utility of
of
the underlying
behavior
and
reluctance
to
specify
the
rules
that
underlying
govern the primary actors. Then it explores the pragmatic
considerations-like cost and collateral
effects-that might influence
considerations-like
collateral effects-that
a court to adopt a conditional rule. And last, Part II explores
explores whether
the language of the Constitution itself,
itself, specifically the Due Process
Clause, compels
compels the adoption
adoption of a conditional rule.
The conclusion
conclusion is followed by two appendices: one that lists all of
of
the cases in which the Court either discussed or actually adopted a
conditional rule; and another indicating
indicating the votes of the Justices in
each of those cases.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONAL RULES
DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONAL

A. Conditional
ConditionalAdmission in the Law ofEvidence
The concept
concept underlying
underlying aa conditional
rule-that future
The
conditional rule-that
future events
events must
must
unfold
before
one
can
make
a
final
judgment
about
the
legitimacy
of
unfold before one can make a final judgment about the legitimacy of
an action-is
action-is aa familiar
familiar one
of evidence.
Common law
law
an
one in
in the
the law
law of
evidence. Common
judges often
often found
found themselves
in the
of having
having to
to rule
rule on
on the
the
judges
themselves in
the position
position of
admissibility of
of evidence
evidence in
where all
all of
of the
the facts
admissibility
in circumstances
circumstances where
facts
necessary to
to establish
either its
or competence
competence had
necessary
establish either
its relevance
relevance or
had not
not yet
yet
been established.
established. Rather
Rather than
suffering the
the inconvenience
inconvenience of
of
been
than suffering
requiring the
the evidence
evidence to
to prove
prove foundational
foundational facts
facts
requiring
the party
party offering
offering the
out
of the
order which
which logic
logic commended,
commended, aa judge
judge would
the
out of
the order
would allow
allow the
11 If the proponent of
evidence
to come
come in
in de bene, or
or conditionally.'
evidence to
conditionally. I If
the proponent of
the evidence
evidence subsequently
subsequently "brought
or "connected
"connected Up,,12
up' 12 the
the
"brought home"
home" or
the
evidence,
became part
of the
the proof
proof the
the jury
consider. If,
evidence, then
then it
it became
part of
jury could
could consider.
If,
however,
the proponent
proponent failed
failed to
come forward
with the
necessary
however, the
to come
forward with
the necessary
predicate for
for evidence
had already
already been
admitted,
the
predicate
evidence that
that had
been admitted,
the judge
judge
3
13
it.'
disregard
to
jury
the
tell
and
stricken and tell the jury to disregard it.
order it
would order
would
it stricken
11. See 6 WIGMORE
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
II.
EVIDENCE § 1871 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) ("Thus
(''Thus the fundamental rule,

universally accepted, is that with
of
with reference to facts whose relevancy depends upon others, the order
order of
presentation
presentation is left to the discretion
discretion ofthe party himself,
himself, subject of course to the general discretion of the
the
trial court in controlling
evidence.") (emphasis added); Edmund M. Morgan, Functions
Functions of
of
controlling the order of evidence.")
Judge and
and Jury
PreliminaryQuestions
Fact,43 HARv.
HARV. L. REv.
REV. 165,
165, 166-67
Judge
Jury in the Determination
Determination of Preliminary
Questions of
of Fact,

(1929)
relevancy and competence
competence often depend on the existence
existence of other facts); John
(1929) (questions of relevancy
Maguire
Questions of
Determining the Admissibility of
of
& Charles Epstein, Preliminary
Preliminary Questions
of Fact
Fact in Determining
Maguire &
Evidence, 40 HARV.
REV. 392, 394 n.9 (1927)
Evidence,
HARv. L. REv.
(1927) ("Judges sometimes
sometimes admit evidence conditionally
conditionally or de
bene subject to a motion to strike out.").
12.
CoconspiratorException:
Exception: Action, Assertion,
and Hearsay,
12
12. Christopher
Christopher Mueller, The Federal
Federal Coconspirator
Assertion, and
Hearsay, 12
HOFSTRA
323, 326 (1984).
(1984).
HOFSTRA L. REv.
REv. 323,
13. See O'Brien v. Keefe, 175 Mass. 274.
(1900) (''The
("The possibility of testimony admitted
de
13.
274, 279 (1900)
admitted de
bene not being subsequently made competent is one of the considerations
considerations to be passed upon by the
the
presiding magistrate in determining
determining whether to admit such evidence
evidence at the time it is offered or not; and it
is necessary, in the conduct of trials, that such discretion should be exercised;
exercised; if evidence
evidence admitted de
bene is not subsequently
subsequently made good, the only remedy that can be given is,
is, on the proper application
application
being
being subsequently made, to rule out the testimony. Whether, in such a case, the party, who produces the
witness whose testimony has been confused, or the party who has undertaken to assert that the witness is
not to be believed because he is a criminal, and it turns
turns out that that assertion is unfounded, is
is the greater
greater
sufferer, is open to question; if he has suffered
suffered an injury, it is one inherent in the trial of causes and it is
well settled, when such evidence
evidence is admitted in a jury trial, that the objecting
objecting party cannot
cannot be heard to
complain,
complain, if the evidence is ruled out and the jury are instructed to disregard it.") (citing Smith v.
v.
Whitman,
(1863); Selkirk v. Cobb, 13 Gray
173
Whitman, 6 Allen 562 (1863);
Gray 313 (1859);
(1859); Whitney v. Bayley, 44 Allen 173
(1862));
also Maguire &
& Epstein, supra
supra note II,
11, at 411 n.65 (1927)
"the time-saving
(1862»; see also
(1927) (referring to ''the
time-saving
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When
conditionally admits
admits evidence
evidence in
case, it
When aa judge
judge conditionally
in aa criminal
criminal case,
it
can
constitutional implications.
an out-of-court
statement
can have
have constitutional
implications. Where
Where an
out-of-court statement
by
an absent
absent witness
of the
prosecution's case,
by an
witness is
is part
part of
the prosecution's
case, it
it can
can violate
violate
the
defendant's right
to cross-examine
cross-examine under
the Confrontation
the defendant's
right to
under the
Confrontation
114
4
Clause.
However,
if the
the statement
statement was
was made
co-conspirator
Clause.
However, if
made by
by aa co-conspirator
while
the
conspiracy
was
ongoing
and
the
statement
in
while the conspiracy was ongoing and the statement was
was in
furtherance of
the conspiracy's
objective, there
there is
is aa long
furtherance
of the
conspiracy's objective,
long standing
standing
5
practice
that allows
allows the
the statement
evidence.' The
practice that
statement into
into evidenceY
The historical
historical
pedigree
removes the
the co-conspirator
the realm
of
pedigree removes
co-conspirator exception
exception from
from the
realm of
Clause.16
Confrontation
the
by
prohibited
practices
practices prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. 16
Conspiracy cases
cases are
are often
often by
their nature
complex.
Conspiracy
by their
nature quite
quite complex.
Requiring
the prosecutor
to establish
existence of
of the
Requiring the
prosecutor to
establish the
the existence
the conspiracy,
conspiracy,
the defendant's
involvement, and
and the
the connection
the out-of-court
the
defendant's involvement,
connection of
of the
out-of-court
statement with
conspiracy's objective
objective before
before allowing
the
statement
with the
the conspiracy's
allowing the
17
statement into
evidence can
can be
nightmare. 17
Thus, early
early
statement
into evidence
be aa logistical
logistical nightmare.
Thus,
on in
in the
American courts'
courts' encounters
encounters with
with these
types of
on
the American
these types
of trials,
trials,
judges had
leeway to
allow the
the statements
statements in
conditionally.18 If
judges
had the
the leeway
to allow
in conditionally.18
If
[evidence] subject
device of tentatively admitting
admitting the [evidence]
subject at the close of the case to a motion to strike out,"
Hitchens v. Eardley,
& D. 248 (1871)).
in reference
reference to Lord Penzance's
Penzance's ruling in Hitchens
Eardley, L.R. 22 P. &
(1871)).
1983) (stating it is a violation of
of
14. See Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983)
co-conspirator when statement was
defendant's Confrontation
Confrontation Clause right to admit statement of co-conspirator
was not
1301, 1311
conspiracy); Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301,
BII (M.D. Fla. 2001)
2001)
made in furtherance of the conspiracy);
(granting habeas relief because
because out of court
court statements
statements offered in evidence were not made by a coevidence did not satisfy
conspirator during and in furtherance
furtherance of the conspiracy:
conspiracy: "[1If
"[I]f the evidence
satisfy the
exception to the rule, then there was not only an evidentiary
evidentiary error,
coconspirator exception
requirements of the coconspirator
confrontation.").
there was also a violation of the right of confrontation.").
res
15. United States
States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (1827)
(1827) (interpreting statements of co-conspirator
co-conspirator as res
gestae and thus admissible against defendant); Mueller, supra
supra note 12, at 325 (tracing the co-conspirator
co-conspirator
exception
exception to English
English treason trials in the late
late eighteenth
eighteenth century).
(2004) (recognizing co-conspirator's
16. Crawford v. Washington,
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004)
co-conspirator's statements as a
171, 183
183
historically recognized
recognized exception
exception to the hearsay rule);
rule); Bourjaily
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
(1987)
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence.");
jurisprudence."); Dutton
(1987) ("[T]he co-conspirator
Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)
(1970) (holding that the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause does not prohibit
prohibit the introduction
of
concealment phase of the conspiracy).
ofaa statement by a co-conspirator made during the conceahnent
17. State
17.
State v. Winner, 17 Kan. 298, 305 (1876)
(1876) ("Ordinarily
("Ordinarily when the acts and declarations of one coconspirator
another co-conspirator,
evidence as against another
co-conspirator, the conspiracy itself should first be
conspirator are offered in evidence
established
primafacie,
cannot
established prima
jacie, and to the satisfaction
satisfaction of the judge of the court trying the cause. But this cannot
always
conspiracy depends upon a vast
always be required. It cannot
cannot well be required where
where the proof
proof of the conspiracy
vast
amount
circumstantial evidence---a
evidence-a vast number of isolated and independent facts.").
amount of circumstantial
18. See id; I SIMON
I1ll, at 127
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE
mE LAW OF EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE § III,
127 (2d ed.
1844)
1844) ("Sometimes,
("Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are admitted in
evidence, before sufficient
sufficient proof
proof is given of the conspiracy;
conspiracy; the prosecutor
prosecutor undertaking
undertaking to furnish such
proof
proof in a subsequent stage of the cause.
cause. But this rests in the discretion
discretion of the Judge, and is not
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the prosecutor
prosecutor did not follow through
through on
on the
the necessary
necessary proof
proof
the
concerning the
the conspiracy, however, the judge
judge either
either had
had to instruct
instruct
concerning
19 While the
the jury
jury to disregard
disregard the statement
declare aa mistrial. 19
statement or declare
preferred practice
practice was for the
the prosecutor
prosecutor to establish
establish the
the foundation
foundation
preferred
20
if
it was not
statement,
before
admitting
an
absent
co-conspirator's
statement,20
absent
co-conspirator's
before
universally
reasonably
practicable to do so, courts
courts
universally allowed
allowed the judge
reasonably practicable
21
conditionally.
to admit
admit the statement
statement conditionally.21
doctrine of conditional
admission in the law of evidence
evidence
conditional admission
The doctrine
subject
that
are
the
conditional
rules
of
differs from the type
conditional
subject of
of this
type
article in one important respect. In
In the evidentiary
evidentiary context there
there is a
article
participants in the process that
shared expectation
expectation among all of the participants
shared
the actor
actor whose behavior is governed by the rule, the lawyer seeking
seeking
to admit the evidence
evidence conditionally, will bring about the future
consequence
consequence necessary to legitimize the original action. Establishing
Establishing
the reasonableness
reasonableness of this expectation,
expectation, in fact, is a necessary
necessary
ingredient
evidence in the first
ingredient for the conditional
conditional admission of the evidence
22 The conditional rules that the Supreme
place. 22
Supreme Court has adopted in
the area of constitutional
constitutional criminal procedure,
procedure, on the other hand, do
not proceed
proceed on this assumption
assumption at all. When the initial action takes
place, there is no obligation on the part of the actor to establish that
legitimizing it will occur. In fact, it is often
the future consequence
consequence legitimizing
the case that the future consequence
consequence is entirely outside of the control
of the actor and as a result it would not be reasonable, or even
possible, for the actor to claim that the future event will take place.

should be misled
misled to infer the
circumstances; lest
lest the
the Jury
and urgent
pennitted, except
particular and
urgent circumstances;
Jury should
except under
under particular
permitted,
the declarations
declarations of
of strangers.").
strangers.").
fact
from the
the conspiracy
conspiracy from
fact itself
itself of
of the
(Joseph M.
M. McLaughlin
19. WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.34[6][c]
19.
801.34[6][c] (Joseph
McLaughlin ed.,
ed., 1997) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN].
WEINSTEIN]'
supranote
20. [d.;
Id; GREENLEAF,
GREENLEAF, supra
20.
note 18.
each federal
federal circuit).
[ii] (listing
(listing the
the rule
rule in
in each
19, § 801.34[6][c]
801.34[6][c] [ii]
supra note
21.
note 19,
circuit). In
21. WEINSTEIN, supra
to address
the
Court specifically
specifically declined
declined to
171, 176
176 (1987),
(1987), the
the Court
Bourjaily v.
483 U.S. 171,
address the
States, 483
Bouraily
v. United
United States,
of an
an absent
absent cocofor the
admission of
establishing the
the foundation
foundation for
proper order
order of
of proof
question of
of the
the proper
question
proof inin establishing
the admission
a judge
conspirator's statement.
statement. However, the law in every circuit allows a
conspirator's
judge to admit
admit the statement
foundation to
to come
come beforehand.
beforehand.
practicable to
to require
require the
the foundation
not reasonably
conditionally where
conditionally
where itit isis not
reasonably practicable
("[1]f the evidential fact thus
(Chadboum rev. 1976) ("[I]f
ON EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE § 1871 (Chadbourn
6 WIGMORE
22. See 6
WIGMORE ON
thus put
accompanying statement
statement of the
case, an
an accompanying
apparent connection
connection with the case.
has on
on its
its face
face no apparent
forward has
forward
a later
introduce them at a
counsel, and a
a promise to introduce
connectingfacts
connecting
facts must be made by counse~
later time if they have
have
(emphasis added).
added).
already been
been introduced.")
introduced.") (emphasis
not already
not
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B. Incorporating
IncorporatingPrejudice
Prejudice
One future event that can make a rule conditional is the admission
admission
of additional
additional evidence
evidence that renders the outcome
outcome of the trial a foregone
conclusion despite the existence of the predicate
predicate action that triggered
conclusion
the rule. In other words, courts simply incorporate
incorporate a requirement
requirement of
of
expost
ex
post prejudice
prejudice in defining the rule.
For those who find that sports analogies
analogies make articles about legal
doctrine more fun to read, it is very much like the offsides
offsides rule in
soccer. Players in the half of the field closest to their opponent's
opponent's goal
are penalized
penalized for being in an off
offsides
sides position (when they do not have
two opposing players between
them
and the end line at the moment
between
when one of their teammates touches the ball) only if they gain some
23
advantage
advantage by failing to stay on sides. 23
When the ball is played, the
assistant
assistant referee
referee on the sideline
sideline raises a flag to indicate
indicate that someone
is in an offsides position but subsequent
subsequent events must often unfold
before the referee
referee on the field can make a decision about whether
whether the
rule was violated
violated and the defending
defending team awarded an indirect free
kick.
Incorporating prejudice is the way the Court first adopted a
Incorporating
conditional rule and it remains the most common technique
technique in the
conditional rules universe. The value to which the Court has
Court's conditional
directed the prejudice inquiry considers whether there was any effect
effect
on the defendant's
defendant's ability to convince the fact finder to return a not
guilty verdict or a more lenient sentence. It is, in order words,
entirely result oriented.
1. Harmless
HarmlessError
ConditionalRules
1.
Error and Conditional
A conditional rule based on ex post prejudice sounds a lot like the
Contemporary appellate
doctrine of harmless error. Contemporary
appellate courts affirm
convictions all the time despite the presence of some constitutional
convictions
constitutional
LAWS OF
OF THE GAME 2005 Law 11,
23. Federation Internationale
Intemationale de Football
Football Association, LAws
11, at 24 ("A
player in an offside position is only penalised if,
if, at the moment the ball touches
touches or is played by one of
of
his team, he is, in the opinion
opinion of the referee,
referee, involved in active play by: interfering with play or;
interfering
interfering with an opponent
opponent or,
or; gaining an advantage by being in that position.").
position.").
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rule violation
violation because
because they
they determine
the error
error did
affect the
rule
determine that
that the
did not
not affect
the
24
2
4
result of
Both harmless
harmless error
and this
this type
type of
conditional
result
of the
the trial.
trial.
Both
error and
of conditional
rule stem
stem from
from aa concern
that defendants
defendants escape
convictions for
rule
concern that
escape convictions
for
"technical"
rule violations
that do
do not
the fundamental
fundamental integrity
integrity
"technical" rule
violations that
not affect
affect the
of
process.
of the
the process.
The
harmless error
came about
The concept
concept of
of harmless
error came
about as
as aa reaction
reaction to
to the
the rigid
rigid
rule-based
system
of
appellate
review
that
prevailed
prior
to
the
early
rule-based system of appellate review that prevailed prior to the early
25
decades
the twentieth
words of
of one
early
decades of
of the
twentieth century.
century.25 In the
the words
one early
proponent,
the doctrine
doctrine was
was aa necessary
necessary antidote
the prevailing
prevailing
proponent, the
antidote to
to the
process
of review
that allowed
to "tower
"tower above
the
process of
review that
allowed appellate
appellate courts
courts to
above the
trials
cases as
as impregnable
impregnable citadels
of technicality.,,26
technicality." 26 To
trials of
of criminal
criminal cases
citadels of
To
27
curb
formalistic practice
"record worship,"
first
curb the
the formalistic
practice of
of "record
worship,'.27 Congress
Congress first
24. E.g.,
E.g., United States v. Williams,
Williams, 461 F.3d 441,
441, 448 (4th Cir. 2006); United States
States v. Allen, 406
F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005); Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175,
175, 185 (2d Cir.
Cir. 2003).
25. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,48
18, 48 (1967)
(1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
dissenting) ("The harmless-error
hannless-error
rules now utilized by all the States and in the federal judicial system are the product
product of judicial reform
early
concerned about the harshness of
of
early in this century. Previously most American appellate courts, concerned
criminal
criminal penalties, followed the rule imposed on English courts through the efforts of Baron Parke, and
held that any
any error of substance required a reversal
reversal of conviction.").
The
anti-formalist movement that led to the adoption of the harmless
harmless error rule on appeal also
also
The anti-formalist
interpreted constitutional rules that applied
affected
affected the way the Court
Court interpreted
applied in the trial process. Two cases
cases
bracketing
turn of the century that dealt with the same issue display the philosophical current that
bracketing the tum
underlay
underlay each
each position. Both cases dealt with whether
whether the Due Process Clause requires that before
before a trial
can
can commence the accused must first formally enter a not guilty plea.
The Court first encountered
United States,
encountered this application
application of due process in 1896, in Crain v. United
States,
162
162 U.S.
U.S. 625 (1896).
(1896). Crain reversed a conviction because
because the record of the trial did not reflect the fact
fact
that
that the defendant
defendant entered
entered a not guilty plea. "It
"It is true that the [C]onstitution
[C]onstitution does not, in terms, declare
that
demanded of him that
that a person accused of crime
crime cannot be tried until it be demanded
that he plead, or unless
unless he
pleads,
without due process of law; and
pleads, to the indictment. But it does forbid the deprivation of liberty without
due process of law requires that the accused
accused plead,
plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper case,
case, that a
plea
....
plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can rightfully proceed
proceed ....
" Id.
Id. at 645. Refusing to
draw
draw the inescapable
inescapable inference that the defendant
defendant did enter
enter the appropriate plea from the fact that the
"was sworn to and tried 'the
id., the Court in Crain acted
acted on the basis of a formalist
jury "was
'the issue joined,"
joined," id.,
principle, handed down through the centuries, that "safety
of
"safety lies in adhering
adhering to established modes of
procedure
procedure devised
devised for the security of life and liberty."
liberty." Id.
Id. at 644. The four dissenting Justices
Justices in Crain
derided
"upon the merest
technicality." Id.
derided the Court's decision as resting ''upon
merest technicality."
Id. at 646.
Crain did not last long as binding precedent.
commanded a
precedent. By 1914,
1914, the dissent's position
position commanded
Garlandv.
v. Washington,
Washington, 232 U.S.
U.S. 642 (1914).
(1914). The Garland
Garland Court overruled Crain,
Crain,
unanimous Court in Garland
evincing a sense of confidence
confidence in the overall integrity of the process that allowed it to dispense with
technical compliance with formality as a bulwark
bulwark against incursions
incursions on liberty, the same impulse that
motivated the adoption of the hannless
harmless error doctrine.
26. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement a/Administration
ofAdministration of
CriminalJustice
Justice by Exercise
Judicial
a/Criminal
Exercise of
a/Judicial
Power,
A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)
(1925) (cited
(cited in Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759 n.13
n.13
Power, II A.BA
328 U.S.
(1946)).
27. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL
IN AMERICA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 161
161 (1930)
(1930) ("[Record
("[Record worship
worship is] an
excessive regard for the formal record at the expense of the case, a strict scrutiny
scrutiny of that record for
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adopted a statute dealing with the necessity for prejudice In
in
28
overturning criminal judgments in 1872.
1872.28
of
The Supreme Court first dipped its toe into the pool of
constitutional harmless error in a criminal
Motes v.
v.
criminal case in 1900, in Motes
29
UnitedStates.
States.29
Motes involved the conviction of six defendants for a
United
civil rights violation arising out of the murder of a witness in a
bootlegging case in rural Alabama. The Court reversed the conviction
conviction
of five of the six on the ground that their rights under the
Confrontation Clause had been violated by the admission into
evidence of the written statement of a witness who was not available
30 The sixth defendant, Columbus
examination at the tria1.
trial.30
for cross examination
Motes, was not so lucky. His case was different
different because
because at trial he
evidently tried to save his codefendants
codefendants by taking the stand and
testifying that only two people were responsible for the murder,
31
explained why Motes
The Court explained
himself and the missing witness. 31
was to be hoist on his own petard:
In this
the jury had conclusive proof of the guilt of
In
this evidence
evidence the
of
Columbus W. Motes of the crime charged in the indictment. The
admission of the statement
statement of [the witness] in evidence
evidence was,
therefore,
of
no
consequence
as
to
him;
for in his own testimony
therefore,
consequence
testimony
enough was stated to require
a
verdict
of
guilty
as
to
him,
even
require
even if
'errors
of law'
the expense
expense of
'errors of
law' at
at the
of scrutiny
scrutiny of
of the
the case
case to
to insure
insure the consonance
consonance of the
the result to the
demands of substantive
substantive law.").
1,
28. See Russell
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 761-62
761-62 (1962).
(1962). The
The original statute, Act of June
June I,
1872, Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 198,
198, provided:
1872,
[N]o
[N]o indictment
indictment found and presented
presented by
by aa grand
grand jury
jury in any
any district or
or circuit
circuit or
or other
other
court of the
the United
United States
States shall be deemed
deemed insufficient,
insufficient, nor shall
shall the trial, judgment, or
or
other proceeding
proceeding thereon
thereon be
be affected
affected by reason of
of any
any defect
defect or
or imperfection
imperfection in matter
matter of
of
form only, which
the defendant.
which shall
shall not
not tend to
to the prejudice of
ofthe
defendant.
The
morphed in
The statute
statute morphed
in that form
form into
into Rev. Stat. § 1025,
1025, which
which was
was cited
cited by both
both the majority and
and
dissent in
in Crain,
Crain, 162 U.S.
U.S. 625.
625.
In
In 1919,
1919, Congress
Congress mandated
mandated the
the use of a more
more general
general harmless
harmless error
error doctrine. Act of
of February
February
26,
ch. 48,
26, 1919,
1919, ch.
48, 40
40 Stat. 1181.
118!. Section
Section 269 of
of the
the Judicial
Judicial Code required
required that "[o]n
"[o]n the
the hearing
hearing of
of any
any
appeal,
appeal, certiorari,
certiorari, writ
writ of error, or
or motion
motion for
for aa new
new trial,
trial, in
in any
any case,
case, civil
civil or criminal,
criminal, the court shall
give
give judgment
judgment after
after an
an examination
examination of
of the entire
entire record
record before the
the court,
court, without
without regard
regard to
to technical
technical
errors,
errors, defects,
defects, or
or exceptions
exceptions which
which do not affect
affect the substantial rights of
of the parties."
parties."
29. Motes v. United
United States,
States, 178
178 U.S. 458 (1900).
(1900).
30. Id.
Id. at 471-72.
471-72.
31.
3!. Id.
Id. at
at 474-75.
474-75.
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the jury had disregarded [the witness's] statements altogether.
We can therefore say, upon the record before us, that the
evidence furnished by [the witness's] statement was not so
materially to the prejudice
prejudice of Columbus W. Motes as to justify a
reversal of the judgment as to him. It would be trifling with the
administration of the criminal law to award him a new trial
administration
because of a particular error committed by the trial court, when
in effect he has stated under oath that he was guilty of the charge
32
him.
. h'
against
preferred
pre
1m.32
f1erred agamst

Supreme Court formally to
It took some time, however, for the Supreme
recognize that the Constitution allowed a permanent breach in the
substantial opinion grappling
wall of automatic reversal. In the first substantial
application of the harmless
with the application
harmless error statute, Kotteakos v. United
States, the Court averred to the possibility that constitutional errors
States,
33
might be outside
But it was
outside the scope
scope of the harmless error doctrine. 33
1967, in Chapman
Chapman v. California,
California, that the Court first made
not until 1967,
constitutional defects in a
explicit the application
application of harmless error to constitutional
38
38
conviction.
criminal conviction.
Chapman
Chapman came to the Court from a California
California Supreme
Supreme Court
decision ruling
prosecutor's comment
ruling that a prosecutor's
comment on the fact that the
defendant
defendant did not testify was, despite being a violation
violation of the
defendant's
harmless error under
defendant's privilege against self incrimination, harmless
the state's
formulation
"which
forbids
reversal
unless
state's
"which
unless 'the
'the court shall
shall
be of the opinion
opinion that the error complained
complained of has resulted
resulted in a
34 The Court concluded that the question of
miscarriage
miscarriage of justice.'
justice. ",34
of
what remedy a state
state must
must provide
provide in reviewing
reviewing a conviction based on
on
an error of
of constitutional
constitutional magnitude
magnitude was just
just as much
much a federal

32. Id.
Id. at
at 475-76.
475-76.
33.
States, 328 U.S. 750,
750, 764-65 (1946)
(1946) ("If, when
when all is said and done,
done, the
the
33. Kotteakos
Kotteakos v. United States,
conviction is sure
sure that
that the error
error did
did not
not influence
influence the jury,
jury, or had but very slight effect,
effect, the verdict
verdict and
and
the judgment
judgment should stand,
stand, except perhaps
perhaps where
where the
the departure
departure is from a constitutional
constitutional norm
norm or a
specific
of Congress.");
Congress."); id.
id. at 765 n.19
n.19 (citing Malinski
Malinski v. New
New York, 324 U.S. 401,
401, 404
specific command
command of
(1945);
Oklahoma, 322
540-42
(1945); Lyons
Lyons v.
v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596,
596, 597
597 n.1
n.1 (1944);
(1944); Brain
Bram v. United
United States, 168 U.S. 532,
532,540-42
(1897);
(1897); United
United States
States v. Mitchell,
Mitchell, 137 F.2d
F.2d 1006,
1006, 1012
1012 (1943))
(1943)) ("Thus, when
when forced confessions
confessions have
been
been received,
received, reversals
reversals have
have followed although
although on other
other evidence
evidence guilt
guilt might be taken
taken to be
be clear.").
34. Id.
Id. at 20.
20.
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question as was the standard
standard for defining the constitutional right that
35 After establishing its
the trial process disregarded
disregarded in the first place. 35
hannless error applied in constitutional
role in saying how harmless
constitutional cases, the
Court for the first time rejected the claim that no constitutional
error
constitutional error
could be hannless,
harmless, stating, "We
"We conclude
conclude that there may be some
constitutional
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant
insignificant that they may, consistent
unimportant and insignificant
consistent with the
Federal
Federal Constitution, be deemed
deemed 36harmless, not requiring the
conviction."
the
of
reversal
automatic
of the conviction. ,,36
automatic
California's formulation
Then the Court went on to disapprove of California's
articulated in an earlier
earlier
of the harmless
harmless error test, and adopted one articulated
Fahy v. Connecticut,
Connecticut, which
which concluded, without deciding the
case, Fahy
harmless error rule applied to the erroneous
erroneous
issue, that even if a harmless
violation of the Fourth Amendment,
admission of evidence seized in violation
the conviction
conviction it was reviewing
still
could not stand: "The
"The question is
reviewing
whether
complained
evidence complained
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
37
conviction."
the
to
of might have contributed to the conviction. ,,37
Chapman, it has been commonplace to accept the
Ever since Chapman,
notion that a deprivation of a defendant's
defendant's constitutional rights need
category
not invalidate a conviction. There is only a relatively small category
of errors for which the Constitution requires automatic
automatic reversal. In
"defect[s] affecting
making the list, the Court
Court identified those "defect[s]
affecting the
''
38
framework within which
which the trial proceeds,
proceeds,,,38 so that they
"necessarily render
trial fundamentally
unfair." 39 For constitutional
"necessarily
render aa trial
fundamentally unfair.,,39
Id.at
35. Id.
at 21.
21.
Id.at
36. Id.
at 22.
37. Fahy
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
85, 86-87
86-87 (1963).
(1963).
(1991).
38. Arizona
Arizona v. Fulimante, 499
499 U.S.
U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
39.
39. Rose
Rose v. Clark,
Clark, 478 U.S.
U.S. 570,
570, 577 (1986). The Court's latest
latest version
version of these
these "structural
"structural errors"
errors"
UnitedStates v.
v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
from United
548 U.S.
U.s. 140,
140, 149 (2006), includes
includes the
the following:
following:
•- the
the total
total deprivation of the
the right
right to counsel at trial,
trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963);
335
(1963);
(1927);
•* lack of
of impartiality
impartiality on
on the part
part of the judge,
judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273
273 U.S.
U.S. 510 (1927);
•* the unlawful
unlawful exclusion
exclusion of members of the defendant's
defendant's race from aa grand or petit jury,
jury,
see Vasquez v.
v. Hillery,
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
254 (1986);
(1986);
McKaskle v.
•- denying aa defendant
defendant the right
right toto self-representation
self-representation atat trial, see McKaskie
v. Wiggins,
(1984);
465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984);
Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
•- failing
failing toto respect the right
right to public trial,
trial, see Waller
U.S. 39,
39, 49 n.9
n.9
(1984);
(1984);
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errors not on this list, the Constitution
a
Constitution allows a court to sanction
40
error test.
harmless error
appropriate harmless
the appropriate
conviction
test. 40
conviction so long as it meets the
There
difference between the doctrine of harmless
There is, of course, a difference
error and the idea of a conditional rule. The most significant is in the
audience
audience to whom each is relevant. 4411 Harmless error is a
constitutional
constitutional mandate that directs only the behavior of judges
reviewing the validity of a conviction. It tells them when they must
prevent
prevent the state from upholding a conviction
conviction that results from a
constitutionally
flawed
process
and
when they can validate a
constitutionally
conviction
conviction despite the state's failure to abide by all of the
constitutional
Conditional rules, on the
constitutional rules that govern
govern the process. Conditional
other hand, are directed to the primary actors in the trial process and
govern
govern the behavior that leads to a conviction in the first place.
Saying that a conviction can stand despite a harmless error does not
validate the behavior
behavior of the state actor who deprived the defendant
defendant of
of
a constitutional right. It simply means that the defendant will be
unable to void the conviction as a remedy. Saying that a state actor
actor
defendant
did not violate a conditional rule, however, means that the defendant
has not been deprived of anything the Constitution promises. It not
only validates
validates the end result, if it happens to be a guilty verdict;
verdict; it
validates each step in the process by which the state obtained the
result.
2. Due Process
Processand the Defendant's
at Trial
Trial
Defendant's Right to Be Present
Present at
The first time the Supreme Court announced a constitutional rule
in a conditional format was in 1933,
1933, when it decided
decided Snyder v.
v.

•- giving the jury a defective instruction concerning
concerning reasonable
reasonable doubt, see Sullivan v.
U.S. 275 (1993);
Louisiana, 508 U.S.
(\ 993);
•- denying
denying the defendant the right to select counsel of his own choice, see United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
40. The Chapman
Chapman test applies when a conviction is reviewed on appeal.
appeal. If a court
court is considering
considering the
validity
harmless error test can
validity of a conviction
conviction in a collateral review
review process
process such as habeas
habeas corpus,
corpus, the hannless
be more forgiving. See Brecht v. Abrahamson,
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993)
(\993) (stating
(stating that on habeas review,
the Constitution
Constitution allows aa test that asks whether the error "had
"had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining
determining the jury's verdict").
influence
41.
41. There
There are, of course, other differences,
differences, such as which party bears the burden of proof and the
effect
constitutional rules. See infra
effect each has on the behavior
behavior of the actors who must obey constitutional
infra Part II.A.iv.a.
I1.A.iv.a
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42
42
Massachusetts.
Snyder did so by incorporating
prejudice
Massachusetts.
incorporating an ex post prejudice
evaluation into the definition
evaluation
definition of the right. The issue in Snyder was
defendant's presence
whether Due Process required the defendant's
presence when the jury
essentially a field trip for the jury at the
goes on a view. A view is essentially
start of the trial, where they get to look at the scene
scene of the crime.
Massachusetts procedure, what the jury learned on the view
Under Massachusetts
43
verdict.43
arriving at
consider in
could consider
was part of the evidence
evidence they could
in arriving
at aa verdict.
The jury in Snyder went with the prosecutor, judge, and defense
murder for which the defendant was on
on
attorney to the location
location of the murder
accompany the group.
trial. The judge refused to let the defendant accompany
However, essentially
essentially all that occurred
occurred was for the lawyers
lawyers to call the
jury's attention to various aspects of the physical
physical surroundings. The
defendant
defendant only learned about what happened on the view after the
fact.
Snyder's lawyer in the Supreme Court was not exactly clear about
where in the Constitution he was basing his client's claim. The
Confrontation Clause was an attractive choice, since it directly
directly
Confrontation
addressed the issue of a defendant's presence in the trial process. But
since a view entails
entails neither having witnesses make statements
statements nor
lawyers ask questions, the Court refused to expand
the
reach of a
expand
44
confrontation right to the context of a view. What did
defendant's confrontation
implication from the right to
govern the process, though, was an implication
defend oneself that the Court found in the general
general guarantee
guarantee of due
process. "In
"In a prosecution for a felony," Justice
Justice Cardozo wrote, "the
defendant has the privilege
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment to be
privilege
Amendment
present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation,
opportunity to defend
reasonably substantial,
to the fullness of his opportunity
'A5
charge.
the
against
,.45
But how does one determine if a defendant's presence
presence is
substantially
himself?. The
substantially related to the opportunity
opportunity to defend himself?
somewhat ambiguous.
Court's description
description of the general method was somewhat
exclusion
The opinion states only that "the
"the justice or injustice of that exclusion

42.
43.
44.
45.

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
(1934).
Id. at 125.
Id
Id at 108.
Id at 105-06.
105-06.
Id.
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must be determined in the light of the whole record.'.46
record. 'A 6 This is
certainly
certainly consistent with the way that one would articulate
articulate a
conditional rule. You would look to the record at the end of the trial
to see if the defendant's
defendant's absence from the view detracted
detracted from his
himself. But it could
opportunity to defend himself.
could also mean that the judge
must evaluate
evaluate the whole record at the time the defendant makes the
request to join the jury on its adventure rather than waiting for the
view and the trial that follows.
What the Court had in mind, however, becomes
becomes clearer
clearer by looking
at the way that the opinion justified
justified rejecting Snyder's
Snyder's claim. The
Court evaluated
evaluated whether it was unjust to bar Snyder from the view by
examining what happened
happened when the jury visited the scene and at the
47
trial proceedings
proceedings that followed.47
The jury was taken to the proper
proper
4s
48
place. They were shown features of the scene that the defendant
defendant
learned
agreed were there at the time of the crime. 4499 The defendant learned
everything that happened after the fact and had an opportunity to
raise an objection to any misimpression
misimpression or misinformation the jury
50 Based on
the way the events
events in Snyder
Snyder
might have received. 50 Based
unfolded
unfolded after the judge made the decision to bar the defendant's
defendant's
conceivable way that he
presence, the Court was at a loss to see any conceivable
could have gained even "a
"a shred of advantage"
advantage" by going on the
51
"reasonable probability that
Since Snyder could not show a "reasonable
view.51
injustice had been done" his claim that the Commonwealth
of
Commonwealth of
Massachusetts violated a rule established
Massachusetts
established by the federal Constitution
52
failed. 52
Why did the Court adopt a conditional rule in Snyder? Because of
of
the same impulse that led, decades later, to the adoption of the
harmless error doctrine. "There is danger,"
danger," Justice Cardozo wrote,
"that the criminal law will be brought into contempt-that
contempt-that discredit
will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth
46.
115.
46. Id.
Id. at 115.
47. Id.
47.
Id. at 103-04.
103-{)4.
48. Snyder,
Snyder, 291 U.S
U.s at
103.
at 103.
4S.
49. Id.
Id. at
at104.
104.
49.
50.
atI1S.
118.
50. Id.
Id. at
51. Id.
Id.at
atIDS.
108.
52.
Id.at
at113.
113.
52. Id.
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Amendment-if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant
Amendment-if
defendant
sentence pronounced
are to nullify a sentence
pronounced by a court of competent
competent
53 What
jurisdiction
jurisdiction in obedience
obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.
free.",,,53
sense, one imagines the Snyder Court asking itself, would it have
made to overturn
overturn the conviction
conviction when the defendant
defendant could not
not
possibly
have
suffered
any
ill
effect
from
the
practice
of
which
he
possibly
complained.
The concern
concern with not reversing a case because
because of a mistake
mistake that
could have had no effect on the outcome, to the modem ear, makes
Snyder sound a lot like a garden variety
variety harmless error case. So does
the textual justification
justification that Justice
Justice Cardozo gave for why prejudice
was a necessary
necessary component
component of the right at issue in Snyder? He
explained
conferred
explained that only rights that the Constitution expressly
expressly conferred
"would
not
be
overlooked
as
immaterial
[if]
the
evidence
"would not be overlooked as immaterial
evidence thus
guilt. '54 A prejudice
procured was persuasive
persuasive of the defendant's guilt.,,54
requirement was also unnecessary
unnecessary for a right a like the opportunity
requirement
opportunity to
be heard, which though not expressly mentioned
mentioned in the Constitution
was "obviously
"obviously fundamental.,,55
fundamental." 55 But for rights merely implied by the
Due Process Clause, as was the right to accompany
accompany the jury on a
view, the Court was left with the task of making a contextual
judgment about whether the proceedings
proceedings were
were fair, by reference to
the entire record.56
This
56
division of rights into those that are express
or fundamental and those that are merely implied is very similar to
53.
Id. at 122.
53. Id.
122.
54. Snyder, 291
291 U.S
116. This textual argument
U.S at 116.
54.
argument is one the Court would repeat over the years,
always
always with as little explanation
explanation as in Snyder for why the source
source of the right makes it necessary to
475 U.S.
U.S. 673, 679-80 (1986);
(1986); Donnelly
incorporate a prejudice
prejudice requirement. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.s.
U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
subsequent cases have not consistently
(1974). Certainly, subsequent
consistently hewed to
this line. Cases based on the Due Process Clause that have not incorporated
incorporated a prejudice
prejudice requirement
include the following: Penson
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
U.S. 75, 85-89 (1988)
(1988) (denying the appointment of counsel
on appeal); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
421 U.s.
U.S. 684,
(1975) (improperly
(improperly shifting
684, 702-04
702-04 (l975)
shifting burden of proof);
Wardius v. Oregon,
Oregon, 412 U.S.
U.s. 470, 475-76
475-76 (1973)
(l973) (lacking
(lacking reciprocity
reciprocity in discovery);
discovery); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368,
368, 389
389 (1964)
determination of voluntariness of confession);
confession); Tumey v. Ohio,
378
(l964) (no judicial detennination
273 U.S.
U.S. 510,
510, 523
523 (1927) (judge having a financial interest in a criminal
criminal conviction). It is not intuitively
obvious
fundamental than the one at
obvious that the underlying rights involved
involved in all of these cases are more fundamental
Snyder. Of these cases,
Snyder. Tumey, however, was
issue in Snyder.
cases, only Tumey was decided
decided before Snyder.
mentioned only by the dissent in Snyder.
Snyder. Snyder, 291
291 U.S.
U.S. at 128
128 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523); see
infra Part II-A-iv-a.
lI-A-iv-a.
infra
Snyder, 291 U.S at 116.
55. Snyder,
56. Id.
Id at 117.
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the way the Court, decades
decades later, bifurcated
bifurcated harmless error analysis
into those rights subject to its application and those so fundamental
57
harmless. 57
never harmless.
and were
error" and
"structural error"
that they constituted "structural
were never
58
Indeed, in Rushen v. Spain,
Spain,58
a case raising the question of whether
the due process right involved
involved in Snyder is the sort of constitutional
claim
claim that is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court cited Snyder
for the proposition
proposition that the right to be personally
personally present was subject
subject
59
to harmless error. 59
The reference
reference to Snyder as a harmless error case, however, was not
quite accurate. The language Snyder used was phrased in terms that
made clear excluding the defendant
defendant from the view did not violate his
right to be present at all critical stages of the trial. You cannot have
harmless
harmless error
error without error in the first place.
harmless error
error
The fact that Snyder failed to use the framework of harmless
but instead incorporated
incorporated prejudice into the terms of the constitutional
rule was hardly surprising. In 1934
1934 when Snyder was decided, the
Supreme Court, and most everyone
everyone else, assumed that any
constitutional error required reversal.660° So if the Court felt it
57. See supra
supranote 42.
(1983). Spain
Spain presented the Court with a question about
58. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
U.S. 114 (1983).
about the
consequence of the trial judge's holding an ex parte
conference with a juror. Spain, on trial for several
consequence
parte conference
murders
member of the Black
Black Panther
Panther Party.
murders committed
committed during
during the course of a prison break, was a member
During voir dire,
dire, the juror in question said she did not particularly
particularly associate
associate the Black Panthers with any
Id. at 115.
115. However, months later, during the course
sort of violence. Id.
course of trial testimony, the juror
recalled that she personally knew the victim of a murder committed
committed by a party member. The juror
informed the judge, who met with
with her alone, to discuss her ability to remain impartial. The
The constitutional
basis for the defendant's
defendant's complaint
complaint in Spain about the judge's behavior was, as in Snyder,
Snyder, his right to be
assistance of counsel.
counsel. See id.
id
personally present at all critical stages of the trial, as well as his right to the assistance
at 117 n.2. Relying on the state's concession that the judge's
judge's behavior
behavior entailed
entailed an error of constitutional
constitutional rights were in fact
dimension, the Court assumed without deciding that these two constitutional
implicated. The Court went on, however, to hold that whatever
whatever constitutional
constitutional harm
harm was involved in the
judge's action was harmless error.
59. Id.
Id at 117 n.2.
Non-Retroactivity, and
and Constitutional
Constitutional
60. See Richard
Richard Fallon &
& Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
Remedies, 104 HARv.
1733, 1771-72
(1991) ("A finding that an error is harmless does not, even
HARV. L. REv. 1733,
1771-72 (1991)
even
in theory, constitute a certain
certain conclusion
conclusion that the defendant
defendant was not prejudiced. Indeed, until early in this
this
century, errors at trial were generally treated as requiring automatic
automatic reversal, and before 1967 it was
constitutional errors
prejudicial."); Tom Stacy &
& Kim Dayton,
generally assumed that constitutional
errors were always prejudicial.");
Rethinking Harmless
Harmless Constitutional
Constitutional Error,
Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79,
(1988) ("Until 1967 it was
79, 82-83
82-83 (1988)
unclear whether constitutional
constitutional errors occurring in a criminal trial could
could ever be harmless.").
In a case decided five years after Snyder,
Snyder, Bruno
Bruno v. United
UnitedStates,
(1939), the Court
States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939),
"Suffice it to
gave a sense of the type of problem for which it thought
thought harmless error was appropriate:
appropriate: "Suffice
[the harmless error statute],
statute), knows,
knows, that that Act was
indicate, what every student of the history behind [the

Published by Reading Room, 2010

19
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 435 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

436

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY LAW

[Vol. 26:2
(Vol.
26:2

necessary to take into account
account the inevitability
inevitability of a conviction despite
the defendant's
defendant's absence
absence from the view, it had to make the underlying
underlying
rule conditional, since harmless
hannless error was not yet available as a
6611
tool.
Snyder's legacy in the Court's somewhat limited jurisprudence
jurisprudence on
the rule concerning
concerning a defendant's
defendant's presence during the trial process
process
intended
concerned with
intended to prevent
prevent matters concerned
with the mere
mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and
minutiae
verdict." ld.
Id.at 294. Deprivation of a constitutional
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict."
constitutional
minutiae of procedure
right, such as the one with which the Snyder Court grappled, would hardly
hardly have been seen as dealing
merely
Chapman was harmless error a viable
minutiae of procedure. Not until Chapman
merely with a formality and minutiae
alternative
alternative in the Supreme
Supreme Court's decision making arsenal.
That Chapman
Chapman staked the flag of harmless error on virgin territory
territory is clear
clear from its failure to cite
any previous Supreme Court
Motes, that affirmed a
Court decision,
decision, most notably not even Snyder or Motes,
conviction
Harlan's
conviction despite finding that the defendant was denied a constitutional
constitutional right. Justice Harlan's
"errors of constitutional
dissenting opinion did cite both
both cases for the proposition
proposition that "errors
constitutional dimension can be
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 50 n.3, but the majority opinion did not mention them at all.
harmless," Chapman,
Justice Stewart's dissent made the point explicitly, lamenting: "In devising a harmless-error rule
rule
of federal constitutional
for violations
violations offederal
constitutional rights, both the Court
Court and [Justice Harlan's]
Harlan's] dissent proceed as if
of
the question
question were one of first impression.
impression. But in a long line of cases,
cases, involving a variety of
constitutional claims
claims in
in both state and federal prosecutions, this Court
Court has steadfastly rejected any notion
'harmless."'
that constitutional
constitutional violations
violations might be disregarded
disregarded on the ground
ground that they were 'harmless.
'" Id.
ld. at 42.
The cases on which he relied
relied dealt
dealt with a long list of constitutional
constitutional provisions:
•- The due process right against the admission into evidence of an involuntary confession.
See Lynumn
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
(1963) (the argument "that
in
528, 537 (1963)
"that the error in
admitting
..is
doctrine"');
admitting such a confession
confession 'was
'was a harmless
harmless one .
...
is an impermissible
impermissible doctrine"');
Malinski v. New
New York, 324 U.S. 401,
401, 404 (1945);
(1945); Payne
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
560, 568
(1958); Spano v. New York, 360
315, 324
(1959); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
(1958);
360 U.S. 315,
324 (1959);
503,
518-19 (1963);
(1963); Jackson
376-77 (1964).
368,376-77
(1964).
503,518-19
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
76
•- The Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942);
(1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
(1961); White v. Maryland,
55 (1961);
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
(1963).
•* The due process
process right against participation
participation of a judge with
with a financial interest in the
510, 535 (1927).
(1927).
outcome of the case. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5\0,535
•- The due process
process protection against effect
effect of pervasive
pervasive negative
negative pretrial publicity
publicity on the
351-52 (1966).
jury. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-52
(1966). Cf Rideau v. Louisiana,
Louisiana,
(1963). See a/so
also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-44, 562-64 (1965)
373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963).
(1965)
(Warren,
J., concurring).
(Warren, C.J., concurring);
concurring); 593-94 (Harlan, 1.,
•* The due process protection
protection against jury instructions containing mandatory
mandatory
(1946).
presumptions. See Bollenbach
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15
614-15 (1946).
•* The doctrine
doctrine that convictions
convictions resting on both a valid and constitutionally
constitutionally invalid basis
are nevertheless
nevertheless illegitimate. See Stromberg v. California,
California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68
367-68 (1931);
(1931);
(1942).
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942).
Amendments' protection
•: And, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments'
protection against
against discrimination
discrimination in the
the
(1967).
grand and petit jurors. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
selection of grand
61.
groundwork for a harmless rule some years earlier, Snyder did not
61. Although Motes had laid the groundwork
rely on Motes for the proposition
constitutional error could be harmless. While
proposition that a constitutional
While the opinion did cite
Motes, it was not for that case's treatment of poor Columbus
Columbus as compared to his five luckier coConfrontation Clause. See Snyder,
Snyder, 291 U.S. at
defendants, but for details about the application
application of the Confrontation
107.
\07.
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makes clear that the basis for the decision was the conditional nature
of the rule rather than an application
application of the harmless error doctrine. In
62
v. Stincer.
1987 case,
issue in
explicit
fact, this was an explicit issue
in aa 1987
case, Kentucky
Kentucky v.
Stincer. 62
Stincer
Stincer also dealt with a defendant who was prohibited from
competency hearing
attending a pretrial
pretrial proceeding,
proceeding, in his case a competency
hearing for
two child witnesses held outside
outside the presence
presence of the jury.
concluding that the defendant's absence did not violate the
In concluding
Snyder rule, the Court found it necessary to respond to Justice
Marshall's
Marshall's complaint
complaint in dissent that "the propriety of the decision to
exclude respondent from this critical stage of his trial should not be
evaluated in light of what transpired
transpired in his absence. To do so
transforms
the
issue
from
whether
a due process violation has
transforms
63 Justice
occurred into whether the violation
violation was harmless."
harmless. ,,63
Blackmun's majority
majority opinion
opinion directly
directly answered this charge:
We do not address the question whether harmless-error
harmless-error analysis
analysis
applies in the situation
situation where a defendant
defendant is excluded from a
critical stage of the proceedings
proceedings in which his presence would
contribute to the fairness of the proceeding. In this case,
respondent simply has failed to establish that his presence
presence at the
competency hearing would have contributed
contributed to the fairness of the
competency
proceeding. He thus fails to establish, as an initial matter, the
64
presence
presence of a constitutional
constitutional deprivation.
deprivation. 64
and the Prosecutor's
Obligationto Reveal
3. Due Process
Process and
Prosecutor's Obligation
Exculpatory
Exculpatory Evidence
conditional rule to make its appearance
appearance also sprung from
The next conditional
Snyder, the complaint
the Due Process Clause. As in Snyder,
complaint was not
specific provisions
of
something addressed
addressed by one of the specific
provisions of the Bill of
"free standing"
Rights. It was, rather, a "free
standing" due process dictate-this one
65
directed to the prosecutor.65
It dealt with the obligation to disclose
62. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
(1987).
63.
63. Id.
Id. at 754 (Marshall,
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
!d. at 747.
65.
Processand
and Criminal
CriminalProcedure:
Supreme Court's
Court'sSearch
65. Jerold Israel, Free
Free Standing
Standing Due Process
Procedure: The Supreme
Search
for
Interpretive Guidelines,
Guidelines,45 ST. LoUIS
LouIs L.J. 303 (2001).
(2001).
for Interpretive
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exculpatory information to the defense. In 1985, the Court eventually
exculpatory
prosecutors to reveal exculpatory
cast this rule in a form that required prosecutors
information
prior
to
significance in the context of the
information
trial only if its significance
evidence
evidence that was eventually admitted against the defendant
defendant was so
great that it would raise a reasonable
reasonable probability that the defendant
66
would have been acquitted. 66 The rule, however, did not emerge in
this format fully formed as a conditional one.
67 Mooney
The path it took began in 1935,
1935, in Mooney v. Holohan.
Holohan. 67
was a habeas corpus case based on a claim that the state's entire case
perjured testimony. This
rested on the prosecutor's
prosecutor's knowing use of perjured
was the Court's first occasion
occasion to find in the Due Process
Process Clause any
constitutional
rule
limiting
the
power
of
a
prosecutor.
A unanimous
constitutional
Court concluded
concluded that due process:
[C]annot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if
a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant
defendant of
liberty
liberty through a deliberate
deliberate deception of court and jury by the
68
known
.
f
·
be perjured.
. d.68
testimony
of
presentation
presentation 0 testImony 1m
own to
to be
peIJure

Mooney did not present
present the Court with an occasion
occasion to consider
consider
whether
requirement into the definition
whether to incorporate
incorporate a prejudice requirement
definition of
of
its new rule, since there
there was no factual dispute about
about the habeas
corpus
petition's
claim
that
the
entire
prosecution
corpus petition's
entire prosecution case
case consisted of
of
subomed perjury. The same was true the next time the issue appeared
appeared
suborned
Kansas. 69 But a case
case that arose in the
seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas.
concerned to
1950s, Napue v. Illinois,
Illinois, indicated
indicated that
that the
the Court
Court was concerned
some degree with the
of
the effect
effect that a prosecutor's
prosecutor's knowing use 70of
evidence. 7o
perjured
perjured testimony
testimony had
had on
on the
the jury's
jury's evaluation
evaluation of
of all
all the
the evidence.
Napue dealt with a prosecutor
prosecutor who allowed
allowed aa witness to lie not
about
about what the defendant
defendant had done, as was the case in the earlier
earlier
66.
67.
68.
69.
69.
70.
70.

United
United States
States v. Bagley, 473
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
(1985).
Mooney
Mooney v. Holohan,
Holohan, 294
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
(1935).
Id.
Id. at
at 112.
112.
Pyle
Pyle v. Kansas,
Kansas, 317
317 U.S.
U.S. 213 (1942).
(1942).
Napue
Napue v. Illinois,
Dlinois, 360 U.S.
U.S. 264
264 (1959).
(1959).
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background that
decisions, but about something in the witness's background
affected
affected his credibility. In extending the Mooney decision to this
context, the Court addressed the state's contention that it was bound
"the false testimony
determination in the state court that "the
by a factual determination
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of
could not in any reasonable
of
71
jury.',7i Rather
Rather than rejecting the contention
contention as irrelevant
irrelevant to the
the jury."
federal claim, the Court made its own examination
examination of the record and
concluded
concluded that "the false testimony used by the State in securing the
conviction
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the
72
trial.,,72
trial."
A standard that asks a court reviewing a conviction
conviction to determine,
Napue requires, whether the evidence "may
as Napue
"may have had an effect on
on
the trial"
trial" places
places it in exactly
exactly the same position it occupies when it
considers whether to apply the harmless error rule that was first
"whether
Fahy v. Connecticut
Connecticut eight years afterward:
afterward: "whether
articulated in Fahy
complained of
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
evidence complained
of
73
conviction." For this reason, a court
might have contributed
contributed to the conviction.,,73
of
considering a case dealing with the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony would never have to choose between a conditional
perjured
rule and harmless error. The process
process of applying the relevant
relevant legal
doctrine to the facts would always be the same.
As a result, neither Mooney nor any of its progeny
progeny interpreting
interpreting the
rule preventing prosecutors from using perjured
perjured testimony
testimony ever truly
truly
cast it in conditional form. That opportunity came,
came, however, when
when
extending the Mooney line of cases to
the Court had to consider extending
situations where the prosecutor's
prosecutor's actions consisted of withholding
withholding
evidence that should have been revealed
evidence
revealed rather than presenting
presenting
evidence
evidence that never should have come to the attention of the jury.
71. Id.
at 271.
271.
71.
Id. at
72. Id.
Id. at
at 272.
272. The context in which the Supreme Court was
was asked toto decide
decide this issue isis much
narrower than the
the one that it subsequently
subsequently adopted
adopted as
as part of
of the test for
for aa prosecutor's
prosecutor's obligation to
the lllinois
Illinois Supreme
Supreme Court
Court concluded
exculpatory evidence.
reveal exculpatory
reveal
evidence. In Napue,
Napue, the
concluded that there
there "was no
constitutional
constitutional infirmity
infirmity by virtue of
of the
the false
false statement," because the
the witness subsequently admitted
admitted that
he
had been
he had
been promised that
that efforts would
would be
be made
made toto see
see that he
he would
would receive aa reduced sentence ifif he
testified
testified against Napue. Napue v. Illinois,
lllinois, 150 N.E.2d 613, 615
615 (1958).
(1958). This makes
makes Napue close to
to aa
case
case where
where the
the question is whether the
the witness
witness retracted his
his lie rather than one that looks
looks at whether
whether the
the
lie
was sufficiently important
lie was
important to have affected
affected the jury's decision
decision toto convict.
86-87 (1963).
73. Fahy
Fahy v.v. Connecticut,
Connecticut, 375
375 U.S.
U.S. 85, 8Cr87
(1963).
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The case that the Court used as a vehicle to reach this issue was
Maryland.74
Brady v. Maryland.
74 Brady was tried for capital murder and
overwhelming evidence,
evidence, his defense
sentenced to die. In the face of overwhelming
attorney's strategy was to concede his client's culpability but argue to
the jury that they should spare him the death penalty. Brady, in fact,
testified that he and a joint venturer, Boblit, both participated
participated in the
robbery that led to the death of the victim but that Boblit, who was
tried separately, was the actual killer.
In an effort to find information that would have bolstered this
strategy, defense counsel had requested prior to the trial the discovery
of any of Boblit's statements
statements the prosecution
prosecution had in its possession.
Several were, in fact, produced. But not until after his conviction did
Brady find out that the prosecutor withheld
withheld the only statement that
Brady would have really wanted to see-the one where
where Boblit
collateral attack in state court, Brady got
admitted the homicide. In a collateral
sentence vacated, leaving the underlying
conviction
the death sentence
underlying murder conviction
75
intact. 75
The Supreme Court's articulation of the rule governing situations
like Brady's left room for an interpretation
interpretation that it was a conditional
"We now hold that the suppression
suppression by the prosecution
of
one: "We
prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused
evidence
accused upon request violates due process
process
where the evidence is material
material either to guilt or to punishment,
76 The
irrespective
irrespective of the good
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.,
prosecution.,,76
"material."
key word is "material."
The Brady opinion
opinion gave
gave no definition
definition of the term. It is likely that
Justice Douglas meant it simply in its usual courtroom
courtroom evidentiary
evidentiary
sense-to
connote
nothing
more
than
evidence
sense-to connote
more
evidence that is germane
germane to the
fact at issue. In
In this way, it serves to shed
shed light on what the Court
meant by "evidencefavorable
"evidence favorable to an accused."
accused."
The Brady Court's application
application of its rule
rule to the facts of the case
case
before it is also consistent
with
this
understanding.
The
Court
left
consistent with
understanding. The
left the
underlying murder
murder conviction
conviction standing and affirmed
affirmed the lower court's
court's
74.
74.
75.
75.
76.

Brady
Brady v. Maryland,
Maryland, 373
373 U.S. 83
83 (1963).
(1963).
Brady
v. State,
174 A.2d
167 (Md.
Bradyv.
State, 174
A.2d 167
(Md. 1961).
1961).
Brady,
Brady, 373
373 U.S.
U.S. at
at 87.
87.
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ruling vacating
vacating the imposition of the death penalty. In explaining this
split decision, Brady accepted, as it was obliged, the state court's
court's
interpretation of its own law of evidence and of the elements
interpretation
elements of its
substantive crimes. Boblit's confession was not admissible on the
accepted it as true,
question of Brady's guilt because
because even if the jury
jury accepted
elements of first
it would have done nothing to negate any of the elements
degree murder under Maryland law. It would, however, have been
admissible on the question of punishment.
In this light, Brady is not exactly a conditional
conditional rule. It could simply
simply
beforehand
mean that a prosecutor has the obligation
obligation of disclosing beforehand
evidentiary sense
any evidence whose character
sense
character met the terms of this evidentiary
eventually
of materiality, without regard for the proof that was eventually
admitted at trial. The rule morphed, however, in its subsequent
subsequent
appearances before the Court.
appearances
United States
States v.
The first part of the transformation
transformation came in United
Brady in
Agurs.77 Agurs dealt with a slightly different scenario than Brady
terms of the interaction between the defense and prosecution
prosecution prior to
the trial. Whereas Brady's attorney had specifically asked for the
Agurs'ss lawyer did not.
information that the prosecutor
prosecutor withheld, Agurs'
different
test for materiality,
This difference
led
the
Court
to
adopt
a
difference
Court
one that is expressly conditional.
Gaul,78 found that
The Agurs Court, like Caesar in his invasion of Gaul,78
the territory it considered was divided into three parts. The first,
knowing use of perjury, meant that the Napue
applied
Napue formulation applied
reasonable
and a conviction "must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood
likelihood that the false testimony
testimony could have affected
affected the judgment
judgment
79
jury.,,79 This formulation is essentially a harmless error
of the jury."
standard
standard that puts the burden on the prosecutor to show that the
80 The second, where the
conviction
conviction should not be overturned. 8o
77. United States v. Agurs, 427
(1976).
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
& Peter Wiseman Trans., (D.R. Godine
78.
JuLius CAESAR,
CAESAR, THE
THE BATTLE
78. JULIUS
BATILE FOR
FOR GAUL, Anne &
Godine 1980).
Id.at 103.
79. /d.
103.
(1999) (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting) ("We have
80. Strickler
Strickler v. Greene, 527
527 U.S. 263, 299
299 (1999)
suppression of the evidence
perjured-testimony cases with a showing that suppression
...
... equated
equated materiality in the peIjured-testimony
(1985)
was not hannless
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); United States v. Bagley, 473
473 U.S. 667, 679
679 (1985)
(Agurs
category stated a rule "in terms that
(Agurs first category
that treat the knowing use of perjured
peIjured testimony as error
error
subject to harmless-error
harmless-error review.").

Published by Reading Room, 2010

25
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 441 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

442

GEORGIA STATE
STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
REVIEW

(Vol.
[Vol. 26:2

prosecutor ignored a request for information specifically
specifically identifying
what the defense sought, requires the prosecutor
prosecutor to comply if the
information
information is material
material in the sense that Brady used the term-so that
"the suppressed evidence might have affected the result of the
"the
trial."'" The third, where the defense either made no request or
trial.,,8l
simply asked for exculpatory
exculpatory information
information in broad, nonspecific
nonspecific
8822
terms.
In this third category, the Court crafted
crafted a rule that required
required the
prosecutor
before
trial
prosecutor before
to evaluate how the significance
significance of the
evidence
omitted
evidence would appear
appear in context after the trial. "[I]f
"[I]f the omitted
evidence
evidence creates
creates a reasonable
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
otherwise exist,
constitutional
constitutional error has been committed. This means that the
83
context of
omission
omission must be evaluated in the context
of the
the entire
entire record.,
record. ,,83
Unlike the Brady formulation, this clearly is conditional.
Taking
Taking this backward
backward looking view, the prosecutor
prosecutor in Agurs did
did
nothing wrong by withholding
withholding information
information that the murder victim,
knife
Sewell, had several convictions for crimes of violence (using a knife
as the weapon) despite knowing that the defendant intended to rely
rely
on a claim of self defense
defense in the face of a knife attack by Sewell.
Knowing
Justices'
Knowing that the victim had a record would not, in the Justices'
minds, have created a reasonable doubt in light of the trial evidence
revealing
revealing that the victim had been84stabbed a number of times while
no injuries
had no
the defendant
injuries at
at all.
all. 84
defendant had
Agurs did not explain in any detail why it made the rule for this
exculpatory information
information conditional. Justice Stevens
category of exculpatory
pointed out that the problem of identifying
identifying what the Constitution
Constitution
requires
requires prosecutors
prosecutors to do arises at two different time frames: prior to
trial when the prosecutor has to decide whether to tum
turn something
over or not; and after trial when a judge has to determine if the
prosecutor's
prosecutor's inaction
inaction at the earlier stage violated the defendant's right

81. Agurs, 427
U.S. at 104.
81.
427 u.s.
82. Id.
Id. at 108.
83. Id.
Id. at 112.
84. Id.
Id. at
at 114
114 ("Sewell's
("Sewell's prior
prior record
record did
did not contradict
contradict any evidence offered by the prosecutor and
and
.... ").
").
was largely cumulative
cumulative ....
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85
to exculpatory
exculpatory infonnation.
information. 85
From there, he concluded
concluded that logic
86 "[U]nless
"[U]nless
required the rule to mean the same thing at both times. 86
the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial," Agurs states,
"there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set
aside; and absent a constitutional
constitutional violation, there was no breach of
of
disclose." 87 But it is not
the prosecutor's
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose.,,87
coherence of a constitutional rule
obvious why this insight into the coherence
requires that the Court adopt the post hoc vantage point rather than
the ex ante.
ante.
Perhaps more significant were the brief allusions in the opinion to
the difficulty the Court foresaw a non-conditional
non-conditional rule would create
"imprecise" the standard
for prosecutors. The opinion noted how "imprecise"
standard was
to identify exculpatory
exculpatory information
and
how
"the
significance
of an
infonnation
evidence can seldom
item of evidence
seldom be predicted accurately
accurately until the entire
88
complete."
The opinion went on to bemoan
record is complete.,,88
bemoan the
impracticality
non-conditional rule: "If everything
impracticality of a non-conditional
everything that might
influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor
prosecutor could
allow complete
discharge his constitutional
constitutional duty would be to 89
practice.'
routine
of
matter
a
as
files
a matter of routine practice.,,89
discovery of his
evidence
After Agurs, which
which category
category one placed
placed an exculpatory
exculpatory evidence
case in made
all
the
difference.
If
defense
counsel
specifically
defense
specifically
made
difference.
requested
information, courts would apply a less forgiving
requested the infonnation,
standard
Brady
standard than when counsel
counsel made no request or just asked for Brady
material
United States v.
material in general. However, nine years later, in United
90 the Court abandoned
Bagley,
categorization scheme
Bagley,90
abandoned its categorization
scheme and made
clear that there was only one rule governing a prosecutor's
prosecutor's obligation
obligation
to disclose
disclose exculpatory
exculpatory evidence-that
evidence-that it was
was conditional.
conditional.
Defense counsel
had requested
requested information
infonnation whether
whether
counsel in Bagley had
prosecution
witnesses
had
received
any
"deals,
promises
prosecution witnesses had received
"deals, promises or
91
inducements"
testify.91 The prosecution
prosecution failed
failed to disclose
disclose that its
inducements" to testify.

85. Id.
[d. at 107-08.
107-08.

108.

86. Id.
[d. at 108.
87. Id.
[d.

88.
89.
89.
90.
90.
91.
91.

Agurs, 427
427 U.S
U.S at 108.
108.
Id.
[d. at 109.
109.
United
United States
States v. Bagley, 473
473 U.S. 667
667 (1985).
(1985).
Id.
[d. at
at 669-70.
669-70.
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two principal
principal witnesses
witnesses had entered into written agreements
agreements with
federal law enforcement
enforcement authorities, literally titled a "Contract
"Contract for
Purchase
Therefore,"
Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefore,"
Purchase of Information
giving them money
money in92return for gathering information
information and testifying
testifying
defendant.
the
92
against
The Court of Appeals
Appeals relied on defense counsel's specific request
Brady test of materiality
as the trigger to apply the Brady
materiality rather than the
93
more forgiving Agurs conditional rule. Since information that these
witnesses
witnesses were paid informants would have been material
material to the issue
of the defendant's guilt, it meant that the prosecutor
prosecutor had violated
violated the
of
due process
process right of the defendant and left only the question of
turn, required
remedy. This, in tum,
required the court to apply the harmless error
94
94
application of this doctrine, the
rule. Casting about for the proper application
court reasoned
that
what
happened
here could never be harmless
reasoned
because it not only implicated the defendant's right under the Due
evidence but impaired his right
Process Clause to receive exculpatory
exculpatory evidence
Confrontation Clause to effectively
effectively cross examine
under the Confrontation
examine adverse
95
95 That was a
violation Supreme Court precedent
precedent had
witnesses.
placed outside the realm of harmless error. 96 It was, in other words,
subject to automatic
automatic reversal.
The Bagley decision
decision rejected
rejected the notion that harmless
harmless error was the
lens through which it was appropriate to consider what the prosecutor
prosecutor
had done. Rather than maintaining a separate regime for exculpatory
evidence
evidence cases depending on whether there has been a request or not,
the Court collapsed the two categories
categories and adopted a test from
Stricklandv. Washington,
Washington, an ineffective
ineffective assistance of counsel case:
Strickland
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
reasonable probability
that, had the evidence
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
of
the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable
"reasonable

92.
93.
93.
94.
95.
95.
96.

Id.
[d. at 687.
Bagley
1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983).
1983).
Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1463--64
Id.
[d. at 1463-64.
1463--64.
Id.
/d. at 1464.
1464.
See id.
(1974)).
id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
308, 318
318 (1974».
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probability" is a7 probability
probability sufficient to undermine confidence
confidence
9
outcome. 97
in the outcome.
As before,
before, the Court did not spend a lot of effort explaining why
the Constitution required
required a conditional rule even when the prosecutor
prosecutor
ignored defense
defense counsel's specific
specific request. It repeated
repeated the language
language
from Agurs about the basis for the rule being to ensure fundamental
fundamental
fairness. The opinion also claimed that any non-conditional rule
"a rule that the prosecutor
prosecutor commits
would be wildly impractical:
impractical: "a
error by any failure to disclose evidence
evidence favorable to the accused, no
matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden
burden on the
of
prosecutor and would undermine
undermine the interest in the finality of
98
judgments." Taking this straw-man
judgments.,,98
straw-man on its face, the Court went on to
comment that placing
this
type of obligation on prosecutors would
placing
fundamentally alter the adversary
adversary system, presumably
presumably a result that the
99
99
encompass.
not
could
Clause could not encompass.
Due Process Clause
application of its
The Bagley Court remanded the case for the application
newly announced
announced standard. A Ninth Circuit panel
panel of three former
so
trial judges
judges found that the impeachment
impeachment information was so
significant that it raised a reasonable probability
probability that the result of the
lOo
00
sentence
trial would have been different.'
different. Bagley, serving a federal sentence
0
on other charges, was never retried.
101
retried.' '

4. Due Process
and the Prosecutor's
Obligation to Avoid
Avoid
Process and
Prosecutor's Obligation
ImproperPre-Indictment
Delay
Improper
Pre-Indictment Delay
Prosecutors control the timing of much of the process that brings
defendants to justice. They have total control over the decision
decision
whether to charge someone with a crime
crime and when to initiate a
complaint or indictment. The Due Process
Process Clause provides
provides the limit
limit
complaint
on how long a prosecutor can wait in the pre-charge
stage
of
a
case
case
pre-charge
before initiating the process
process that brings the defendant
defendant into court. And
97.
98.
99.
100.
100.
101.
101.

Bagley, 473
Bagley,
473 U.S. at 682.
Id.
n.7.
Id. at
at 676
676 n.7.
Id.
Id.
Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798
F.2d 1297,
1297, 1300
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1985).
1985).
Bagley
798 F.2d
1300 n.2
n.2 (9th
United States v. Bagley,
Bagley, 837 F.2d
F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the governing rule that controls is conditional. The line of cases
cases
dealing with exculpatory
exculpatory evidence influenced
influenced the format of the rule
the Court crafted for pre-indictment
pre-indictment delay.
United States
States v. Marion,
In United
Marion, the government brought a case directly
directly
to the Court after the trial judge dismissed the indictment
indictment on the
three-year delay between the end of the defendant's
defendant's
ground that the three-year
criminal
criminal behavior
behavior and the return of the grand jury's true bill violated
violated
102
10
2
summarily rejected
The Court summarily
rejected this claim
claim
the Speedy
Speedy Trial Clause.
on the ground that the speedy trial rule only governed10 3the timing of
of
into court.
the process after a defendant
defendant is
is first
first brought
brought into
court. 103
However, that did not leave the timing of an indictment
indictment entirely
unregulated. In a brief passage in the opinion, the Court accepted the
government's
concession that due process
government's concession
process still served as a source for
preventing governmental
preventing
governmental overreaching. The resulting test had two
parts: first, a defendant
delayed
defendant had to show that the prosecutor
prosecutor delayed
bringing charges to gain a tactical advantage;
advantage; and second, citing both
Brady and Napue,
the delay "caused
Napue, the defendant had to show that
"caused
10 4
fair trial.',
[his] rights
substantial prejudice to
to [his]
rights to
to aa fair
trial. ,,104
Because
Because Marion
Marion had not yet been tried and had neither alleged nor
proved any actual prejudice, relying only on the generic possibility
that because
"memories will dim, witnesses
because of the delay "memories
witnesses become
lost,"'10 5 the Court found it easy to clear
inaccessible, and evidence
evidence be lost,,,105
the path for his trial. In light of the lack of any facts against which to
craft a more precise
precise standard, the Court left the issue without further
illumination.
One can glean the conditional
conditional nature of this rule, however, by
by
area
looking to statements the Court has made in the closely related area
component of a
of speedy trial law. Whereas prejudice
prejudice is a necessary
necessary component
pre-indictment delay, it is only one of the
due process
process claim based
based on pre-indictment
interests that the Speedy Trial Clause protects. However, in practical

102.

(1971).
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
U.S. 307 (1971).
103. Id.
!d. at 313.
104. Id.
Id. at 324 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373
(1963); Napue v. lllinois,
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
104.
373 U.S.
U.S. 83
83 (1963);
264
(1959)).
(1959».
Id. at 326.
105. Id
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the most important
important and
and almost
almost always
always the only
only interest
interest at
at
terms, itit is the
in speedy
speedy trial
trial case.
stake in
United States v.
What
What the Court
Court said about
about speedy trial
trial claims
claims in
in United
I06
°6
MacDonald applies equally
equally to claims
claims based
based on Marion:
Marion: "a
"a central
MacDonald"
interest served by
by the [due process
process rule dealing with
with pre-indictment
pre-indictment
interest
delay] is the protection
protection of the factfinding
factfinding process
process at trial. The essence
essence
[Marion] claim in the usual
usual case
case is that the passage
passage of
of time has
of a [Marion]
ability to establish
establish his innocence
innocence of the crime
crime charged.
charged.
frustrated his ability
that that claim
claim may
may fairly be
be
Normally, it is only after trial that
10 7
assessed."J07
The necessity
necessity for a post-trial
post-trial evaluation
evaluation is the hallmark
hallmark
assessed."'
of a conditional rule.

Obligation of
of the Prosecutor
Prosecutor Not to Impair
Impair the Sixth
5. The Obligation
Compulsory Process
Amendment's Right to Compulsory
Process
guarantees that a defendant
defendant will have
Amendment guarantees
The Sixth Amendment
"compulsory
process
for
obtaining
witnesses
in
his favor."J08
favor."'0 8 There
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
must also be a rule that prevents
prevents the prosecutor from obstructing
obstructing the
defendant's efforts
efforts to bring witnesses into court. Otherwise,
Otherwise, it would
defendant's
obligation of a judge
be too easy for the government to frustrate the obligation
Compulsory Process
to give the defendant
defendant the benefit of what the Compulsory
Process
Clause requires. When a prosecutor
prosecutor contemplates
contemplates action that will
make a potential defense
defense witness unavailable, however, she only has
defendant's access to those witnesses for
to avoid hindering the defendant's
whom the defendant can establish there was "a reasonable
reasonable likelihood
likelihood
of
of
the
trier of
that the testimony could have affected
affected the judgment
judgment
fact,,109_
fact" °-0 a standard that makes the rule conditional.
ValenzuelaStates v. ValenzuelaUnited States
In constructing this rule, the Court, in United
Bernal, borrowed
borrowed heavily from the exculpatory evidence
evidence cases, 1as0
Bernal,
'
cases. IIO
trial cases.
speedy
the
and
delay
pre-indictment
undue
the
as
well
pre-indictment delay and the speedy trial
transporting aliens into the country
Valenzuela involved a charge of transporting
Valenzuela
illegally. The defendant was arrested along with three Mexican
Mexican aliens
106.
107.
108.
108.
109.
110.

United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850
850 (1978).
(1978).
Id. at 860.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
U.S. 858, 874 (1982).
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S.
United States
Id.
Id.
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after fleeing from the car he was driving when he first came to the
attention
interviewed
attention of Border Patrol agents. All of the aliens were interviewed
by federal law enforcement
enforcement authorities. One of them was held to
serve
deported
serve as a witness against the defendant. The other two were deported
before defense counsel had an opportunity
opportunity to interview them.
The Court's precedents
compulsory process were
precedents on the right to compulsory
principle much like
sparse, but from them Valenzuela could extract a principle
the one that animated the limit that Brady contemplated. The
defendant must first establish that a witness, whose testimony would
would
be the subject of compulsory
compulsory process, would have something to say
that could help the defendant on an issue material to the case against
against
compulsory
III' Beyond this rather minimal test, however, the compulsory
him. 11
process
process cases
cases could not go.
The Court, however, had a body of law from other parts of the
"the
Constitution that it thought related because they also dealt with "the
12
constitutionally guaranteed
area of constitutionally
access
to
evidence.,
Thus,
the
guaranteed
evidence. ,,112
exculpatory evidence case, Marion,
Marion, which
which
Court looked to Agurs, the exculpatory
113
v. Wingo,l13
Wingo, a speedy trial
dealt with pre-indictment
pre-indictment delay and Barker
Barker v.
Valenzuela noted, the defendant
defendant had to
case. In each of these areas, Valenzuela
establish prejudice
prejudice to his ability to mount a defense in order to make
14
So it
out a case that the constitutional
constitutional rule had been violated. 114
compulsory process. Although the Court did not rule
would be with compulsory
prosecutor
out the possibility that a determination of whether the prosecutor
violated the rule of compulsory process
process could be made prior to trial,
in practical
terms
it
is
hard
to
see
how a prosecutor
practical
prosecutor can know at the
point in the process when a decision has to be made whether
whether
deportation of a potential defense witness would violate the
defendant's rights. "Because
"Because determinations
materiality are often
often
defendant's
determinations of materiality
best made in light of all of the evidence
adduced
at
trial,"
then
Justice
evidence adduced trial,"
Rehnquist wrote, "judges may wish to defer
defer ruling on motions until
'
15
presentation of evidence.,,1l5
evidence."
after the presentation
Though phrased
phrased in terms of a
111.
Ill.
112.
113.
113.
114.
115.
lIS.

Id. at 867.
ld.
867.
Id. at 867...{j8.
867-68.
ld.
Barker
(1972).
Barker v. Wingo, 407
407 U.S. 514
514 (1972).
Valenzuela, 458
458 U.S. at 868.
Id.at874.
ld. at 874.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/7
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 448 2009-2010

32

Rossman: Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland Mee

2010]
20101

CONDITIONAL RULES
RULES IN
IN CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE
CONDITIONAL

449

practical terms there
there is often
often no other option
option than
than to
suggestion, in practical
wait
prosecutor has violated
violated the rule. ItIt
wait until after
after trial
trial to
to decide
decide if a prosecutor
is, for all intents and purposes, conditional.
Counsel and the Defense
6. The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel
Obligation to Provide
Provide Effective
Effective Assistance
Attorney's Obligation

aspect of the Sixth Amendment's
Amendment's guarantee
guarantee of the right to
One aspect
counsel is a quality
quality control
control feature. Ever
Ever since the Court's first
first
dimension of
of the right to
encounter in 1935 with the constitutional
constitutional dimension
encounter
116
Alabama,116
the
counsel in the landmark
landmark decision.
decision in Powell v. Alabama,
"Scottsboro
Boys" case, it has recognized
recognized that in order to serve the
"Scottsboro Boys"
contemplated by the Sixth Amendment,
function contemplated
Amendment, defense attorneys
attorneys in
competence.
standard
meet
a
minimum
of
competence.
cases
criminal
cases
must
meet
minimum
standard
criminal
This feature of the Sixth Amendment
Amendment makes it unique among
among
constitutional rules because
because the actor whose behavior
behavior is subject to
constitutional
conventional way.
evaluation does not exercise state power
power in any conventional
evaluation
While some defense
defense attorneys do work for the state, as full time
public defenders, and others may take on the role of quasi-public
accepting a court appointment
appointment to represent an
employees by virtue of accepting
employees
indigent defendant, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of what has
indigent
come to be known as the effective assistance of counsel applies as
117
pockets. 117
own pockets.
of their
out of
well to lawyers hired by defendants
their own
defendants out
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, it does make sense to talk about the Sixth
Amendment
Amendment as a rule that is directed toward the behavior of even
their
private actors. Their behavior in conducting the defense of their
these private
clients will determine the legitimacy of the process that the state has
initiated in its attempt to impose a criminal sanction. Certainly, if the
process ends in a conviction
conviction in which a private lawyer failed to
process
of counsel, the government may not
assistance
effective
provide effective
defendant of life, liberty, or property
legitimately deprive the defendant
consistent with the Sixth Amendment. And, even if the defendant is
acquitted despite the bumbling efforts of an incompetent lawyer, one
may certainly argue that defendant failed to receive some benefit that
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
(1932).
Alabama, 287
116. Powell v. Alabama,
116.
(1980).
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).
117. Cuyler v.
117.
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the Sixth Amendment incorporates. When one looks closer, however,
the
at the details of the rule
rule that defines competence one finds that the
at
Court has chosen a conditional format. Unless the lawyer's
lawyer's
incompetence in
in fact
fact deprived the defendant of a reasonable
opportunity to achieve aa better result,
result, not even the starkest
incompetence violates the Sixth Amendment's rule requiring
effective assistance of counsel.
Powell and the right to counsel cases that followed over the next
fifty years in the Supreme Court never fleshed out the test by which
one could determine if a defendant received the effective assistance
18 Strickland
of counsel that the Sixth Amendment required.1118
Strickland v.
9
UT
h'
h
C
.
fi
.
119
Washington
its first
opportunity.ll
rr
as mgton gave the
t e Court
ourt Its
lrst OppOrtunIty.
David Leroy Washington was represented
represented by a court-appointed
lawyer in a capital, multiple-murder
multiple-murder case in a Florida state court.
Against
Washington not only pled guilty to the
Against his lawyer's
lawyer's advice, Washington
murders
murders but chose
chose to waive a jury in the sentencing
sentencing hearing that
followed the plea by a week. Defense
Defense counsel, admitting
admitting later that he
was overcome
at
that
point
in
the
case
by
a
overcome
sense of hopelessness,
hopelessness,
120
ceased
In
ceased his efforts to investigate
investigate the defendant's background. 12o
In
preparation
preparation for the proceeding
proceeding which would decide
decide his client's fate,
he only spoke
spoke to two people who could provide
provide insight into his
background:
the
defendant's
wife
mother.
and
And he spoke to them
background:
defendant's
them
1211
12
over
telephone, not
Counsel's performance
performance at the
over the telephone,
not in person. Counsel's
sentencing
sentencing hearing-which
hearing-which was the
the subject of Washington's
Washington's claim
claim
that he did not
of counsel-was
not receive
receive effective
effective assistance of
perfunctory.
He
failed
to
request
a
pre-sentence
perfunctory. He
pre-sentence investigation
investigation by
by the
probation
probation department,
department, presented
presented no evidence
evidence of his own, and
and did not
not
cross-examine
or the
cross-examine the
the witnesses
witnesses the prosecutor
prosecutor presented
presented
the medical
medical
122
122
injunies.
victims'
the
about
testified
experts
experts who testified about the victims' injuries.
The
The only
only sign
sign that defense
defense counsel
counsel was
was actively
actively engaged
engaged as an
advocate
was
his
objection
to
the
prosecutor's
effort
to
advocate
his objection to
prosecutor's effort to introduce
introduce the
118.
118.
119.
119.
120.
120.
121.
121.
122.
122.

Powell
Powell v.
v. Alabama,
Alabama, 287
287 U.S.
U.S. 45
45 (1932).
(1932).
Strickland
668 (1984).
(1984).
Strickland v.
v. Washington,
Washington, 466
466 U.S.
U.S. 668
Id.
Id. at
at 672.
672.
Id.
Id. at
at 673.
673.
Id.
Id.
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record of the defendant's
defendant's prior criminal history, which was offered to
of
prove that the defendant
defendant was a danger to commit further crimes of
123
123
lawyering legerdemain was accomplished
accomplished
This piece of lawyering
violence.
by objecting on the ground that the document the prosecutor was
trying to get in as evidence
evidence had not been properly
properly certified. This
might
otherwise seem in
it
accomplishment is less impressive than
accomplishment
light of the fact that defense counsel had already asked the judge to
spare his client's life on the ground that he had no history of criminal
124
activity. 124
Washington's attorney been more diligent in trying to
Had Washington's
discover information that might have swayed
swayed the judge to find some
reason to sentence him to life imprisonment instead of death, he
would have discovered, as did the lawyers who represented
represented him in
acquaintances and neighbors,
federal court, a lot. At least fourteen acquaintances
aberration
including a police officer, would have vouched
vouched for what an aberration
pressure Washington
Washington was
this spree of violence was and the financial pressure
12 5
addition, he could have found expert
under at the time. 125 In addition,
conviction
witnesses, like the two psychologists discovered by post conviction
counsel, who would have testified that26at the time of the murders the
1
depressed. 126
chronically depressed.
defendant was chronically
Strickland announced
Strickland
announced a two part test by which to judge the
attorney's efforts. One part was
adequacy of a defense
defense attorney's
constitutional adequacy
to evaluate
evaluate counsel's efforts, as the situation
situation appeared at the time in
which they were undertaken,
undertaken, against a standard of reasonableness
reasonableness
127
127
Nothing about this, so far,
under prevailing professional
professional norms.
half of the test did.
rule.
But
the
second
makes it a conditional
conditional
In addition to showing that counsel performed unreasonably, the
constitutional
constitutional rule the Court crafted requires a showing of prejudice.
Justice O'Connor began her discussion of why this is so by noting
"[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
that "[a]n
professionally unreasonable, does
Id.
123. Id.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
673. While it may not be obvious to the reader of this account, it must
124. Strickland,
have
have been obvious to the judge
judge that Washington
Washington did, in fact, have a criminal record because the judge
evidentiary grounds.
defendant's rap sheet on evidentiary
had excluded
excluded the defendant's
125. Id.
Id. at 675.
126. Id.
Id. at 675-76.
127. Id.
Id. at 688.
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not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding
proceeding if the
error had no effect on the judgment,"
judgment,"
a proposition for which she
28
128
Morrison.1
v.
States
United
cited United States v. Morrison.
Morrison
Morrison was an interesting
interesting choice for this purpose. It involved the
Court's review of the dismissal of an indictment because federal law
enforcement
enforcement agents had contacted
contacted the defendant after her indictment
indictment
in order to persuade her to cooperate
cooperate with their investigation against a
bigger fish. It appears that the DEA agents involved
involved saw the key to
their success
success to be getting Ms. Morrison to jettison her attorney,
particularly hospitable
whom they believed would not have been particularly
hospitable to
129
1
29
their suggestion. In order to accomplish their end, they disparaged
disparaged
her attorney's
merit
and
urged
her
to
replace
him
with
a public
attorney's
replace
defender whom they thought more pliant. The government, once the
case reached
reached the Supreme Court, urged the Justices to hold that,
absent a showing of actual prejudice, the actions of its agents did not
even violate the Sixth Amendment.
Amendment. The Court, however, assumed
without deciding that what the stalwarts
stalwarts from the DEA did was in
constitutional rule, but agreed that it need not
fact a violation of the constitutional
be remedied by dismissing the indictment since Morrison could
could not
130
prejudice of any kind.
show prejudice
agents'
kind.l3o She had not only resisted the agents'
entreaties
to
ditch
her
attorney,
but
promptly
told
him
what
they
were
entreaties
up to and stood by his subsequent
subsequent efforts on her behalf.
behalf.
Morrison's
Morrison's use of prejudice, then, is all about when you get a
remedy and not about defining
of
defining the rule which sets the boundaries
boundaries of
acceptable
behavior
for
government
agents
in
the
sphere
of
acceptable behavior
government
sphere of
interfering
interfering with a defendant's relationship
relationship to her attorney.
Strickland cited it as a basis for incorporating
Nevertheless, Strickland
incorporating the
question of prejudice into the defmition
definition of the right.
Strickland
offered
a
number
of reasons that prejudice was
Strickland
necessary
definitional matter. Of primary
primary importance
importance was the
necessary as a definitional
underlying value that the right to effective
effective
Court's view of the underlying
Amendment
served: "The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
assistance of counsel served:

128.
128.
129.
129.
130.

Id.
361, 365 (1981».
(1981)).
Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
361, 362 (1981).
United States
States v. Morrison,
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
(1981).
Id.
Id at 365.
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guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.
Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute
ineffective assistance
prejudicial
constitute ineffective
13
1
Constitution." Pragmatic concerns played a role as well.
under the Constitution."l3I

The government is not responsible
responsible for, and hence not able to
conviction
prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction
or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as
likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial. They cannot
of
cannot be classified according to likelihood of
causing
causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient
sufficient
precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct
to avoid. Representation
Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is
unprofessional
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another. Even if a defendant
defendant shows that particular errors of
of
counsel were unreasonable,
unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show
show
132
132
defense.
the
on
effect
adverse
an
that they actually had
had an adverse effect on the defense.
For the standard
standard by which a court was to judge the defendant's
defendant's
claim
prejudice, Strickland
Strickland borrowed
borrowed from Agurs and Valenzuelaclaim of prejudice,
Bernal.
The
defendant
must
show that there
Bernal.
there is a reasonable
reasonable
probability
probability that the attorney's
attorney's inadequate
inadequate representation
representation adversely
adversely
133
33
affected
proceeding. Using
Using this standard,
standard, the Court
affected the result of the proceeding.'
concluded
evidence that Strickland said his trial
concluded that none of the evidence
lawyer
should
have
developed
would have led to a sentencing
lawyer
have
sentencing profile
134
eventual
his
to
very much different than
than the
the one
one which
which led
led to his eventual death.
death. 134

131.
131. Strickland,
Strickland, 466
466 U.S. at 692.
132. Id.
[d. at 693.
133. Id.
[d. at 694.
134.
of
134. Id.
[d. at 700. Once
Once a court
court isis convinced
convinced that
that aa defense
defense attorney
attorney has
has performed
performed incompetently,
incompetently, of
course,
course, it increases
increases the probability
probability that
that the
the defendant
defendant will
will be hampered
hampered in her effort
effort to show
show the
the lawyer's
lawyer's
incompetence
of the trial since,
since, as Justice
Justice Marshall
Marshall noted
noted in
in his dissent,
incompetence adversely
adversely affected
affected the
the result
result of
"evidence
of injury
injury to
to the
the defendant
defendant may
may be
be missing
missing from
from the
the record
record precisely
precisely because
because of
of the
the
"evidence of
incompetence
incompetence of
of defense
defense counsel."
counsel." Id.
[d. at
at 710.
710.
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Counseland
andthe Responsibility
Responsibility
7.7. The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel
Judge to Ensure
That the Defendant's
of a Judge
Ensure That
Defendant's Attorney Is Not Subject
Conflict ofInterest
to a Conflict
Another part of the problem of defining competent defense counsel
counsel
comes in the context of conflict of interest. Ten years after Powell,
Powell,
Glasser
v.
United
States
established
that
"the
'assistance
of
counsel'
Glasser United States
'assistance counsel'
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
Amendment contemplates that such
guaranteed
assistance be untrammeled
untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring
assistance
that one lawyer shall simultaneously
simultaneously represent conflicting
' 135
interests."
interests." 135
When a defendant or a lawyer, prior to trial, objects
objects to the
appointment
appointment of an attorney on the ground that the lawyer
lawyer cannot
provide objective, unconflicted representation, the Glasser
Glasser rule
requires
the
judge
to
act,
either
by
counsel or
either
appointing separate counselor
requires
investigating to ensure
ensure that the risk posed by joint representation
representation is
too remote. This rule is not conditional. The judge can
can determine
determine if
if
requiring
requiring the defendant to be represented by the attorney alleged to
have
have aa conflict of interest would
would violate
violate the Constitution or not at the
time that she makes the decision, ruling
ruling on the facts that were
brought to her attention.
But where the facts known
known to the judge prior to trial make it
apparent
apparent that a lawyer
lawyer appointed
appointed to represent the defendant
defendant serves
serves
conflicting
interests,
if
neither
the
lawyer
nor
her
client
objects,
the
conflicting interests,
lawyer
Constitution's mandate
mandate is conditional. The failure of the judge to act
in the face of the facts available
available to her may, or may not, violate
violate the
rule
that
governs
rule
governs in this situation.
This conditional
conditional rule appeared
appeared in Mickens v. Taylor,
Taylor, a 2002
1136
36
decision.
The
decision.
The juvenile
juvenile court
court judge
judge who was
was responsible
responsible for
appointing
the murder
murder charge
charge he
appointing a lawyer
lawyer to represent
represent Mickens
Mickens on the
faced had
had to have
have been
been struck by the coincidence
coincidence of the victim's
victim's
identity. She
had
appointed
a
lawyer
for
the
victim
on
weapons
She
appointed lawyer
weapons and
assault
assault charges
charges just seventeen
seventeen days
days earlier
earlier and had dismissed
dismissed those

135.
135. Glasser
Glasser v.
v. United States,
States, 315
315 U.S.
U.S. 60,
60, 70
70 (1942).
(\ 942).
136.
v. Taylor,
Taylor, 535
535 U.S.
U.S. 162
162 (2002).
(2002).
136. Mickens
Mickens v.
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137
charges when the victim's body was discovered. 137
The very next
day, however, she called the lawyer she had appointed for the victim
and asked him to "do her a favor" and represent
represent the person who was
138
38
client.' The lawyer did not object to
charged with killing his former client.
being placed in a situation that might compromise his ability to
represent Mickens and Mickens himself did not discover the conflict
conflict
139
death. 139
sentenced to
and sentenced
convicted and
until after he was convicted
to death.
In these circumstances,
circumstances, the majority held, Mickens's right to
depended on his establishing that
effective assistance of counsel depended
some action the lawyer took after
after being appointed was adversely
adversely
affected by the lawyer's prior representation of the murder victim.
The message to judges charged
charged with appointing lawyers in criminal
serves
cases is a conditional
conditional one: even if you are aware
aware that a lawyer serves
conflicting
interests,
your
failure
to
act
will
only
violate
the
Sixth
conflicting
violate
Amendment if the lawyer's
Amendment
lawyer's
subsequent behavior shows some effect
effect
40
1
conflict.
the
to
traceable the conflict. 140
Justice Scalia's opinion in Mickens offered
offered several reasons that the
rule should be a conditional one. One was the underlying
underlying purpose
purpose he
attributed to the right to counsel,
counsel, as in Strickland.
Strickland. The Constitution
Constitution
protects
protects defendants
defendants from being
being represented by lawyers
lawyers who have
divided interests
effect it has
interests "not for its own sake,
sake, but because
because of the effect
14 ' And the way
on the ability
ability of the accused
accused to receive a fair trial."'
trial.,,141
"fair trial"
trial" is to determine
that the Court can tell if a defendant had a "fair
if there are "defects
"defects in assistance that have [a] probable
probable effect upon
upon
' 142
outcome.,,142
the trial's outcome."
In conflict
conflict of interest
interest cases, though, the Court makes an exception
exception
to the rule that requires
requires a defendant
defendant to show an effect on the outcome.
outcome.
Unless
Unless the
the judge improperly overrules
overrules an objection
objection that has been
been
raised
prior
to
trial,
as
in
Glasser,
the
defendant
must
show
that
the
Glasser, the
show
raised prior
lawyer's
lawyer's divided
divided loyalties
loyalties had an effect
effect on some action
action the lawyer
lawyer

137.
137.
138.
138.
139.
139.
140.
140.
141.
141.
142.
142.

Id.
Id. at
at 164.
164.
Id.
/d. at
at 190n.1.
190 n.1.
Id.
/d. at
at 191.
191.
Id.
/d. at
at 173.
173.
Id.
658 (1984)).
/d. at
at 166
166 (citing
(citing United
United States
States v. Cronic, 466
466 U.S.
U.S. 648,
648,658
(1984».
Mickens,
Mickens, 535
535 U.S. at 166.
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43
outcome.1143
the outcome.
on the
took or neglected to take, but not a probable effect on
Since the lawyer's dual representation may make it impossible for the
defendant to show prejudice
prejudice in terms of outcome, all that the Court
lawyer's
looks for in this situation is a determination that the lawyer's
performance
was
adversely
affected
by
an
actual
conflict
of
interest.
performance
affected
consequence still leaves the rule in conditional form. And
This future consequence
in Justice Scalia's view, finding a violation of the rule from the facts
in Mickens would be cutting the right to counsel too far adrift from its
purpose of ensuring reliable results.
unnecessary to abandon a
Justice Scalia also believed that it was unnecessary
conditional rule in Mickens as a way of ensuring that judges
conscientiously carry out their obligation to ensure that a defendant
conscientiously
receives conflict
conflict free counsel. Judges, he assumed, are not "as
careless or as partial as those police officers who need the incentive
rule."144
of the exclusionary
exclusionary rule."I44
14 5
He saw a
Justice Souter's dissent addressed
addressed both these points. 145
non-conditional
rule
requiring
a
judge
non-conditional
to act whenever she learns that
regime."' 146
"sensible regime.,,146
the only
conflict the
defense counsel labors under
under aa conflict
only "sensible
"The best time to deal with a known threat to the basic guarantee
"The
guarantee of
of
fair trial,"
trial," he wrote, "is before the trial has proceeded
proceeded to become
become
147
unfair."'
The majority's position, he maintained, was "skewed
unfair.,,147
"skewed
48
responsibility.' 1148
recognizing judicial
against recognizing
judicial responsibility."
Justice Souter
Souter also took aim at the majority's defense
defense of a
conditional
conditional rule on the ground of the underlying
underlying value of the Sixth
Amendment
Amendment right to counsel:

Requiring
Requiring a criminal
criminal defendant
defendant to prove a conflict's adverse
adverse
effect in all no-objection
no-objection cases only makes sense
sense on the Court's
Court's
presumption
presumption that
that the Sixth Amendment
Amendment right against ineffective
ineffective
assistance of counsel
is
at
its
core
nothing
more
than
a
utilitarian
counsel
utilitarian

143.
143.
144.
144.
145.
145.
146.
146.
147.
147.
148.
148.

Id.
[d.
See
See id
id. at 173.
See
See id.
id. at 207
207 (Souter, J.,J., dissenting).
Id.
[d.
Id.
[d. at
at 203.
203.
Mickens, 535
535 U.S. at 208.
208.
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right against unprofessional errors that have detectable effects on
outcome....
[T]he right against ineffective
ineffective assistance of counsel
outcome
.... [T]he
has as much to do with public confidence in the professionalism
of lawyers as with the results of legal proceedings. A revelation
advocate could not place his client's interest above
that a trusted advocate
the interests of self and others in the satisfaction of his
professional responsibilities will destroy that confidence,
professional
149
of outcome.
outcome. 149
regardless of

C. Liability
LiabilityRules
C.
Conditional rules do not have to rely on a post hoc evaluation of
of
whether there is prejudice.
prejudice. Another
Another way to make a rule conditional is
to cast it as a liability rule. This type of rule allows the actor to
engage
engage in the conduct
conduct that it addresses but gives to the person whose
legal entitlement the act adversely affects
affects the right to obtain a
enforcement depends
remedy. The essence of a liability rule is that its enforcement
the person
person most closely affected
affected to ensure that the remedial
mechanism
accompanying
mechanism accompanying it is put into play.
It is, to pick a sports analogy closer to the American
American heart than
soccer, like the rule in baseball
baseball that requires
requires a base
base runner
runner to wait
wait
until a fly ball is caught before
before leaving the base to advance
advance her
her
position. If a runner
leaves
early, the individuals
runner
individuals charged
charged with
enforcing
enforcing the rule will not act on their own. It is up to the opposing
team to lodge an appeal which sets in motion the umpire's ruling that
150
out.150
therefore, OUt.
is, therefore,
early and
the runner left early
and is,
Liability rules play a major role in the law of torts, where
where they
they
represent
the
most
efficient
way
to
distribute
resources
when
represent
efficient
distribute resources
15 1 As a mechanism
negotiation
negotiation between
between the parties is not practical. 151
mechanism
for constitutional
constitutional rules, the most
most familiar
familiar example
example for this type of
of
152
1
52
format is the Takings
The Takings
Takings Clause.
Takings Clause does
does not
regulate when
or
how
or
under
what
conditions
the
government
when
what conditions
government may
149.
149. See id.
id. at
at 207.
207.
150.
ISO. See
See N.C.A.A. 2007
2007 BASEBALL
BASEBALL RULES
RULES AND
AND INTERPRETATIONS
INTERPRETATIONS Rule
Rule 8, § 6(a),
6(a), at
at 96-97.
96-97.
151.
and Inalienability:
lSI. See
See Guido
Guido Calabresi &
& A. Douglas Melamed,
Melamed, Property
Property Rules, Liability
Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:
One View
View of
ofthe Cathedral,
Cathedral, 85 HARV.
HARv. L.
L. REv.
REv. 1089
1089 (1972).
(1972).
152.
152. See
See U.S.
U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend. V.
V.
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take private property for public use. The rule only prescribes what the
53
property.1153
the property.
taken the
has taken
government must do after itit has
(dressing the defendant in prison
In three different situations (dressing
clothes at trial, asking a defendant on cross examination about
exercising Miranda
Mirandarights, and the police's confronting a person with
exercising
demanding that he or she submit), the Supreme Court
a show of force demanding
has crafted constitutional rules that operate
operate much like liability rules.
They depend on the reaction of the person who is the rule's intended
intended
beneficiary to determine if the governmental actor whom the rule
beneficiary
regulates has violated its precept. In each case, if the target does not
respond in the way necessary
necessary to define a violation of the rule, the
actor's behavior becomes
becomes unobjectionable.
unobjectionable. If,
If, on the other hand, the
target does react in the appropriate way, what the actor has done will
have violated the target's rights. In a fourth context, a prosecutor's
prosecutor's
evidence of a confession
introduction into evidence
confession by a codefendant
codefendant
implicating the defendant, the Court has molded a constitutional
constitutional rule
into an even more unwieldy format that resembles a liability rule but
differs in one respect. The rule depends on the future action of
of
someone other than the beneficiary
beneficiary of the rule to determine
determine the
government actor has done.
legitimacy of what the government
1. Due Process
Process and
and the Defendant's
Defendant's Right Not to Appear at Trial
Trial
in Prison
Clothes
Prison Clothes
free-standing dictates of the Due Process
A number of free-standing
Process Clause
Clause flow
bedrock
from the concept of the presumption of innocence. This bedrock
principle
has
implications
for
a
variety
of
facets
of
the
criminal
principle has implications
criminal trial
which a defendant
defendant may
may be deprived
deprived
system. It bears on the extent to which
1
54
of
of his liberty
liberty prior to conviction,
conviction,154 the instructions
instructions the jury receives
receives
about
the
significance
the fact that the defendant
defendant has been
been charged
charged
about
significance of the
155
with
a
crime,
and
the
requirement
that
prosecution
bear
the
burden
with crime,155 and
requirement
prosecution
burden
156
1
56
of
of proof
proof on each
each of its elements. It
It also comes into play
play when the
153.
153.
154.
154.
155.
155.
156.
156.

See
See discussion
discussion infra Part
Part ll.B.iv.
D.B.iv.
United
United States.
States. v.
v. Salerno,
Salerno, 481
481 U.S. 739
739 (1987).
(1987).
Taylor v. Kentucky,
Kentucky, 436
436 U.S. 478
478 (1978).
(1978).
Id.
Id
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jury is exposed to information that presents an unacceptable risk of
of
influencing them to convict the defendant not because of the strength
evidence but because
of the evidence
because of his status as someone accused of a
crime.
cnme.
Estelle v. Williams,
Williams, the Court considered
considered the implication of this
In Estelle
dynamic in a case in which the defendant was clothed in prison attire
157
throughout the course of his trial. 157
The court system in which
Williams was tried-Houston, Texas-routinely
Texas-routinely had defendants who
were held on bail appear
in
appear before the juries who sat on their cases in
distinctive, prison-issue clothing. The Court was aware of the
psychological
appearance: "The
psychological implications of a defendant's appearance:
"The
defendant's
defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence
throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of
of
deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an
unacceptable
unacceptable risk is presented
presented of impermissible
impermissible factors coming into
'9 158
play.
play.,,158 But, the rule the Court constructed to meet this danger was a
conditional
conditional one. It is only when a defendant
defendant objects that forcing him
him
59
Constitution.1159
violates the
clothes violates
prison clothes
wear prison
to wear
the Constitution.
Sometimes it makes sense that a rule requires
requires an objection be
raised by the protected
protected person before an act can constitute a violation.
The privilege against self-incrimination
self-incrimination protects
protects a person from
160
against himself."'
witness
"be[ing]
"be[ing] compelled
compelled .. .. .. to
to be
be aa witness against
himself.,,160
Compulsion
objectionable
Compulsion is part of the linguistic
linguistic formula and the objectionable
aspect of the government's
government's effort
effort to obtain information that it needs
161 When a witness is on the stand and is asked
to prosecute someone. 161
witness
a question
question that may lead to an incriminating
incriminating answer, the law
governing
governing the
the privilege
privilege requires the witness
witness to seek its protection
protection and
refuse to answer before being
being able to find shelter
shelter in its protection. If
If
the witness answers
without
having
first
asserted
the
privilege,
the
answers
having
privilege,
answer
compelled and therefore
answer is not
not compelled
therefore does not give rise to a
157.
157. Estelle
Estelle v.v. Williams,
Williams, 425
425 U.S.
U.S. 501
SOl (1976).
(1976).
158.
158. Id.
Id. at
at 505.
159.
159. Id.
Id. at
at 508.
160.
160. U.S.
U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend. V.
161.
161. See
See Schmerber
Schmerber v.v. California,
California, 384
384 U.S.
U.s. 757,
757, 761
761 (1966)
(1966) ("We
("We hold
hold the
the [self-incrimination]
[self-incrimination]
privilege
privilege protects
protects an
an accused
accused only
only from
from being
being compelled
compeUed toto testify
testify against
against himself.").
himself.").
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violation. As a result, the ordinary rule that governs the application
application of
of
the privilege does not prohibit a government official
prosecutor
official like a prosecutor
or judge from asking a witness a question that might tend to
incriminate. What the rule prohibits, however, is compelling someone
to answer over his or her objection. In other words, the rule's
rule's
162
162
claimed.
is
privilege
the
after
into play
protection
protection only comes into
play after the privilege is claimed.
Obviously, there is no similar linguistic reason for a rule that has
as its foundation in the Due Process
Process Clause. Estelle found another
basis for justifying
incorporation of a requirement
justifying the incorporation
requirement that the
defendant object. "[I]t
"[I]t is not an uncommon defense tactic,"
tactic," Chief
Chief
defendant
Justice Warren E. Burger wrote, "to produce the defendant in jail
sympathy from the jury....
clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy
jury.... Under our
adversary system, once a defendant
has
the
assistance
defendant
assistance of counsel the
vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be
made before and during trial rests with the accused
accused and his attorney.
Any other approach
approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and
system."'163
counsel in our legal system.,,163
There is a familiar doctrine that holds defendants to strategic
strategic
consciously choose not to
choices by which they, or their attorneys, consciously
waiver. 164
of waiver.l64
concept of
the concept
course,
of
is,
That
rights.
assert underlying
is, of course, the
If a defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses to forego a
otherwise provide, the criminal
protection that the Constitution would otherwise
justice system is under no obligation to remedy the rule violation that
preceded the waiver. But this is not the basis on which the Court
preceded
65 Under a waiver approach, the
decided Estelle.
Estelle. 1165
Under
Court would have
recognized that the judge's
defendant appear in
recognized
judge's decision
decision to have the defendant
in
prison clothes was a violation of due process and placed on the State
the burden of showing that the defendant
defendant waived this right. There was
nothing in the record to indicate in the slightest that the defendant
1 66
of the
front of
in front
clothes in
wanted to wear prison clothes
the jury.
jury. 166
infra Part I.D.ii.
162. See discussion
discussion infra
163. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.
163.
512.
(1993) ("[W]aiver
("[W]aiver is the 'intentional
'intentional
164. See United States
States v. Olano,
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
733 (1993)
relinquishment
abandonment of a known
right."') (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
relinquishment or abandonment
known right."')
(1938)).
(1938)).
165. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.
165.
512.
166. Id
Id.
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Nor is it accurate
accurate to
to view
view Estelle as an example
example of the
the closely
closely
Nor
related
related doctrine
doctrine of
of procedural
procedural default
default that
that the
the Court
Court could
could have
have used
justify its conclusion. Unlike
Unlike waiver, this concept
concept does not
not
to justify
presuppose the defendant's
defendant's active abandonment
abandonment of the rule's
rule's
presuppose
protection. Rather, it strips the defendant
defendant of the ability to complain
complain
at
rule's violation
violation because
because of a failure to assert the right at
about the rule's
issue pursuant to the terms of a fair procedural
procedural mechanism."'
mechanism. 167 While
appears superficially
superficially to be
be a procedural
procedural default case, since it
Estelle appears
emphasized
emphasized the defendant's
defendant's lack of an objection
objection when he clearly
clearly
knew that he was wearing
wearing prison clothes,
clothes, it differs
differs in a fundamental
knew
168 Procedural
way.168
Procedural default
default is a doctrine
doctrine about
about the remedies
remedies that one
way.
Estelle is about
loses by failing to follow the proper procedure.
about the
169
follow.
must
judge
the
that
rule
content of the
the judge must follow. 169
content
The four Justices who joined
joined the majority opinion
opinion in Estelle
Estelle could
not have been unaware
possibility of reaching the result they
unaware of the possibility
doctrine of procedural
procedural default. Justices
Justices Lewis
Lewis F.
did by relying on the doctrine
170 In
concurred on precisely
Powell
Powell and Potter Stewart concurred
precisely this ground. 170
In
their
their view, no relief
relief was warranted
warranted in this case because
because the defense
attorney was aware of the possibility of objecting to the way his
client was dressed
dressed and failed to do so simply because he mistakenly
mistakenly
17 1
171
futile.
it
thought it futile.
There are different
different conclusions one might draw from the
majority's crafting a conditional rule rather than relying on the
doctrine of procedural
procedural default. One is the possibility that the majority
procedural default doctrine would not be
was concerned
concerned that the procedural
convictions in cases
strong enough medicine
medicine to ensure the finality of convictions
Estelle
where the defendant
defendant did not lodge an objection. At the time Estelle
was decided, 1976, the law of constitutional remedies was much
more forgiving than it became in the last two decades of the twentieth
('No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that aa
Olano, 507
507 U.S. at 731
167. See Olano,
731 ('''No
failure to make timely
well as civil cases by the failure
ight...
... may be forfeited in criminal as weD
timely
constitutional right
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."') (quoting Yakus v. United
assertion of the right before a tribunal
United
(1944)).
States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944».
509-10.
Estelle, 425
168. Estelle,
425 U.S.
U.S. at 509-10.
Id. at 507-{)8.
507-08.
169. [d.
170. [d.
Id. at 513-14
513-14 (powell,
(Powell, 1.,
J., concurring).
171. [d.
Id. at 514 (powell,
(Powell, J., concurring).
concurring).
171.

Published by Reading Room, 2010

45
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 461 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

462

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
(Vol. 26:2

century. Defendants in the mid-1970s whose lawyers had failed to
clients' rights stood a much better
object to the violation
violation of their clients'
better
chance
chance of getting relief in a habeas
habeas corpus action than their
their
172
stingier.
much
was
relief
habeas
when
successors thirty years later when habeas relief was much stingier. 172
conclusion that one may draw from the majority opinion
Another conclusion
in Estelle
Estelle is that by making the rule conditional, the Court may
completely
simply have been signaling to trial judges
judges that they have completely
unfettered
unfettered discretion in making decisions
decisions about whether defendants
defendants
Estelle were not cast
appear in prison clothes. Certainly, if the rule in Estelle
in conditional form, the state would appear to have an affirmative
affirmative
obligation to provide a less emotionally charged
wardrobe
charged wardrobe for the
defendants it chooses to prosecute. It may be that Estelle was
motivated by a desire to spare that expense.
2. Due Process
Process and Evidence
Evidence That the Defendant
Defendant Remained Silent
After Receiving a Miranda
Miranda Warning
Warning
The famous Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona decision has become
become so embedded
in popular culture that almost every English speaking moviegoer or
or
television watcher knows that after you are arrested, you have a right
73
to remain silent. 1173
Ohio, the Court held that if a suspect
suspect
In Doyle v. Ohio,
hears this warning and relies on it, it is so fundamentally unfair to
allow the prosecutor
prosecutor to use the defendant's silence as evidence
evidence of his
174
74 For eleven years, the Doyle
guilt that it violates due process.'
process.
rule
appeared to be straightforward. Prosecutors knew they could not
attempt to bring to the attention
attention of the jury the fact that the defendant
had remained silent after receiving a Miranda
Miranda warning. Greer
Greer v.
175
175
one.
conditional
a
rule
the
made
however,
Miller,
Miller,
made the rule a conditional one.
Charles Miller took the stand in his murder trial and testified that
17 6
he had nothing to do with the crime. 176
When the prosecutor
prosecutor had an
opportunity
cross-examine, he chose to start out strong:
opportunity to cross-examine,
UnlimitedInnocence:
Innocence: Recognizing
an "Actual
Recognizing an
"ActualInnocence" Exception to AEDPA 's
172. Jake Sussman,
Sussman, Unlimited
Statute o/Limitations,
of Limitations,27 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
& Soc. CHANGE
CHANGE 343,
343, 377-79, (2001-02).
(1969).
173. Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S.
u.s. 868 (1969).
174. Doyle
610,618-19
(1976).
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
618-19 (1976).
(1987).
175. Greer
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
176. Id.
Id. at 758.
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Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you?
A: 23.
Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you got
got
177
arrested? 177
By highlighting the defendant's
post-Miranda silence at the very
defendant's post-Miranda
beginning of his cross-examination,
cross-examination, the prosecutor
prosecutor cannot have been
unaware of the impact this point must have had on the jury. It was no
accident
accident that it was the second question, immediately
immediately after asking the
defendant's age. Defense counsel certainly knew what the prosecutor
prosecutor
was up to, for an objection immediately
followed. 17 8 The judge
immediately followedYs
179
question, for
[the] question,
"ignore [the]
instructed
being.,,179
instructed the jury to "ignore
for the
the time
time being."'
80
1
issue. Miller
the issue.
prosecutor never returned
The prosecutor
returned to
to the
Miller was
was convicted.
convicted. ISO
Both state appellate
considered Miller's appeal, the
appellate courts
courts that considered
federal district court
court that granted him habeas corpus relief and the
Seventh Circuit panel, as well as the en banc
banc court that affirmed,
approached
understanding that the prosecutor's
approached the case on the understanding
prosecutor's
question
violated
the
defendant's
right
to
remain
silent.
question violated
defendant's
For each of
of
these courts, the only issue they thought relevant was whether the
81
harmless or
violation was harmless
or not.'
not. 181
The question on which the Court granted
granted certiorari
certiorari was what the
standard of harmless error should be in a habeas proceeding
proceeding for a
ls2
182
Doyle violation. But somewhere
somewhere in the course of its consideration
consideration
83
IS3
rule. 1
Doyle
the
of
structure
the
changed
Court
the
of the case, the Court changed the structure of the Doyle rule.
Doyle itself dealt with a case in which
which the prosecutor
prosecutor had been
permitted
to
question
the
defendant
about
his
failure
to tell the police
permitted
the same story as included
included in his direct testimony
testimony and to argue to the
jury that his post-Miranda
post-Miranda silence was proof that his claim of
of
184
184
innocence
innocence at trial was contrived.
Since the context of the case
177.
178.
17S.
179.
180.
181.
IS!.
182.
IS2.
183.
184.

Id. at 759.
!d.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
!d.
Greer,483
760-61.
Greer,
4S3 U.S.
U.S. at 760-6!.
Id.at 761 n.3.
!d.
Id.at 764-65.
!d.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
610, 614 n.5 {I(1976).
976).
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accompli concerning the unfair use of
of
presented the Court with aafait
fait accompli
the defendant's silence, there was no reason for Doyle to have paid
difference between the effect of a prosecutor's merely
merely
attention to the difference
asking the forbidden question and the defendant's answering it. So,
the way that the Doyle opinion phrased its rule allowed the majority
Greer to find room to make it conditional.
in Greer
The quotes from Doyle that Greer
Greer excerpted to illustrate its rule
gave it room to maneuver:
[T]he holding of Doyle is that the Due Process Clause bars "the
use for impeachment
post-arrest
impeachment purposes"
purposes" of a defendant's post-arrest
silence. The Court noted that "'it
'''it does not comport with due
process to permit
permit the prosecution
prosecution during trial to call attention to
1 85
silence."'
[the defendant's]
defendant's] silence.",185

The choice to make Doyle a conditional rule may have been a
proper
result of the majority's reluctance to face head-on the proper
application of the harmless error doctrine to Doyle violations. More
than one circuit had taken
taken the position that "Doyle violations
violations are
186 and there was
harmless,,,186
an as yet unsettled
unsettled question of
of
rarely harmless,"
whether the standard
standard for harmless error should
should be the same in a
habeas corpus case, as this one
one was, as on direct review. Because
Because the
defendant in Greer
Greer never
prosecutor's question, the
never answered
answered the prosecutor's
defendant
Court held, there was no Doyle violation in the first place and thus no
standard should
question of what harmless error standard
need to87address the question
1
apply. 187
apply.
Four Justices
Justices disagreed with the majority's decision
decision to make Doyle
1188
88 Justice Stevens "agree[d] with the 10
a conditional
rule.
conditional
Justice Stevens "agree[d]
10 Illinois
Illinois
judges and 12 federal
federal judges who
who have concluded
concluded that
that the rule of the
Doyle case was violated
violated when the
the prosecutor
prosecutor called
called the jury's
jury's
185. Greer,
185.
Greer, 483
483 U.S.
U.S. atat 763-64
763-M (quoting
(quoting Doyle,
Doy/e, 426
426 U.S.
U.S. atat 619)
619) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
186. Id.
Williams v.
/d. at
at 772
772 (Brennan,
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
dissenting) (quoting
(quoting Williams
v. Zahradnick,
Zahradnick, 632
632 F.2d
F.2d 353,
353, 364
364 (4th
(4th Cir.
Cir.
1980)).
1980».
187. Seeid.
See id. at765.
at 765.
188. Id.
/d. at
at 769
769 (Stevens,
(Stevens, J.,
J., concurring)
concurring) (agreeing
(agreeing with
with majority's
majority's outcome
outcome but
but disagreeing
disagreeing on
on the
the
standard
standard toto be
be applied
applied on
on direct
direct appeal);
appeal); id
id. at
at 760-70
760-70 (Brennan,
(Brennan, J.,
1., dissenting).
dissenting).
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to
respondent's silence.,,189
silence."' 89 Although
he affirmed
affirmed the
to respondent's
Although he
the
conviction on
the ground
that the
the error
error was
was harmless,
Justice Stevens
Stevens
conviction
on the
ground that
harmless, Justice
90
clarity.'
of
rule
Doyle
the
robbed
approach
majority's
the
felt
felt the majority's approach robbed the Doyle rule of clarity.190
Justices William
William J.
J. Brennan,
Brennan, Jr.,
Jr., Thurgood
and Harold
Justices
Thurgood Marshall,
Marshall, and
Harold A.
Blackmun criticized
the majority
majority for
error
Blackmun
criticized the
for eschewing
eschewing aa harmless
harmless error
approach that
would have
been more
more nuanced
the blunt
approach
that would
have been
nuanced than
than the
blunt
191
9
conditional
rule
that
the
Court adopted.
adopted.' ' AA harmless
error analysis
conditional rule that the Court
harmless error
analysis
could not
not only
only take
that the
prosecutor's
could
take into
into account
account the
the fact
fact that
the prosecutor's
question went
went unanswered
unanswered (the
(the major
major factor
factor relevant
relevant to
to the
question
the majority's
majority's
192
conditional rule),
the other
other events
trial that
conditional
rule), 192 but
but also
also the
events at
at trial
that might
might have
have
led
the
jury
to
weigh
the
defendant's
silence
after
arrest
despite
led the jury to weigh the defendant's silence after arrest despite the
the
193
193
the point.
on the
of explicit
lack of
lack
explicit testimony
testimony on
point.
attention
attention

3. The Fourth
and the Definition
Fourth Amendment and
Definition of a Seizure
If there
is any
provision in
in the
Constitution where
where both
If
there is
any provision
the Constitution
both the
the
historical understanding
and the
the contemporary
depend on
historical
understanding and
contemporary application
application depend
on
government officials'
officials' being
clear rules
tell them
in
government
being subject
subject to
to clear
rules which
which tell
them in
advance of
of power
power whether
they can
act or
or not,
advance
of their
their exercise
exercise of
whether they
can act
not, the
the
189. Id.
Id. at 767.
Greer, 483 U.S. at 763-64 ("But if there is to be a rule that prohibits a prosecutor's
190. Greer,
prosecutor's use of a
defendant's post-Miranda
post-Miranda silence,
silence, it should be a clearly defined
defined rule.").
191. Id.
Id. at 769-75 (Brennan, J.,
191.
J., dissenting).
192. The majority also relied on the fact that the trial judge
judge instructed the jury to disregard any
id. at 764.
question to which an objection
objection had been sustained. See id.
193. For example, the context in which the prosecutor's question came, the weight of the evidence,
evidence,
and the importance
importance of the defendant's
defendant's credibility all played a factor in the lower court's conclusion that
that
the error in Greer
445-47 (7th Cir. 1986)
1986) (en banc).
Greer was not harmless.
harmless. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438, 445--47
bane).
The majority was not completely
completely blind to the inherent
inherent unfairness
unfairness of allowing the prosecutor
prosecutor to
to
suggest by his question that the defendant
defendant should not be believed,
believed, because he did not tell his story to the
police. In
'so
In a separate
separate part of the opinion, they considered whether
whether prosecutorial misconduct
misconduct "'so
infec[ted]
process."'
Greer,
infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
resulting conviction
conviction a denial of due process.
'" Greer,
483 U.S. at 765 n.7. But what was it that the prosecutor did that would even require the Court to
to
evaluate
specifically says,
evaluate its impact
impact in the context of the entire trial? It must be, though the Court never specifically
the possibility
possibility that the jury would
would infer as true the suggestion contained in the question posed by the
prosecutor
defendant's silence. And what, one might ask, was that implicit suggestion? It must
must
prosecutor about the defendant's
have been the inference
inference that the defendant remained silent after receiving
receiving a Miranda
Miranda warning. But that is
precisely
precisely the factual assertion that Doyle itself prevents the prosecutor from making a part
part of the
evidence.
evidence. True, it does more damage when
when the defendant admits the assertion than when
when the prosecutor
prosecutor
suggests it in a question. But it is hard
hard to see why this difference
difference justifies
justifies applying two different
different rules to
what is essentially the same problem. Nevertheless, by subsuming this analysis under the rubric of the
test applicable
demanding
applicable to prosecutorial
prosecutorial misconduct, the majority
majority was able to subject it to a less demanding
Greer,483 U.S. at 765 n.7.
was in place at the time for harmless error. Greer,
standard than the one that was
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Fourth Amendment would be at the top of almost every
every list. Much of
of
the Court's recent Fourth Amendment analysis is driven by its desire
to make things simple for the police officers who have to translate
194
their legal doctrine into action out on the street. 194
Yet in one
important
important area, the Court has constructed
constructed a Fourth Amendment
conditional
rule
that
makes
the
legitimacy
officer
conditional
legitimacy of what a police officer
does dependent
dependent on how the target of his actions responds.
Boiled down to its essence,
essence, all Fourth Amendment issues relevant
relevant
to the cop on the beat depend on a preliminary
preliminary question that defines
the relevant scope
scope of action that the Amendment
Amendment controls. Is she
doing something that the Amendment addresses?
addresses? The Fourth
Amendment
searches and seizures. 195 If a police
Amendment regulates only searches
officer
officer contemplates
contemplates doing something that fits neither
neither category, like
shining
shining a flashlight into a car parked on a public street or following
someone walking through a public park, then that is the end of the
196
matter. 196
It is only if the conduct fits into one of these two categories
that the officer has to apply the myriad rules the Court has crafted to
of
fit the Amendment's standard of reasonableness
reasonableness to the vast array of
modem day contexts
in
which
we
expect
our
police
to
act.
contexts
The most common
common area where police action implicates
implicates the Fourth
Amendment
Amendment is in one of the two varieties
varieties of seizures that infringe on
an individual's liberty interest. Ever since the Court broke the mold
of a unitary Fourth Amendment
Amendment in Terry v. Ohio, police and courts
classify seizures, depending on how intrusive they are, into either
either
197
97
arrests.' In order to make the sort of brief
Terry stops or full-scale arrests.
brief
stop of a suspect that Terry allows to conduct a threshold
threshold inquiry, an

194. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
("[The protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth
U.s. 454, 458 (1981)
(1981) ("[T]he
Amendments 'can
Amendments
'can only be realized
realized if the police
police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances,
makes it possible
possible to reach a correct
correct determination
determination beforehand as to whether
whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement."');
(1979)
enforcement."'); Dunaway v. New
New York, 442 U.S. 200,
200, 213-14
213-14 (1979)
("A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social
social and individual interests
interests involved
involved in the specific
confront.").
circumstances they confront.
circumstances
").
195.
195. U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend. IV.
N.
(1927);
196. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983);
(1983); United States v. Lee, 274
274 U.S. 559, 563
563 (1927);
United States v. Feliz, No. 08-CR-133 (DLI), 2009 WL 3069742,
3069742, at *8
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009).
197.
(1968).
197. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/7
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 466 2009-2010

50

Rossman: Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland Mee

CONDITIONAL RULES
RULES IN
IN CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE
CONDITIONAL

2010)
20101

467

officer needs
needs some reasonable
reasonable198suspicion
suspicion that the person
person is, has
has been,
officer
crime.
a
in
engaged in a crime. 198
or will be engaged
Reasonable suspicion, the
the Court
Court has held many
many times, is
Reasonable
99
determined ex
ex ante.
199 It depends
depends not on what
what the true state
state of affairs
ante.1
determined
things
appear
but
on
how
after
the
fact,
out to be after
on
appear to the officer
officer
turns out
at the time she exercises
exercises her power. Otherwise,
Otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment cannot
cannot serve
serve as a guide
guide to the officer's
officer's behavior.
Amendment
of
One would
would think that the same
same logic must apply to the question of
defining a seizure.
seizure. If an officer
officer cannot tell in advance
advance if she proposes
proposes
engage in activity
activity regulated
regulated by the Fourth
to engage
Fourth Amendment,
Amendment, how can
can
crosses the line?
line? This was
she know if what she plans to do crosses
Californiav. Hodari
the question the Court confronted
essentially
confronted in California
Hodari
2 00
D
D?OO
The officers whose
whose actions precipitated
precipitated the Court's encounter
encounter came
came
other
across Hodari Dulin in an alley where
where he and a number
number of other
201
20 1
scattered when
young men were huddled around a car. The boys scattered
they saw the officers
officers and, predictably,
predictably, the police
police gave chase. In the
course of the pursuit, one of the officers
officers saw Dulin throw down
down a
202
2
20
crack cocaine.
In the
small rock of what he later learned was crack
juvenile court proceeding, Dulin sought to suppress
suppress the use of the
that
he
drugs as evidence
on
the
ground
had
been seized without
evidence
justification
initiation of the chase and the discovery of the
justification at the initiation
203 Since the State
cocaine
"fruit of the poisonous tree."
tree.,,203
cocaine was a "fruit
officer
conceded that up until the time Dulin dropped the drugs the officer
conceded
did not have reasonable suspicion
suspicion that Dulin was engaged in any
discovery of the drugs
criminal activity,204
activity, 20 4 the legality of the officer's discovery
Amendment
depended on whether Dulin had been seized for Fourth
Amendment
20 5
205
chase.
the
begin
officer
the
saw
he
purposes when
the officer begin the chase.

Id.at 22.
198. [d.
Id.
199. [d.

200.
200.
201.l.
20
202.
203.
204.
205.

621 (1991).
(1991).
California v. Hodari D.,
D., 499
499 U.S. 621
Id.at
at622.
!d.
622.
Id.at 622-23.
!d.
Id.at 623.
[d.
Id.at 623
623 n.l.
n.1.
[d.
Id.at 623.
623.
[d.
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Hodari D.
In doctrinal terms, the resolution of Hadari
D. depended on
whether the Court would continue to adhere to its most widely
accepted
accepted modem day formulation of what constituted a seizure or
would revert to the historical common law understanding. The
prevailing
contemporary test for defining a seizure under
prevailing contemporary
circumstances
objective one: "a
"a person has been
circumstances like Dulin's was an objective
'seized'
within
the
meaning
of
the
Fourth
Amendment
only if,
if, in
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
view of all the circumstances
circumstances surrounding
surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.,,206
leave." 20 6 No one
on the Court disputed that the officer's action, chasing Dulin,
implicitly communicated
communicated that the7 State intended to interfere
interfere with his
alley.20
that alley.207
down that
freedom to run down
The common law definition
definition of a seizure came exclusively from the
tort law of trespass. It required that either
either the police must touch their
suspect physically or the suspect must submit in some way to a show
of force.202088 Since Dulin was not touched and certainly did not submit,
he would have been unable to successfully
of
successfully establish
establish the elements of
trespass, as the doctrine was known in the Eighteenth
Eighteenth century.
Underlying
Underlying the choice
choice between these two approaches
approaches were the
different
views
the
Justices
had
on
the
practical
different
Justices
practical consequence
consequence of the
rule that would emerge. The historical
historical account
account leads to a conditional
conditional
rule that gives police
police officers
officers much more freedom
freedom in using a display
of authority
authority to get people's
people's cooperation, even if those people are
viewed
by
the
police
as targets
viewed
targets for whom
whom they lack objective indicia
indicia
of criminality. Justice
Justice Antonin
Antonin Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion
opinion in Hodari
Hadari D., clearly
clearly belongs in this camp:
We
stretch
We do not think it desirable,
desirable, even as a policy
policy matter, to stretch
the Fourth
Amendment
beyond
its
words
and
beyond
Fourth Amendment beyond
beyond the
meaning
....Street pursuits always
always place
place the public at
meaning of arrest ....
some risk, and compliance
compliance with police
police orders
orders to stop
stop should
should
therefore
must
therefore be
be encouraged.
encouraged. Only a few of those orders, we must
206.
(1980)).
206. Hodari
Hadari D.,
D., 499
499 U.S.
U.s. atat 627-28
627-28 (quoting United
United States
States v.v. Mendenhall,
Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
U.S. 544, 554 (I980».
207.
207. Id.
Id. at 625.
625.
208.
208. See
See Mendenhall,
Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
U.S. atat 553
553 ("[A]
("[A] person
person isis 'seized'
'seized' only
only when,
when, by
by means
means of
ofphysical
physical force
or
or show
show of
ofauthority,
authority, his
his freedom
freedom of
ofmovement
movement isis restrained.").
restrained.").
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presume, will be without adequate basis, and since the addressee
has no ready means of identifying the deficient ones it almost
invariably is the responsible course to comply. Unlawful orders
will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the
exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed. Since
exclusionary
"Stop!" expecting to be ignored, or
policemen do not command "Stop!"
give chase hoping to be outrun, it fully suffices
to apply the
20 9
seizures.
.
.
ful'
209
successful
genuine,
their
to
deterrent
deterrent thelr genume, success seIzures.

Marshall, thought that the
The two dissenters, Justices Stevens and Marshall,
construction
govern when police
police officers
officers
construction of a conditional rule to govern
could attempt to interfere
"profoundly
interfere with a person's liberty
liberty "profoundly
210
unwise."
unwise.,,210
Without a rule that allowed a police officer to know in
advance
advance whether his course of action was consistent with the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment, they argued, not only creates
uncertainty
uncertainty but also provides
provides police with a perverse incentive. Since
merely directing a menacing
individual is, under
menacing show of force at an individual
the majority's view, not governed by the Fourth Amendment, police
officers
officers would be free to threaten to interfere with someone
someone whom
they could
not
lawfully
stop
and hope
could
hope that the suspect's reaction gave
gave
211 "In an
them the reasonable
reasonable suspicion that they otherwise
otherwise lacked. 211
"In
airport
setting," Justice
enforcement
airport setting,"
Justice Stevens
Stevens posed, "may
"mayaa drug enforcement
agent now
passengers with his gun drawn,
now approach
approach a group of passengers
announce
a
'baggage
search,'
passengers' reactions to
announce 'baggage search,' and rely on the passengers'
212
justify his investigative
investigative stops?
stopS?,,212
4. The Confrontation
Confrontation Clause
Clause and the Admissibility of
ofa
Codefendant's
Confession
Codefendant's

In Bruton v. United
United States, the Court held that the Confrontation
Confrontation
Clause
Clause prohibits a prosecutor
prosecutor from introducing
introducing as evidence
evidence at a joint
trial the confession
confession of one of the
the group charged
charged with the crime
crime if it
209. Hodari,
Hodari, 499
499 U.S.
U.s. atat 627.
627.
210. Id.
Id. at
at 630 (Stevens,
(Stevens, J.,
1., dissenting).
dissenting).
211.
211. Id.
Id. at643-44.
at 643-44.
212. Id.
Id. at
at 645.
645. E.g.,
E.g., United
United States
States v.v. Waterman,
Waterman, 569
569 F.3d
F.3d 144
144 (3d
(3d Cir.
Cir. 2009)
2009) (holding
(holding that
that merely
merely
pointing
pointing aa gun
gun at
at aasuspect
suspect does
does not
not constitute
constitute aa seizure).
seizure).
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incriminates
instruction
incriminates a codefendant, even if the jury receives an instruction
213
made
who
person
the
against
only
it
consider
to
them
directing
directing
it only against the person who made it.
it. 213
The problem such a situation creates
creates for the values the Confrontation
Clause protects stems from the Court's assumption about the utility
of a limiting instruction
instruction in this circumstance.
circumstance. The chance
chance that the jury
would use the confession
confession against both the person who made it and the
214 Once that barrier is
person whom it mentions is overwhelming.
overwhelming?14
evidence against the
breached, the confession becomes part of the evidence
nonconfessing
codefendant, and its admission without the ability to
nonconfessing codefendant,
cross-examine
Confrontation Clause's core
cross-examine its maker violates the Confrontation
215
215
guarantee.
guarantee.
Bruton presents a straightforward
straightforward nonconditional
On its face then, Bruton
nonconditional
rule. But two years later, in Nelson v. 0O'Neil,
'Neil, the Court found a way
to make it less clear. The trial in Nelson involved
codefendants,
involved two codefendants,
16
O'Neil and Runnels. Runnels confessed
and
implicated
O'Neil.2216
confessed
implicated O'Nei1.
The prosecutor
prosecutor put three witnesses on the stand: a police officer who
testified to the circumstances
circumstances of the arrest; the victim of the crime,
who identified both men; and the police office
office to whom Runnels
made his confession. The judge instructed
instructed the jury
jury that they were to
use the confession
confession as evidence
O'Neil.217
evidence only against Runnels, not O'Nei1.217
The trial took place before Bruton
Bruton was decided, so neither
neither the
prosecutor
prosecutor nor the judge would have had a reason to believe
believe that this
limiting instruction did not eliminate the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause
problem
prosecutor's use of the confession. Bruton,
Bruton,
problem inherent in the prosecutor's
Roberts v. Russell,
Russell, so
however, had been given retroactive
retroactive effect
effect in Roberts
so

213.
U.S. 123
213. Bruton
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968).
(1968).
214. See
id. at 135-36 ("[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
See id
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.
ignored. Such a context
context is presented
presented here, where the
the
powerfully incriminating
incriminating extrajudicial statements
statements of a co-defendant,
side-by-side
powerfully
co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-side
with the defendant, are
are deliberately
deliberately spread
spread before the jury
jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations
incriminations
defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect ....
....
").).
devastating to the defendant
215.
(1999) (stating that admission of nontestifying
215. See Lilly v. Virginia,
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1999)
nontestifying codefendant's confession violates
violates the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause despite state's hearsay
hearsay exception for
declarations against
against penal interest).
216.
(1971).
216. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
402 U.S. 622 (1971).
217.
217. Id.
[d. at 624.
624.
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O'Neil was able to raise his Confrontation
Confrontation Clause claim in a habeas
.. 218
218
petition.
corpus
corpus petItIon.
Nelson, however, presented
presented the Court with a development
development at trial
Nelson,
that Bruton did not. As part of the defense
defense case, each defendant
defendant took
the stand. O'Neil
corroborated
O'Neil testified to an alibi. Runnels not only corroborated
the alibi, contradicting the account
officer's testimony
account in the police officer's
testimony
about the confession, but he denied making the confession
confession at all.
O'Neil's defense counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine
cross-examine
219
219
Runnels, but chose to forego the chance.
Since the principal vice
Bruton situation was the admission
the Court saw in the Bruton
admission of an
inculpatory statement by an out-of-court
declarant
who was
out-of-court
' '22°
and effective'
effective' cross-examination,
"unavailable at
at the
the trial
"unavailable
trial for
for 'full
'full and
cross-examination,,,220
the mere prospect of putting
putting questions to Runnels
Runnels that O'Neil had
when his codefendant
the stand was enough
enough to take this case out
codefendant took
22 1
Bruton. 22 I
of the ambit of Bruton.
What makes Nelson significant for the purpose of bringing it into
the lineup of conditional
conditional rule cases is the way the Court
Court described
described the
cross-examination. The
Runnels's availability for cross-examination.
consequence of Runnels's
announced as the reason for ruling against O'Neil: "there
Court announced
"there was
222
no violation
violation of the Constitution in this case."
case. ,,222 The simplest
meaning
Bruton as
describing O'Neil's claim is to see Bruton
meaning of this way of describing
a conditional rule. With the benefit of hindsight, knowing that O'Neil
had a chance to cross-examine
cross-examine the person who made the confession,
the Court treated
treated this situation
situation like a prosecutor's asking a question
Miranda rights, or a judge's
judge's ordering
ordering
about a defendant's
defendant's assertion of Miranda
a defendant to appear
appear before the jury in prison clothes, or a police
officer's drawing
drawing a gun and ordering
ordering someone to halt. In all of these

218.
218. Roberts v. Russell, 392
392 U.S. 293
293 (1968).
(1968).
219. Nelson, 402
402 U.S. at 624.
624.
220. Id.
[d. at 627.
221.
Id. at 627-29.
627-29. The majority assumed that had Runnels taken the stand and affinned
affirmed his
221. Id.
confession, there would have been no Confrontation
Confrontation Clause problem. Had Runnels done so, the Court
reasoned, O'Neil would have
have been
been in a worse position than if Runnels had denied
denied making
making the
confession. Given that the former situation would not have violated
violated the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause, it was
easy for the Court to conclude that neither did the latter.
222. Id.
626.
[d. at 626.
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situations, something that happened in the future determined
determined if the
Constitution had been violated or not.
Constitution
convey that Bruton was not a conditional
If the Court had meant to convey
rule, it could easily have adopted either of the two lines of reasoning
that the government put forward on the merits in the Ninth Circuit to
argue against O'Neil's Confrontation
Confrontation Clause claim. The first of these
arguments was that the opportunity to cross-examine
cross-examine Runnels
223
"cured"
223
the
Bruton
error.
Going
to
a
doctor
"cured" the Bruton error. Going to a doctor who cures a disease is
quite different than going to one who tells you that you are perfectly
perfectly
"cure" language, the rule would not
healthy. If the Court had used "cure"
have been conditional. But it did not.
The Supreme
certainly familiar with the concept
of
Supreme Court was certainly
concept of
curing an error. The Court had used the metaphor in considering
whether a prosecutor's
prosecutor's correction
correction of her own improper remarks cured
2 24
the error of her presentation
a judge's instruction
presentation before the jury,
jury,224
instruction
cured the error of a prosecutor
prosecutor mentioning testimony in the
Government's
opening
statement
that was not forthcoming in the
Government's
225
case in chief,225
chief, and whether
whether a defense attorney's
attorney's use of a peremptory
challenge
challenge cured a judge's
judge's error
error in allowing
allowing a juror
juror to sit who was not
qualified. 226 But there isn't any hint in Nelson that this is what the
Court was doing. The majority's opinion eschewed
eschewed any suggestion
suggestion
that what
what Runnels did cured
cured a preexisting
preexisting violation
violation of the
Confrontation
made
announcement that
made the post hoc announcement
Confrontation Clause. It simply
227
all.
at
violation
no
was
there
no violation at all. 227
The other argument
argument the Court could have adopted in Nelson was
228 But as with the possibility
that the Bruton error was harmless.228
of
possibility of
223.
321 (9th
223. O'Neil
O'Neil v.v. Nelson,
Nelson, 422
422 F.2d
F.2d 319,
319,321
(9th Cir.
Cir. 1970).
1970).
224. See Dunlop
Dunlop v.v. United
United States,
States, 165
165 U.S.
U.S. 486,498
486, 498 (1897).
(1897).
225.
that
225. See Frazier v.
v. Cupp,
Cupp, 394
394 U.S.
U.S. 731,
731, 734-35
734-35 (1969)
(1969) (considering
(considering and
and rejecting argument
argument that
instruction
the error,
instruction could
could not
not cure
cure the
error, by
by holding
holding that
that there
there was
was no
no error
error atat all
all given
given the
the context
context of
of the
the
remark
remark in
in the
the overall
overall evaluation
evaluation of
of the
the fairness
fairness of
of the
the trial);
trial); Dunlop,
Dunlop, 165
165 U.S.
U.S. atat 498
498 (trial
(trial judge's
judge's ruling
ruling
holding
generally
holding prosecutor's
prosecutor's remarks
remarks improper
improper inin connection
connection with
with prosecutor's
prosecutor's withdrawing
withdrawing them
them will
will generally
cure
cure the
the error).
error).
226.
States v.
226. See
See United
United States
v. Martinez-Salazar,
Martinez-Salazar, 528
528 U.S.
U.S. 304,
304, 304
304 (2000);
(2000); Ross
Ross v.v. Oklahoma,
Oklahoma, 487
487 U.S.
U.S.
81,
88 (1988)
81,88
(1988) ("Petitioner
("Petitioner was
was undoubtedly
undoubtedly required
required toto exercise
exercise aa peremptory
peremptory challenge
challenge toto cure
cure the
the trial
trial
court's
court's error.").
error.").
227. Nelson,
Nelson, 402
402 U.S.
U.S. atat 626.
626.
228. See
See O'Neil, 422
422 F.2d
F.2d atat 322.
322.
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of
framing what had happened as a cure, the Court rejected
rejected this way of
229
describing O'Neil's claim.229
describing
claim.
Rather than conceding
conceding there was an
error, the Court concluded that an assessment
assessment of what the
Confrontation Clause requires extends beyond the close of the
Confrontation
conditional rule:
prosecutor's
prosecutor's case, making it a conditional
We conclude that where a codefendant
codefendant takes the stand in his own
out-of-court statement
statement
defense,
defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court
implicating the defendant,
defendant, and proceeds
proceeds to testify favorably to
the defendant concerning the underlying
underlying facts, the defendant
defendant has
been denied no rights protected
protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
230
23o
Amendments.
overlooked the
Courts and commentators
commentators have, by and large, overlooked
conditional nature of the rule in Nelson.
Nelson. This absence is hardly
them
surprising in reported decisions, given that the vast majority of them
come from judges reviewing convictions
convictions after the fact, when a court
confession testified or not.
already knows if the person who made the confession
From that vantage point, nothing turns on whether one describes
describes the
rule as conditional,
conditional, though some courts still persist in labeling what
23 ' rather
rather
"cure" of a prior Confrontation Clause violation,
happened a "cure"
violation,231
than saying, as did the Supreme Court, that the defendant's rights
find a trial
were not violated at all. On occasion, though, one can fmd
advantage of the conditional nature of
of
court opinion that takes advantage
Bruton grounds to sever a
Nelson. Where a defendant moves on Bruton
232 and
pending trial from that of a codefendant
confessed,232
codefendant who has confessed,
where the trial judge is reasonably certain that the codefendant
codefendant will
take the stand, Nelson has been used as authority for denying
denying
229. Nelson, 402
402 U.S.
U.S. at 626.
Id. at 629-30.
230. [d.
474,489
See, e.g.,
231. See,
e.g., Moore v.
v. Casperson, 345
345 F.3d
F.3d 474,
489 (7th
(7th Cir. 2003).
2003).
232. In many jurisdictions, if the
the prosecution
prosecution plans to introduce
introduce aa confession
confession by one of several
several codefendants,
defendants, and
and the prosecution cannot redact
redact itit to eliminate
eliminate any
any reference toto the
the others
others who will be
See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 590
subject
subject to the joint
joint trial, aa motion
motion to sever must be
be granted. See,
F.2d
F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1978); United
United States
States v.v. Truslow,
Truslow, 530
530 F.2d 257, 262 n.3
n.3 (4th
(4th Cir. 1975);
1975); United
United
States
States v. Johnson,
Johnson, 478
478 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th
(5th Cir.
Cir. 1973); Schaffer v.v. United States, 221 F.2d
F.2d 17, 19 (5th
Cir.
Cir. 1955); Smith v.v. United
United States, 312 A.2d 781, 788 (D.C.
(D.C. 1973); People
People v.v. Aranda,
Aranda, 407 P.2d 265,
265,
272-73
272-73 (Cal. 1965); State v. Rosen, 86
86 N.E.2d
N.E.2d 24, 26
26 (Ohio
(Ohio 1949).
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severance on the ground that in the end there will be no
Confrontation Clause violation. 233 If Nelson were not in a conditional
prosecutor
format, one can hardly imagine a trial judge's allowing the prosecutor
codefendant's confession
chief.
to use the codefendant's
confession as part of the state's case in chief.
It would be akin to denying a meritorious motion to suppress
suppress a
indicated he would plead
confession on the ground that the defendant indicated
guilty if he lost, raising the prospect that the issue of the confession
234
would be moot. 234
prosecutor to use
The scarcity of cases where a trial judge allows a prosecutor
unredacted confession
a codefendant's unredacted
confession is a reflection of the unusual
Nelson's conditional rule. Unlike the others that resemble
nature of Nelson's
liability
liability rules, the future action that determines the constitutionality
confession is dependent
of admitting an unredacted codefendant's
codefendant's confession
dependent on
on
the decision of a third party, not the person whose rights are at issue.
Moreover, the third party's behavior
behavior comes, if at all, at some point in
time far removed from the action of the government that placed the
defendant's
defendant's rights in jeopardy. Even more significantly,
significantly, the remedy
remedy
for a violation of the rule is relatively
relatively severe. In the prison clothes
clothes
context, if the defendant
objects
to
the
way
he
or
she
is
dressed,
it
defendant
If
simply means that someone has to bring in something else to wear. If
a prosecutor
prosecutor asks a question
question implicating Doyle, an objection to the
question
question simply leads to the judge instructing the witness not to
answer and telling the jury to draw no inference
inference from the question.
And when a suspect submits to an official show of force for which
there is no justification, the police are put in no worse a situation in
terms of discovering evidence of a crime
crime than they would have been

233. See,
See, e.g.,
(S.D. Ohio 1980)
1980) ("As to prejudice
e.g., United States v. Chapman, 501
SOl F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.
prejudice to
the defendant from statements by and a document admitted
admitted against his co-defendant, the circumstances
circumstances
at this time do not indicate
defendant will suffer
indicate that defendant
suffer any prejudice
prejUdice thereby. Co-defendant's
Co-defendant's counsel
counsel has
indicated that his client
client will take the stand in his own
own defense. Consequently, defendant will be able to
cross-examine him thoroughly
incriminating statements
cross-examine
thoroughly as to any incriminating
statements he may make regarding defendant.");
1033, 1048
difficulty with defendants'
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033,
1048 (D. Md. 1976) ("The
("The main difficulty
defendants'
contentions based on Bruton
Bruton is that there is no present
present reason
reason to believe
believe that any defendant in this case
will not
will
not testify.
testify. Under
Under such circumstances,
circumstances, it is clear that the Bruton
Bruton rule is not applicable.").
applicable.").
234. See Parker
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796
796 (1970)
(1970) (holding that defendant may not attack
ground that confession was coerced).
voluntary nature of guilty plea on ground
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235 In a situation raising a Bruton issue,
in had they done nothing. 235
however, if the codefendant who made the confession
confession does not
eventually take the stand, then the judge must almost always declare
a mistrial.
The awkward
prospectively applying a conditional rule
awkward nature of prospectively
practical
where the consequence
consequence of being wrong is so great has the practical
if
effect of influencing those who must abide by the rule to treat it as if
236
236
Supreme Court is not unmindful
it were unconditional.
unconditiona1. Indeed, the Supreme
awkwardness of a conditional rule in protecting
defendant's
of the awkwardness
protecting a defendant's
Bruton to the problem
Confrontation Clause rights. In a case
Confrontation
case applying
applying Bruton
explicitly
of redacted
redacted confessions, Richardson
Richardson v. Marsh,
Marsh, the Court explicitly
237
237
rejected a conditional
conditional rule because
because it was unworkable.
Richardson addressed the question of whether Bruton
Richardson
Bruton would bar a
codefendant's
codefendant's confession
confession that had been
been redacted to eliminate
eliminate any
any
evidence
reference to the defendant, in circumstances
reference
circumstances where other evidence
238 The case
made clear
clear that the confession inculpated
inculpated the defendant. 238
involved
codefendants, Marsh and Williams. As
involved a joint trial of two codefendants,

235. It is true that if a police officer makes a stop without proper
proper justification, he or she is liable for
damages in a civil rights action under 28 U.S.C.
u.s.c. § 1983 (2006). But in practical
practical terms, if the suspect was
likelihood of a successful lawsuit, in large part because the
released immediately there is very little likelihood
and Serendipity:
Serendipity:
damages would be nominal. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
by Stereotypes
Stereotypes and
RacialProfiling
andSearches
Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
(2001) ("In
Racial
Profiling and Stops and
Searches Without Cause,
CONST. L. 296, 354-55 (2001)
cases in which no contraband
contraband is found, and a strong legal claim for damages can be stated,
stated, the damages
damages
particularly harsh or malicious conduct, the
may be too modest to justify
justifY full-scale litigation. Absent particularly
damages
search, may appear
appear to be nominal
damages that flow from a relatively short stop and incidental frisk or search,
competent counsel. Moreover, many civil
to some juries. As a result, such
such cases
cases are not likely to attract competent
rights plaintiffs
plaintiffs are burdened by racial and class characteristics
characteristics that may prejudice juries against them.
compensation.").
Jurors tend to dismiss their allegations,
allegations, often awarding them less than
than a full measure
measure of compensation.").
Bruton problems in advance.
236. A jurisdiction's
jurisdiction's rules on severance typically direct judges
judges to avoid Bruton
STANDARDS FOR JOINDER AND
AND SEVERANCE § 2.3 (proposed
(Proposed Rev. 1968) which provides: "(a)
See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., STANDARDS
co-defendant makes
When
When a defendant
defendant moves
moves for a severance
severance because
because an out-of-court statement of a co-defendant
prosecution
reference
reference to him but is not admissible against him, the court should determine
determine whether the prosecution
evidence at the trial. If so, the court should require the prosecuting
prosecuting
intends
intends to offer
offer the statement
statement in evidence
courses: (i) a joint trial at which the statement
attorney to elect one of the following courses:
statement is not admitted into
into
evidence;
evidence; (ii) a joint trial at which the statement
statement is admitted
admitted into evidence only after all references to the
moving
moving defendant
defendant have been deleted, provided that, as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the
moving
moving defendant;
defendant; or (iii)
(iii) severance
severance of the moving defendant."
defendant."
Rule
14(b) of the Federal
Federal Rules
Rules of Criminal Procedure
Procedure also provides a mechanism for ajudge
ajudge to
Rule 14(b)
"[b]efore ruling on a defendant's
alleviate
Bruton problems in advance, by providing that "[b]efore
alleviate Bruton
defendant's motion
motion to
sever, the court may order an attorney for the government to deliver to the court for in camera
camera inspection
evidence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(b).
any defendant's
defendant's statement that the government intends to use as evidence."
237. Richardson
(1987).
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
238. Id.
Id. at 202.

Published by Reading Room, 2010

59
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 475 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

476

UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

[Vol.
(Vol. 26:2

part of the State's case charging
charging them in a robbery murder scheme,
scheme,
the prosecution
prosecution introduced
introduced Williams's confession into evidence.
evidence. The
confession described
described how Williams
and
someone
Williams
named Martin
drove to the robbery scene, discussing what would happen along the
way.239 According to the confession, Martin said that he would have
way.239
robbery. 240 The confession
confession neither
neither
to kill the victims after the robbery.240
mentioned Marsh nor suggested the participation
participation of a third person
person in
241
24
1
instructed the jury to consider the confession
the crime. The judge instructed
as evidence only against
Marsh.24 2 Williams did not
against Williams not Marsh?42
243
testify?43
testify.
What created the problem for Marsh was the other evidence in the
case. The only surviving victim testified that Marsh arrived at the
scene together with Williams and Martin and helped them commit the
robbery, leading to an inference that she must have been in the car
and overheard
overheard her two cohorts plan the crime while they were all
244
driving to the scene. 244
Marsh's own testimony provided another
another link.
While she testified that her presence at the scene was as an unwitting
dupe, she also admitted that she had traveled to the scene of the
robbery in the car with Martin and Williams, albeit for an innocent
245
24 She told the jury she knew they were discussing
purpose. 245
discussing
something, but that she sat in the back seat and could not hear the
46
But of course, the jury was not bound to accept all of
conversation. 2246
of
what she said. They could, and evidently
evidently did, believe
believe she was in the
car and disbelieve
her
denying
knowing
about
the
plan.
disbelieve
The question that split the majority and the dissent in Richardson
Richardson
was whether
considering only the confession on
whether to apply Bruton by considering
its face, or to evaluate it in the context
context of all of the evidence to
247
incriminated the defendant. 247
One of the factors that
determine if it incriminated

239.
240.
241.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
203-04.
Id. at 203-04.
Id.
n. 1.
/d. at 203 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Richardson,
Richardson, 481
481 U.S. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 215 n.3.
Id
204.
/d. at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
213.
Id. at 213.
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played into this decision was the practical effect of each position.
How would the trial judge apply a rule making the admissibility
admissibility of
of
codefendant's confession
the codefendant's
confession turn
tum on how the rest of the evidence
evidence
came out?
conditional rule:
Justice Stevens, in dissent, proposed a conditional
In most [of these kinds of] cases the trial judge
judge can comply with
postponing his or her decision on the
the dictates of Bruton by postponing

admissibility of the confession until the prosecution rests, at
which time its potentially
potentially inculpatory
inculpatory effect can be evaluated in
248
entire case.
government's entire
case?48
the light of the government's
Justice Scalia, writing
writing for the majority, pounced on the problems
that this proposal, as all conditional
conditional rules, would entail:
Even more significantly, evidence
evidence requiring
requiring linkage
linkage differs from
evidence incriminating
incriminating on its face in the practical effects which
evidence
application
Bruton exception
exception would produce. If limited to
application of the Bruton
facially incriminating
Bruton can be complied with
incriminating confessions, Bruton
redaction-a possibility suggested
itself. If
If
by redaction-a
suggested in that opinion itself.
extended to confessions
incriminating by connection, not only is
extended
confessions incriminating
that not possible,
but
it
is not even possible to predict the
possible,
admissibility of a confession
admissibility
confession in advance of trial. The "contextual
"contextual
implication" doctrine .
implication"
. .
. ..would
would presumably require the trial
judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of
of
the evidence, a nontestifying
codefendant's
confession
has
been
nontestifying codefendant's
been
"powerfully incriminating"
incriminating" that a new, separate
so "powerfully
separate trial is
required for the defendant. This obviously lends itself to
manipulation
manipulation
defense-and even without manipulation
manipulation by the defense-and
will result in numerous mistrials and appeals. It might be

Id.at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent never mentioned
248. [d.
mentioned what would happen if the judge
determined that the rest of the evidence, as in Richardson
detennined
Richardson itself, linked the defendant
defendant to the confession.
confession.
Presumably, though, the judge would have to declare a mistrial. Justice Stevens did make suggestions
about how to avoid the problem in the first place, by "granting
"granting immunity, making
making plea bargains, or
or
simply waiting
separately." /d.
Id.at 219 (Stevens, J.,
waiting until after a confessing defendant
defendant has been tried
tried separately."
dissenting).
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suggested that those consequences
consequences could be reduced by
suggested
conducting
conducting a pretrial hearing at which prosecution and defense
would reveal the evidence they plan to introduce, enabling the
court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than ex
post.
post. If this approach is even feasible under the Federal Rules
(which is doubtful-see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 14), it would be
249
far from
obviously far
time consuming
consuming and obviously
from foolproof.
foolproor.2 49

Neither
Nelson, much less implies
Neither opinion in Richardson
Richardson mentions Nelson,
implies
Bruton doctrine was already a conditional
that the Bruton
conditional rule.
D.
D. Aggregation
Aggregation
The third way that the Supreme Court has made constitutional
constitutional
rules conditional is to aggregate
aggregate the time frame in which to make a
judgment about the legitimacy of an actor's behavior. As with the
other forms of conditional rules, in order to determine
determine if the action at
issue is constitutional, one must take into account a future event. But
with aggregation, the future event is one taken by the same actor who
was responsible
responsible for the original action, or by someone exercising
exercising
250
25°
government
government power toward the same end.
In generic
generic form, such a
rule has the following form:
(i)
(i) If a government
government official does X at time 1,
1, then it violates the
2.
Constitution for the government
government to do Y at time 2.
(ii)
(ii) X and Y both must occur to violate the rule.
For the appropriate
appropriate sports analogy, one must turn
tum to football. In
In
order to make a judgment
judgment about whether an ineligible
ineligible receiver has
gone downfield
downfield on a pass play, the referee
referee cannot simply determine
how far an interior lineman has moved past the line of scrimmage
scrimmage as
the quarterback
quarterback goes back to pass. One must wait until the
249. Richardson,
J., majority
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-09
20~9 (Scalia, 1.,
majority opinion).
250. Thus, a rule made conditional by aggregation differs from a liability
liability rule in that in the latter, the
future action
action is taken by the person
person who is the beneficiary
beneficiary of the rule and in the former by the person
person
whose power the rule restricts.
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quarterback actually
actually throws the ball while an ineligible receiver
receiver is in
a prohibited position before one can determine that a foul has
251
occurred.25
'
At a trivial level, something like this analysis operates whenever a
judge makes an order for something
something to happen
happen which will violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant. If the order is never executed,
the mere announcement
announcement will not violate
violate the Constitution, absent some
extraordinary circumstance
circumstance by which the words alone have an effect
effect
extraordinary
on the process. It is on this basis, for example, that the result the
252
2 The
Gaines v. Washington
Washington makes sense.25
Court reached in Gaines
defendant in Gaines
Gaines claimed that he was denied his right to a public
trial by virtue of the trial judge's order closing the courtroom.253 The
record, however, disclosed that either
either the judge changed
changed his mind or
the bailiffs simply ignored him. Because nothing ever happened
happened as a
result of the judge's original order, the Court refused to find any rule
254
violation. 254
aggregation is necessary
It is easy to see why aggregation
necessary in a Gaines
Gaines situation.
Since the judge's order was never implemented, his words
words were no
more damaging
to
the
defendant
than
the
private
damaging
defendant
private thought that
immediately preceded
preceded them. Even where this is not the case,
immediately
however, aggregation
aggregation is sometimes
sometimes necessary
necessary because the words that
of
the defendant objects to are but a small part of a continuous course of
action whose impact depends on the overall effect. This is what
prosecutor has deprived
deprived
occurs when one must decide if a judge or prosecutor
constitutional right by a single comment that
the defendant of a constitutional
isolated
comes in the course of a relatively lengthy presentation. An isolated
slip of the tongue that is immediately corrected,
corrected, for example, would
would
255
constitutional rule.
not violate any constitutional
rule. 255

251.
251. N.C.A.A. Football
Football Rules and Interpretations Rule 7.3,
7.3, Art. 10 (2007).
252.
252. Gaines v. Washington,
Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928).
(1928).
253.
253. Id.
Id. at 84.
254. Id.
Id. at 86.
255. See,
See, e.g., Commonwealth
Commonwealth v. Cotto, 870
870 N.E.2d
N.E.2d 109,
109, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (finding that trial
court's erroneous
court's
erroneous statement to jury
jury that defendant
defendant had burden
burden of proof
proof with respect to element
element of the
crime was not a violation of defendant's rights as it was a "single, isolated slip of the tongue, which the
judge quickly
quickly corrected").
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When judges
judges instruct juries
juries on the law they must apply in deciding
deciding
a defendant's
defendant's guilt, they often allude to a particular legal doctrine a
related
number of times, using different vantage points to illuminate related
aspects of interlocking concepts. For example, a judge may tell the
jury about the doctrine of the presumption
presumption of innocence, the
prosecution's burden
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and how to
evaluate the truthfulness
witnesses' testimony. An isolated
isolated
evaluate
truthfulness of witnesses'
"every witness is presumed
presumed to speak the
statement to the effect that "every
witnesses
truth," appears problematic
problematic in a case where all of the witnesses
25 6 In
appeared for the prosecution, as occurred
appeared
occurred in Cupp v. Naughten.
Naughten. 256
considering, however, whether
whether this statement so undermined the
defendant of due
presumption of innocence that it deprived the defendant
aggregation technique
process, the Court applied an aggregation
technique that made
evaluating
constitutional rule conditional:
evaluating the constitutional
In determining the effect
instruction..,
effect of this instruction
. . . we accept at the
outset the well-established
well-established proposition that a single instruction to
a jury may not be judged
judged in artificial isolation, but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge. While this does not
mean that an instruction by itself may never
never rise to the level of
constitutional error, it does recognize
of
constitutional
recognize that a judgment of
culmination of a trial which includes
conviction is commonly the culmination
testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits
in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not
only is the challenged
challenged instruction
instruction but one of many such
instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of
several
several components of the trial which may result in the judgment
judgment
25 7
. . 257
ooff conviction.

U.S. 141,142
(1973).
256. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.s.
141, 142 (1973).
257.
Id. at 146-47
146-47 (citations
also Middleton v. McNeil,
257. Id.
(citations omitted). See also
McNeil, 541 U.S. 433,
433, 437 (2004)
(2004) (no
(no
elements of the crime and at
at
due process
process violation where judge gave one erroneous instruction on the elements
least three correct instructions
instructions on the same issue, "not every
every ambiguity, inconsistency,
inconsistency, or deficiency
deficiency in a
jury
instruction rises to the level of a due process violation");
jury instruction
violation"); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,
370, 380
380
(1990) (stating that where the defendant claims that a judge's
(1990)
judge'S instruction is ambiguous
ambiguous and therefore
therefore
erroneous interpretation,
"the proper inquiry
... is whether there is a reasonable
inquiry ...
reasonable likelihood
subject to an erroneous
interpretation, "the
instruction in
that the jury has applied
applied the challenged instruction
in [[an
an improper]
improper] way.").
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The same holds true when considering
considering whether
whether a single part of a
258
due process.
violates
jury
a
to
statement
closing
prosecutor's
process. 258
prosecutor's closing statement to a jury violates due
of
In the situations discussed below, however, the appeal of
aggregation
aggregation is less obvious. The time frame within which events are
earlier
aggregated is much lengthier, and the effect
effect of freeing the earlier
action
from
the
direct
application
of
the
Constitution
is
more
drastic.
action
application
1. The Sixth Amendment
Amendment Right to the Appointment of Counsel
Counsel for
Indigent
Defendants Accused ofMisdemeanors
Indigent Defendants
Misdemeanors
1963, the Supreme
In 1963,
Supreme Court decided one of the iconic cases in
259 Gideon
Gideon v. Wainwright.
Gideon
constitutional criminal procedure, Gideon
Wainwright?59
held that the state of Florida violated
violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment
by
refusing to appoint
Fourteenth Amendment
appoint a lawyer for an
felony. 260 The case arose in the
indigent defendant charged
charged with a felony.260
heyday of due process incorporation,
incorporation, when the Warren Court picked
picked
of
through the specific provisions of the Bill of
its way one by one through
Rights and decided
decided whether or not they applied to the states in more
or less the same format as they did to the federal government. As did
did
Gideon held that the Sixth
almost every other incorporation
incorporation case, Gideon
Amendment
constitutional rule that
Amendment right to counsel
counsel provision was the constitutional
governed the appointment of counsel in state courts, rather than a
balancing test. Justice
more general and less generous due process
process balancing
reflection require us to
Black wrote for the Court: "[R]eason
"[R]eason and reflection
adversary system of criminal
criminal justice, any person
person
recognize that in our adversary
hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
assured
261 Finding the right to
a fair trial unless counsel
counsel is provided
provided for him."
him.,,261
262 the Court held
counsel "fundamental
"fundamental and essential to a fair trial, ,,262
that this part of the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states.
(1974) ("[T]he
("[Tlhe prosecutor's
258. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.
U.S. 637,
637, 645 (1974)
prosecutor's remark here,
admittedly an ambiguous
ambiguous one, was but one moment
moment in an extended
extended trial and was followed by specific
constitutional line drawing in this regard is
disapproving instructions. Although the process of constitutional
necessarily imprecise, we simply do not believe
believe that this incident
incident made respondent's trial so
fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process.").
fundamentally
259. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
(1963).
260. Id
[d. at 339.
339.
261. Jd.
261.
[d. at 344.
262. Id.
[d. at 342.
342.
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On its face, however, the right to counsel clause does not explicitly
explicitly
address
Gideon raised. "In
"In all criminal prosecutions,
prosecutions,
address the question that Gideon
the accused
shall
enjoy
the
right
.
.
.
to
have
the
Assistance
of
accused
. . .
Assistance of
263
Counsel for his defence.
There is no reference
defence.",,263 There
reference to the right to have
the state appoint you a lawyer
lawyer if you are too poor to hire one on your
your
own. And, the historical context against which the provision was
included in the Bill of Rights presented
presented a quite different issue-the
practice
practice of English courts denying all felony defendants the right to
Gideon did
Nevertheless, Gideon
be represented
represented by any attorney whatsoever. Nevertheless,
not have to craft its own answer
answer to what the right to counsel provision
of the Sixth Amendment
Amendment meant for criminal
criminal courts confronted
confronted by an
indigent defendant.
decided one of the few right to counsel
In 1938, the Court had decided
Johnson v.
cases that came
came to its docket from the federal process, Johnson
264
Zerbst.
challenging a federal
Zerbst?64 Johnson
Johnson was a habeas corpus petition challenging
conviction on the ground that having been denied an appointed
appointed
defendant was
lawyer and being unable to afford one on his own, the defendant
being held in custody
custody in violation of his right under the Sixth
Amendment. The Court viewed the right to counsel as a cornerstone
of the integrity of the entire criminal
process-one of the "essential
criminal process--one
265
of human
deprivation of
unjust deprivation
human rights."
rights.,,265
barriers against arbitrary
arbitrary or unjust
Powell v. Alabama
Relying on Powell
Alabama for the proposition that without a
lawyer, the right to a hearing is essentially meaningless
meaningless for even an
intelligent
sophisticated lay defendant, the Court held that "[t]he
intelligent and sophisticated
"[t]he
Sixth Amendment
Amendment withholds
withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority
life
proceedings,
authority to deprive an accused of his life
266
or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance
assistance of counsel.
counsel.,,266
Counsel was so fundamentally
fundamentally important a feature that without it, the
Court, "kiss[ed]
"kiss[ ed] the jurisdictional book" and made the claim
267
cognizable
COrpUS?67
cognizable in habeas
habeas corpus.
amend. VI.
263. U.S.
U.s. CONST. amend.
264. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
304 U.S.
U.S. 458
458 (1938).
264.
(1938).
265.
Id.
at 462.
265. Id.
462.
266. Id.
/d. at 463.
463.
267.
267. The reference is to the phrase
phrase coined by Judge
Judge Friendly. See Henry
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Innocence
Irrelevant?Collateral
CriminalJudgments,
I"elevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 151 (1970-1971).
(1970-1971).
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By incorporating
incorporating the right to counsel
counsel clause in the Fourteenth
Fourteenth
straightforward nonAmendment, Gideon established
established a relatively straightforward
conditional rule. But the state criminal court systems dwarfed
dwarfed their
their
counterparts, and the practical problem of providing attorneys
federal counterparts,
for the millions of state defendants
defendants led to efforts to restrict the scope
of Gideon's
Gideon's mandate. The obvious path to take for states that could
not, or did not want to, appoint attorneys in every case was to confine
Gideon only to felony cases. One could defend this line on more than
pragmatic
Gideon itself was a felony case, and the Court's
Court's
pragmatic grounds. Gideon
language about the need for a lawyer to make the process fair
language
arguably was less relevant to the often simple and relatively brief
brief
proceedings that resolved most misdemeanors. Moreover, there was a
constitutional provision, the right to a jury, which incorporated a
constitutional
felony-misdemeanor line.
distinction that very closely tracked the felony-misdemeanor
Defendants in petty cases, generally those subject
subject to a maximum
268 If
sentence
sentence of less than six months, were not entitled
entitled to a jury.
jury?68
If
defendants in less serious cases could be tried without a jury, why not
defendants
without a lawyer?
This led to the two cases in which the Court defined the limit of the
269
Gideon principle, Argersinger
Hamlin,269
which came first, and
Gideon
Argersinger v. Hamlin,
27
misdemeanor
Scott v. Illinois.
Illinois?70 Argersinger
Argersinger and Scott both involved misdemeanor
appointed
convictions of indigent defendants who had been denied an appointed
lawyer. They differed, however, in one fundamental respect.
Argersinger
sentenced to a short jail term,271
term, 27 1 and Scott received
Argersinger was sentenced
received
272
fine.
The rule that emerged from the two was classically
classically
only a fine?72
misdemeanor defendant's Sixth Amendment
Amendment
conditional. An indigent misdemeanor
right to appointed counsel is violated if,
and
only
if,
at
the
end of the
if,
if,
273
273
in
Thus, in
process he receives
receives a sentence of imprisonment.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
(1968).
See Duncan
u.s. 145,
145, 158 (1968).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
407 U.S. 25
(1972).
25 (1972).
Scott v. Illinois,
lllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
(1979).
Argersinger,
407 U.S. at 26.
Argersinger, 407
26.
272. Scott, 440 U.S. at 368.
273. See Argersinger,
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40
40 (holding that in misdemeanor
misdemeanor cases "that
273.
''that end up in the actual
of counsel' so
deprivation of
ofaa person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit
benefit of 'the
'the guiding hand ofcounsei'
necessary
Scott, 440 U.S.
"that the Sixth and
necessary when one's
one's liberty is in jeopardy"); Scott,
U.S. at 374 (holding ''that
Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendments
Amendments to the United States Constitution require
require only that no indigent criminal

268.

269.
269.
270.
271.
271.
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Argersinger,where the defendant went to jail, the Court held that his
Argersinger,
274
sentence, not his conviction, violated the Constitution. 274
And in
Scott, where jail was not an issue, the conviction
conviction was
unexceptional.275
275
unexceptional.
One might think that these two cases are not really right to counsel
sentencing authority. One
cases at all, but simply regulate a judge's sentencing
could reformulate the rule that emerged
emerged from Scott as a nonindigent
conditional one, telling judges they may not sentence an indigent
defendant to incarceration
misdemeanor case if the defendant
defendant
defendant
incarceration in a misdemeanor
was not afforded
afforded the right to appointed counsel. But that kind of a
rule would logically
logically require a quite different remedy than the one that
the Court imposed in Argersinger.
Argersinger. A sentencing rule would call for a
procedure, not invalidating
new sentencing
sentencing procedure,
invalidating the underlying
conviction. Thus, the misdemeanor
misdemeanor version of the right to counsel
counsel
violated the
rule is truly a conditional one: you cannot tell if the judge violated
rule until after the sentence is imposed.
The problem
problem this creates, of course, is that a judge has to make a
decision about whether
whether to appoint counsel at the start of the process.
In order
order to implement the rule in its conditional format, a judge
would have to make a decision at arraignment whether
whether to preserve
the option of incarceration
incarceration for a misdemeanor
misdemeanor defendant. The
information available
available at such an early stage of the process is almost
always far less meaningful
meaningful to an intelligent sentencing
sentencing decision than
after a full exposition
of
the
facts.
The end result may be that a judge
exposition
will be forced by circumstance
circumstance to "abandon
"abandon his responsibility
responsibility to
consider
established by the
consider the 6 full range of punishments established
27
legislature.
legislature.",,276
It is clear from both opinions that resource concerns
concerns played
played a
major rule in the Court's decision not to extend Gideon
Gideon to the
Argersinger noted that misdemeanor
misdemeanor cases
cases
misdemeanor context. Argersinger
outnumbered felonies by more than ten to one, and that did not even
even
defendant be sentenced
sentenced to a tenn
term of imprisonment
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed
appointed counsel").
274. Argersinger,
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
275. Scott,
Scott, 440 U.S. at 369.
276.
(Powell, J., concurring).
276. Argersinger,
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53 (powell,
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277
count the 40 to 50 million traffic cases each year. 277
But there were a
number of ways to create a different rule for misdemeanors without
making it conditional. Various alternatives were proposed
proposed by one
Justice or another writing in the two cases when not in the majority.
Among them were proposals to draw the line at cases where there
was no statutorily authorized term of imprisonment possible,278
possible, 278 or
where the defendant was charged with a petty crime so that there
would be no constitutional
constitutional right to ajury.279
a jury.279
Scott's conclusion to keep the conditional rule by construing
Argersinger's
Argersinger's line as the limit of the right to counsel was, at bottom,
a pragmatic
pragmatic one. Perhaps the most telling part of Chief Justice
Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was the one that asserted: "Argersinger
"Argersinger has
proved reasonably workable, whereas
whereas any extension would create
confusion
and
impose
unpredictable,
confusion
unpredictable, but necessarily
necessarily substantial, costs
280
States." Keeping
Keeping a conditional
conditional rule was, quite
on 50 quite diverse States.,,280
simply, the cheapest
cheapest alternative.

2. The Privilege
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment
Amendment to the United States Constitution
Constitution provides
provides
that "no
"no person ...
. . . shall be compelled
compelled in any criminal
criminal case to be a
28
1
witness against himself.,,281
himself.',
From the time of its adoption,
adoption, until the
22882 the rule was
Supreme
Martinez in 2003,
2003,282
Supreme Court decided
decided Chavez v. Martinez
almost universally
prohibited
universally considered
considered to be non-conditional.
non-conditional. It prohibited
using compulsion
compulsion to obtain testimony
testimony that could be used to provide
provide a
link
to
a
chain
evidence that might
of evidence
might incriminate
incriminate
the person from
from
link
283
whom the government
government sought
sought the
the information.
information?83

277. See id.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
id. at
at 34
34 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND
AND ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK
REPORT: THE COURTS 55
TASK FORCE
FORCE REpORT:
55 (1967)).
(1967».
278. Scott, 440
440 U.S.
U.S. at 382
382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
279. Id.
Id. at 380
380 (Brennan,
(Brennan, J.,
J., dissenting).
280. Id.
Id. at 373.
373.
281.
281. U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend. V.
v.
282.
282. Chavez
Chavez v. Martinez,
Martinez, 538
538 U.S. 760
760 (2003).
(2003).
283.
("The [Self-Incrimination]
283. Id.
Id. at 791
791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
dissenting) ('The
[Self-Incrimination] Clause protects
protects an
an individual from
from
being
being forced
forced to give
give answers
answers demanded
demanded by an
an official
official in
in any
any context
context when
when the
the answers
answers might
might give
give rise to
to
criminal
criminal liability
liability in
in the
the future.").
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reconfigured it. Now, when
when aa government
government official
official like
like a
Chavez reconfigured
questioning aa suspect
suspect in custody, a judge
judge presiding
presiding over
over
police officer questioning
counsel for a legislative
legislative committee
committee questioning a
a grand jury, or counsel
threatens or applies
applies compulsion
compulsion to get an
an incriminating
incriminating
witness, threatens
self-incrimination
not violated
violated the privilege
privilege against
against self-incrimination
answer, they have not
have merely
merely set
set in motion a potential
potential violation,
violation, which
which
at all. They have
becomes complete
complete only if,
if, and
and when, the compelled
compelled testimony
testimony is
becomes
284
evidence against
introduced
introduced as evidence
against its
its author.
author?84
1983 seeking
was a civil rights
rights action under 42 U.S.C.
U.S.c. § 1983
Chavez was
damages
damages for a violation
violation of the plaintiffs
plaintiff's right to substantive
substantive due
85
process and to the privilege
privilege against self-incrimination.
self-incrimination.2285
Martinez,
the plaintiff, was riding his bicycle by the scene of a narcotics
investigation when he was stopped
investigation
stopped and frisked by police officers. An
altercation
altercation broke out and Martinez
Martinez was shot several
several times, his
wounds severe
severe enough
enough to leave
leave him permanently
permanently blind and paralyzed
paralyzed
from the waist
waist down. A patrol supervisor, Chavez,
Chavez, accompanied
accompanied him
to the hospital, and it is the interrogation
interrogation that took place
place while
emergency room that gave rise to the civil rights
Martinez was in the emergency
286
286
suit.
The due process
process claim, based on the allegation that Chavez
Chavez
intentionally inflicted mental anguish on the plaintiff
intentionally
plaintiff by refusing to
Martinez was in severe
cease his questioning
questioning while Martinez
severe pain and believed
287 The selfselfhe was dying, was remanded
remanded to the lower courts.
COurtS.287
incrimination
incrimination claim, however, did not fare as well because of the way
288
a majority of the Court recast the rule.288
Martinez
Martinez was never charged
charged with a crime, and so the statements
statements he
emergency room were
interrogated him in the emergency
made while Chavez interrogated
289 That
trial. 289
never used as evidence against him at a criminal tria1.
led the
implementing the privilege
Court to consider whether the rule implementing
privilege is a
of
interrogations of
compelled by police interrogations
"Statements compelled
conditional one. "Statements
conditional

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
ld.
at 767.
Id. at 765.
ld.
Id. at 763-64.
763--64.
ld.
Id.at
at 776.
776.
ld
id.
at 773.
See id
at
Id.at
at 764.
764.
ld.
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course may
may not be
be used
used against
against aa defendant
defendant at trial,"
trial," Justice
Justice Clarence
Clarence
course
Thomas wrote
wrote in his plurality
plurality opinion, "but
"but it is not
not until
until their
their use in
Self-Incrimination Clause
criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination
a criminal
29
0
occurS.,,290 Since
Since Martinez was never tried, he suffered
suffered no
occurs."
infringement to his right under the privilege.
infringement
That
officer
That makes the
the rule truly
truly a conditional
conditional one. If a police officer
events
coerces a statement
statement from a suspect, and like in Chavez, future events
coerces
statement is used
do not
not unfold so that the statement
used as evidence
evidence against
against him,
then the officer has not violated
if
violated the privilege. On the other hand, if
Chavez
is
logical
implication
then
the
used
at
trial,
the statement
then
logical
implication
of
is
statement
not only that the defendant
defendant has been deprived of his right under the
privilege, but also that the officer who coerced the statement
statement has
violated
violated the rule.
Had Chavez meant to convey the message that the privilege
privilege simply
simply
does not restrict the actions of the person who compels the statement,
people who offer and allow
allow it into evidence, there would
but only the people
have been no need for the opinions constituting
constituting the majority to focus
on the fact that Martinez
Martinez had not yet been tried. They simply would
have pointed out that he picked the wrong defendant. But what the
Court focused on was not the irrelevance
irrelevance of the privilege for those
who compel
compel suspects
suspects to talk, but the fact that the violation is not
not
291
trial.291
complete until the statements are used at tria1.
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion relied primarily
primarily on a textual
privilege to justify the conclusion
conclusion that a courtroom use
analysis of the privilege
292 Since the
of the suspect's
suspect's statement was a necessary ingredient.292
application of the
language in the Fifth Amendment
Amendment restricted the application
language
any
("No person..,
privilege to criminal
criminal cases (''No
person ... shall be compelled
compelled in any
293
criminal case,,)/93
case"), for Justice Thomas the way to begin was to see if
criminal
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767. This part of the plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
290. Chavez,
and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Justice
Justice Souter
Souter wrote his own concurring
concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Justice
self-incrimination to be
Breyer, in which he viewed the "basic"
"basic" right protected
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination
the exclusion of the statement at trial, and the question presented by Chavez to be whether an
"extension" of
of the
the bare
guarantee was
was necessary
necessary to
protect it
it against
against ''the
"the invasive pressures
of
"extension"
bare guarantee
to protect
pressures of
Id. at 777-78.
contemporary society."
society." !d.
291. !d.
Id.
291.
Id.
292. Id.
V.
293. U.S. CONST. amend. v.

Published by Reading Room, 2010

71
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 487 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

488

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2
[Vol.

occurred in the context of a criminal case.
what happened to Martinez occurred
For this, he turned to the dictionary. According to the definition he
found there, criminal cases require some formal initiation of legal
294 Textualism, then,
proceedings,
proceedings, not just police questioning.
questioning?94
compelled the Court to construe the privilege as a conditional rule.
This textualist view of the privilege, relying in part on a dictionary
published in 1990, would have been strange, indeed, to lawyers
practicing
practicing at the time that the privilege was made a part of the
Constitution. 295 An eighteenth
eighteenth century lawyer would not have
Constitution?95
thought the privilege against self incrimination
order
incrimination was needed in order
to protect defendants
defendants from being compelled to testify against
against
themselves in their own criminal
criminal cases. That really was not a problem
problem
that could have been on anyone's mind for the simple reason that
defendants, as interested
interested parties, were uniformly disqualified from
296 The only places where compelled testimony could
testifying at all.296
could
have been worrisome
worrisome were precisely in those forums that were
case-for example,
outside the common
common understanding
understanding of a criminal case-for
as a witness before
before a grand jury or in a civil case.
Indeed, precisely
precisely the argument
argument Justice Thomas made was rejected
rejected
9 7 The
by the Court
1892, in Counselman
Hitchcock.2297
Counselman v. Hitchcock.
Court in 1892,
Government argued
Government
argued there
there that a grand jury witness could
could not rely on
the privilege
because
"[i]t
privilege
"[i]t is only 'in
'in a criminal
criminal case'
case' that a witness
witness
can refuse to answer. An investigation
investigation before a grand jury
is
jury in no
'
29
8
Counselman's response
'a criminal case.'
case. ",298 Counselman's
response to this claim
claim
sense 'a
reaffirmed
non-conditional nature
reaffIrmed the non-conditional
nature of the rule:
It
It is impossible
impossible that the meaning
meaning of the constitutional
constitutional provision
can
compelled to be a witness
can only be,
be, that a person shall
shall not be compelled
witness
294.
Chavez, 538
294. Chavez,
538 U.S.
U.S. atat 766
766 (citing
(citing BLACK'S
BLACK'S LAW
LAW DICTIONARY
DICTIONARY 215
215 (6th
(6th ed.
ed. 1990)).
1990)).
295.
295. For
For aa discussion
discussion of
of the
the relationship
relationship between
between textualism
textualism and
and originalism,
originalism, see Aileen
Aileen Kavanagh,
Kavanagh,
OriginalIntention,
ConstitutionalInterpretation,
Original
Intention, Enacted
Enacted Text and Constitutional
Interpretation, 47
47 AM.
AM. J.
J. JuRIS.
JURIS. 255,
255, 295-96
295-96 (2002);
(2002);
Paul
Paul Brest,
Brest, The
The Misconceived
MISconceived Quest
Quest for
for the
the Original
Original Understanding,
Understanding, 60
60 B.U.
B.U. L. REV.
REv. 204,
204, 205-17
205-17
(1980).
(1980).

296.
("Disqualification for
296. See Ferguson
Ferguson v.v. Georgia,
Georgia, 365
365 U.S.
U.S. 570,
570, 574
574 (1961)
(1961) ("Disqualification
for interest
interest was
was thus
thus
extensive
extensive inin the
the common
common law
law when
when this
this Nation
Nation was
was formed.
formed. Here,
Here, as in
in England,
England, criminal
criminal defendants
defendants
were
were deemed
deemed incompetent
incompetent as witnesses.")
witnesses.") (citations
(citations omitted).
omitted).
297.
297. Counselman
Counselman v.v. Hitchcock,
Hitchcock, 142
142 U.S.
U.S. 547
547 (1892).
(1892).
298.
298. Id.
Id. at
at 562.
562.
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against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It
would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not limited to them.
The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
investigation, to give testimony
when acting as a witness in any investigation,
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime. The privilege
privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as
crime.
299
299
to guard.
seeks to
broad as the mischief against
against which
which it
it seeks
guard.
of the members
members of the majority opinion
opinion on the privilege
privilege
Now, none ofthe
issue in Chavez advocated
advocated requiring grand jury witnesses
witnesses to give
incriminating answers. Justice Thomas recognized
recognized the continued
continued
vitality
vitality of the principle that a witness could assert the Privilege
Privilege
300
30
0
But the cases that
outside the context of a criminal case.
of
recognized
recognized this principle,
principle, he asserted, were not direct
direct applications of
the
to "safeguard
prophylactic rules designed
the Constitution
Constitution but prophylactic
designed
"safeguard
30 1
core constitutional right.
right.,,301
Two observations
observations come
come to mind about this argument. First, it
coming from someone
someone who was one of the two
sounds very odd coming
30 2
dissenters in Dickerson
United States.
States. 302
Dickerson was decided
Dickerson
Dickerson v. United
Court to the hard
only three years before
before Chavez, and it put the Court
prophylactic rule that
choice of either admitting that Miranda
Miranda was a prophylactic
Congress could override
override or explaining why it had a sound
sound
30 3 The majority, in
constitutional basis.
basis.303
the view of the dissenting
constitutional
opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, never squarely answered
answered this
dissenters, both of whom joined
joined not only there
question. But the two dissenters,
but also in the pertinent part of the Chavez case, were not so reticent
in their views on the legitimacy of the Court's constructing
prophylactic rules. To give but a mild example:
prophylactic

[T]hat this Court has the power, not merely to apply the
Constitution
Constitution but to expand
expand it, imposing what it regards as useful
299.
300.
301.
301.
302.
302.
303.
303.

Id.
/d.
538 U.S. at 772 n.3.
See Chavez, 538
Id.
[d. at 761.
761.
428 (2000).
(2000).
Dickerson v. United States, 530
530 U.S. 428
id.
See id.
at 436-37.
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"prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States
States...
"prophylactic"
... [i]s
an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does
304
. 304
exist.
not eXIst.

Second, prophylactic rules, legitimate
legitimate or not, are entirely a creature
of the mid-1960s. 30°55 It entails some degree of historical revisionism
to attribute to the Court's writing opinions condemning the
compulsion of witnesses before
before grand juries, legislative hearings and
administrative proceedings, which date back at least to Chief Justice
John Marshall's
United States
States v. Burr,306
Burr,306 the
Marshall's 1807 circuit opinion in United
announcement of
construction of a prophylactic
prophylactic rule rather than the announcement
of
what they believed
believed the Constitution
Constitution itself required.
If it was not fidelity to history that drove the majority
majority to the
self-incrimination must be a
conclusion that the privilege against
against self-incrimination
conditional rule, then what explains the result? Well, making the
privilege
Chavez
privilege conditional
conditional was one way to relieve the defendants in Chavez
of civil liability for failing to give the gravely injured suspect
suspect a
Miranda
Miranda warning.
One can see how the prospect
suspect
lawsuit every
every time a suspect
prospect of a lawsuit
Miranda would have
claimed he or she was questioned
questioned in violation of Miranda
been
been daunting. Chavez has the potential of reducing almost to a
nullity the class
successfully sue a
could successfully
class of potential plaintiffs who could
police
officer
for
using
coercion
to
elicit
an
incriminating
police
coercion
incriminating statement.
Since the future consequence
defines the violation is use at
consequence which defmes
someone who successfully suppressed
suppressed
trial, how will Chavez apply to someone
his statement
statement prior to trial? If all that happened
happened is that the prosecutor
prosecutor
unsuccessfully
tried
to
use
the
defendant's
coerced
statement,
it is
unsuccessfully
defendant's coerced
hard to see the Chavez majority's finding a violation
violation of the rule. That
means the only people
people who will
will have a viable case will be those who
made aa statement
statement in the face of police
police coercion,
coercion, lost a suppression
suppression
304.
304. Id.
[d. at 446 (Scalia
(Scalia & Thomas,
Thomas, JJ.,
J1., dissenting).
305.
305. See Dickerson
Dickerson v. United
United States,
States, 530
530 U.S.
U.S. 428,
428, 457
457 (2000)
(2000) (Scalia,
(Scalia, J.,
J., dissenting)
dissenting) ("Indeed,
("Indeed, the
the
United States
of this
this
States argues that 'prophylactic
'prophylactic rules are now
now and have
have been
been for
for many
many years a feature
feature of
if by
by 'many
'many years'
years' one
one
Court's constitutional
constitutional adjudication.'
adjudication.' That statement
statement is not
not wholly
wholly inaccurate,
inaccurate, if
means
means since
since the
the mid-1960s.").
mid· I 960s.").
306.
1807).
v. Burr,
Burr, 25
25 F.
F. Cas. 55
55 (C.C.D.
(C.C.D. Va. 1807).
306. United
United States v.
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motion, had the statement
statement admitted at trial, and either were acquitted
acquitted
or got their conviction reversed
on
the
ground
that
the
statement
reversed
ground
statement
should not have been allowed into evidence. There aren't many
many
lawyers
lawyers who would want to confine
confine their practices
practices to this universe of
of
potential clients.
3. Government Interference
Interference with the Defendant's
Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel

Amendment right to counsel is
One of the corollaries
corollaries of the Sixth Amendment
the rule that prevents the government
government from interfering
interfering with an
established
attorney-client relationship. In the Morrison
Morrison case
established attorney-client
discussed in Part I.B.vi,
l.B.vi, the Court assumed
assumed that it violated the Sixth
Amendment
for
law
enforcement
Amendment
enforcement officials to try to convince the
cooperate with them by
by
defendant to abandon her attorney and cooperate
30 7
lawyer.
her
disparaging her lawyer?07
Another aspect of the lawyer-client
lawyer-client relationship that has a
constitutional dimension is the sanctity of privileged
communications
privileged communications
between
government listens in on a conversation
conversation about
about
between the two. If the government
the case between
between a defendant and her lawyer, does it violate the
depends-this time, it
Constitution? Again, the answer is that it depends-this
depends on what the unwanted listener
listener does with the information. 30 8
v. Bursey.
Weatherford v.
in Weatherford
issue in
this issue
confronted this
The Court confronted
Bursey. 308
Weatherford was a Section 1983
1983 civil rights action against an
Weatherford
an
undercover
Enforcement
undercover agent for the South Carolina
Carolina Law Enforcement
30 9
Division. 309
Weatherford
had
sat
in
on
discussions
between
Weatherford
between Bursey
and his attorney. The Bursey
Bursey defense team was planning for an
upcoming
upcoming trial charging Bursey with malicious
malicious destruction
destruction of
of
property
property for throwing
throwing a brick through the window of a Selective
Service office. Bursey and his lawyer believed
believed Weatherford, who had
also been indicted for the same offense after participating in the brick
brick
throwing incident, was a legitimate
legitimate codefendant. They invited him to

307.
308.

361, 364 (1981).
(1981).
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
(1977).
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
429 U.S. 545
545 (1977).
309. Id.
[d. at 547.
547.
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participate in their discussions, because they believed he could
310
defense. 310
Bursey's defense.
benefit Bursey's
would benefit
that would
ideas that
provide information and ideas
Because Weatherford
Weatherford wanted to maintain his undercover
undercover status so
so
that he could continue to develop information on criminal behavior
behavior
by other members of the anti-war movement at the local university,
affiliation
he attended the meetings without, of course, revealing his affiliation
3 11
with the prosecution. 311
At these meetings, Bursey and his lawyer
discussed with Weatherford the possibility of there being an informer
in the midst of the group, but they never suspected how close he
really was. Since no one ever asked him, Weatherford never had to
312
affiliation. 312
true affiliation.
deny his true
Weatherford's plans to remain undercover
undercover were frustrated when
his affiliation with the prosecutor's
prosecutor's office became known
inadvertently and the prosecutor
prosecutor decided to use him as an eyewitness.
He testified at Bursey's
Bursey's trial and was instrumental in obtaining the
conviction which led to Bursey's serving an eighteen-month
eighteen-month
sentence. When Bursey got out, he sued the agent for depriving him
him
of the effective assistance
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
Amendment
313
3
13
guaranteed.
guaranteed.
The trial court found that Weatherford
Weatherford never revealed any of the
conversation between Bursey
Bursey and his lawyer, either in
details of the conversation
the prosecutor.314
with the
communications
his
in
or
his testimony at trial
trial or in his communications with
prosecutor. 314
That
aggregation the key to Bursey's
aggregated
That made aggregation
Bursey's claim. If one aggregated
the undercover
agent
and
the
prosecutor
for
whom
he worked and
undercover agent
prosecutor
who directed his actions,
actions, it would be an easy
easy case. Even the United
conceded that it
States, in its amicus brief supporting Weatherford, conceded
would violate
Amendment if the government:
violate the Sixth
Sixth Amendment
[R]eceives
. . privileged
[R]eceives ....
privileged information
information pertaining
pertaining to the defense
defense
. . . because
of the criminal charges
charges ...
because the Sixth Amendment's
Amendment's
assistance-of-counsel
assistance-of-counsel guarantee
guarantee can be meaningfully
meaningfully
310.
310.
311.
311.
312.
312.
313.
313.
314.
314.

Id.
[d. at 548.
Id.
[d. at 547.
Id.
[d. at 548.
548.
Id.
[d. at 549.
Weatherford,
Weatheiford, 429 U.S.
U.S. at 548.
548.
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implemented
implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his
his
communications with his attorney
communications
attorney are private and that his lawful
preparations for trial are secure
preparations
secure against
against intrusion by the
3 15
criminal
the
·
d
.
h
"
government, his
government,
a versary in
m t e cnmmaI proceeding.
proceed'mg. 315
h IS adversary

On the other hand, if the Court aggregated
aggregated the actions of the
undercover agent over time, rather than across bureaucratic
undercover
bureaucratic labels,
Bursey's claim looked a lot different. And that is what the Court did.
Weatherford's actions actively
The opinion
opinion did not simply focus on Weatherford's
hiding his allegiance
allegiance to the prosecution
prosecution and invading the attorney
determine
behavior after the fact to detennine
client relationship. It looked at his behavior
if
if he violated the rule. It construed the Sixth Amendment rule to
prohibit not invading the attorney client relationship, but
communicating
what was learned, either at trial or to the
communicating
16
3316
prosecutor.
The Court explained the rationale for its conditional rule:
As long as the information
information possessed by Weatherford
Weatherford remained
remained
uncommunicated, he posed no substantial
Bursey's
uncommunicated,
substantial threat to Bursey's
Sixth Amendment
Amendment rights. Nor do we believe that federal or state
prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the difficulties of proof will
be so great that we must always assume not only that an
informant
communicates what he learns from an encounter
informant communicates
encounter with
the defendant and his counsel but also that what he
communicates
or
communicates has the potential
potential for detriment to the defendant or
3 17
317
case.
prosecutor's
the
to
benefit
prosecutor's case.
Weatherford's presence
presence
Clearly, the Court
Court saw nothing wrong with Weatherford's
at the meeting. Later in the opinion, it did point out that Weatherford
Weatherford
had not actively
been
actively sought to join Bursey and his lawyer, but had been
invited and attended
cover.3 18 However,
attended only in order to maintain his cover.318
nothing in the rationale the opinion
opinion offered, which looked
looked exclusively
exclusively
315. ld.
Id. at 554
554 0.4.
n.4.
Id. at 558.
316. Id.at558.
317.
Id. at 556-57.
317. ld
318.
Id. at 557.
318.ldat557.
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at Weatherford's
Weatherford's behavior
behavior after the fact, would make this factor
determinative.
If one takes a different view of the effect of undercover agents
insinuating themselves into the bosom
bosom of the defense
defense team, the logic
conditional rule is less attractive. Justice Marshall's
of a conditional
Marshall's dissent
considered the effect
condoning the placement of prosecution
considered
effect of condoning
prosecution
witnesses into otherwise
otherwise private
private meetings
meetings between a defendant
defendant and
defense counsel:
[E]ven if the witnesses cannot divulge the information to the
prosecution ...
... [they] are in a position to formulate in advance
prosecution
answers to anticipated
anticipated questions, and even to shade their
testimony to meet expected defenses. Furthermore,
Furthermore, because of
of
these dangers defendants may be deterred
from
exercising
their
deterred
exercising
right to communicate candidly with their lawyers
government
lawyers if government
witnesses can intrude upon the lawyer-client
lawyer-client relationship with
impunity so long as they do not discuss what they learn with the
prosecutor. And insofar
insofar as the Sixth Amendment
Amendment establishes an
independent right to confidential
confidential communications
communications with a lawyer,
that right by definition is invaded
invaded when a government
government agent
attends meetings of the defense team at which defense plans are
19
.
d .3319
reviewed.
reVlewe

The dissent was also less willing to assume that defendants
defendants would
be in a position after the fact to learn that an informer
informer had
communicated
to
the
prosecutor the details of a privileged discussion.
communicated
Surely, it reasoned, it would be unlikely for the informer
informer to offer up
prosecutor of uncommon
such information. And, it would require
require a prosecutor
uncommon
virtue to report such an event, given the likely consequences
consequences not only
only
Weatherford, but also with respect to
in terms of civil liability as in Weatherford,
the real possibility that it would prevent
prevent the case against the
32o
32
°
defendant from going forward.

319. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
/d. at 564 (Marshall,
320. Weatherford,
Weatherford,429 U.S. at 565.
565.
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4. Identification
Procedures,the Right to Counsel
Counsel and Due
4.
Identification Procedures,
Process
Process
If you see enough crime
crime stories on television or film, you'll come
across a scene where the police take a suspect
in
suspect into custody and, in
order to sew up the case, have the victim view him in a lineup or take
a peek at him sitting in handcuffs
When
handcuffs in the back of a police car. When
the scene shifts to the trial, it typically
of
typically includes
includes the little bit of
manufactured
drama
when
the
victim
takes
the
stand,
looks
around
manufactured
the courtroom
courtroom and then points to the guy sitting next to the defense
committed the crime.
attorney as the person who committed
When these events occur in real life, it implicates
implicates two
constitutional
identification
constitutional doctrines. One is relevant if the identification
procedure
procedure occurred after the defendant has been formally charged
charged
with a crime. If so, then the right to counsel
counsel has attached, and the
Amendment to have a lawyer
defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment
21
present. 3321
The other stems from the possibility that the way the
police have arranged the encounter
unnecessarily suggestive.
encounter made it unnecessarily
When that happens
happens there is a substantial
substantial risk that the witness
mistakenly
under
mistakenly identified the wrong person. This raises a concern
concern under
322
the Due Process Clause.322
The first of these constitutional
constitutional rules, the one dealing with the right
to counsel, places a direct obligation on the police to respect the
suspect's right to counsel. The other one, dealing with suggestive
identification procedures, is conditional. The rule does not directly
directly
govern the behavior
behavior of the police at all. The Supreme Court has
disaggregated the actors in the process so that the police do not
disaggregated
violate the Constitution
Constitution by conducting
conducting an unnecessarily
unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure. Rather, it is the prosecutor
prosecutor at trial who does
testimony about what happened.
so if he or she elicits testimony
321.
(1972) (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,272
263, 272
321. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972)
(1967) ("[A]
(1967)
("[A] post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused
accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is
a critical stage
stage of the criminal prosecution; that police
police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in
the absence
absence of his counsel
counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and Fourteenth] Amendment
Amendment right to counsel
and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court
in-court identifications
identifications of the accused
accused by witnesses
who attended
attended the lineup.").
322. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
301-02 (1967).
293, 301"'()2
U.S. 293,
(1967).
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The Supreme Court announced both the right to counsel and due
process doctrines governing identification
identification procedures
procedures on the same
23
United States v. Wade/
Wade,323
Gilbert v.
Gilbert
day in 1967, in a trilogy of cases: United
24
324
325
California, and Stovall v. Denno.325
Denno. The first two dealt with the
California/
consequence of the police's conducting
conducting a lineup or a show-up without
consequence
326 Wade
affording the defendant
defendant the right to have
have an attorney
attorney present. 326
Wade
Amendment was violated
made clear that the Sixth Amendment
violated at the lineup
itself:
itself:

Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional
intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be
capable of reconstruction
reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel
itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful
confrontation
confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the
post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution
prosecution at
post-indictment
... as at
which he was 'as
'as much entitled
entitled to such aid [of counsel] ...
327
itself.',327
the trial itself.

If any doubt remained
Amendment
remained about whose conduct the Sixth Amendment
addressed
identification context, Gilbert
Gilbertlaid it to rest:
addressed in the identification
[P]olice conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the
absence
absence of his counsel
counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and
Fourteenth]
Fourteenth] Amendment
Amendment right to counsel and calls in question
question
the admissibility
admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications
identifications of the
lineup. 328
the lineup.328
attended the
who attended
accused by witnesses who
While
Gilbert established a rule that applied to the police,
While Wade and Gilbert
there were implications for what happened in the courtroom
courtroom as well.
welL
323.
323.
324.
325.
326.

United States
(1967).
States v. Wade, 388
388 U.S.
U.S. 218
218 (1967).
U.S. 263 (1967).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
(1967).
Stovall v. Denno, 388
388 U.S.
293 (1967).
(1967).
U.S. 293
A lineup involves placing
placing the suspect
suspect among a group of other people and having the witness
view the group. A show-up, on the other hand, is a one on one confrontation
confrontation between
between the suspect and the
the
witness.
327. Wade,
Wade, 388 U.S.
U.S. at 236-37.
Gilbert, 388 U.S.
U.S. at 272.
328. Gilbert,
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If the prosecutor
prosecutor attempted
attempted to introduce evidence
evidence of a tainted
identification
exclusion as a way of
of
identification at trial, it called for the remedy of exclusion
ensuring
police
compliance
with
the
Sixth
Amendment:
ensuring

per se exclusionary
Only a per
exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an
effective
effective sanction
sanction to assure that law enforcement
enforcement authorities will
respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence
presence of his
329
.. 11'lineup.
critical
thee cntlca
at th
counsel1at
counse
meup. 329
Stovall required
implications
required the Court to consider
consider the due process implications
of an identification
identification procedure, because
because the Sixth Amendment
Amendment rule the
3300
tool.33
available too1.
an available
not an
was not
Court adopted in Wade and
and Gilbert
Gilbert was
Stovall came to the Court as a habeas corpus case, unlike Wade and
Gilbert, and as a result could benefit from the Sixth Amendment rule
Gilbert,
the latter two announced
announced only if it would be given retroactive
retroactive effect.
33
1
The Court concluded that it would not,331
not, but went on to consider if
the confrontation
confrontation between Stovall and the witness was "so
"so
unnecessarily
conducive to irreparable
mistaken
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
irreparable mistaken
332
of
process
due
defendant
the
denied
it
that
identification"
law. 332
identification"
denied the defendant due process of law.
"This
"This is a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction,"
conviction," the Court
333 In a very
announced,
"independent of any right to counsel claim.
announced, "independent
claim.",,333
brief discussion, the Court concluded that the identification was not
not
unnecessarily
encounter was a
unnecessarily suggestive, despite the fact that the encounter
one-person
one-person show-up. This was so, the Court explained, because the
circumstances
circumstances the police
police confronted
confronted left them no reasonable
alternative.
knife
alternative. The identifying witness was the victim of a brutal knife
attack and was on the edge
edge of death in a hospital room. A more
possible. 334
was not
simply was
like aa lineup,
impartial procedure,
procedure, like
lineup, simply
not possible?34

329. Id.
Gilbert fashion exclusionary
Id. at 273; see also Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297 ("Wade and Gilbert
exclusionary rules to
deter
identification
deter law enforcement
enforcement authorities from exhibiting an accused
accused to witnesses before
before trial for identification
purposes without notice to and in the absence of counsel.").
counsel. ").
330. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296.
296.
331.
331. Id.
Id.
332. Id.
Id. at 302.
302.
333.
333. Id.
Id.
334. Id.
Id.
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In the years immediately following Stovall,
Stovall, there was reason to
believe its due process rule applied to the police, just as did Wade's
right to counsel rule. In a case that came
came to the Court five years later,
35
335
Kirby v. Illinois,
identification
Illinois/ holding that suspects subject to identification
procedures prior to the formal initiation of charges
charges had no right to
counsel, the plurality opinion for the Court described
described Stovall that
"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
way: "The
Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive
Amendments
suggestive and
336
conducive
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.,,336
identification."
It is the police,
after all, who conduct lineups. So it was reasonable
reasonable to take away
from Kirby the idea that it was the police
police to whom the due process
rule of Stovall was directed.
The resolution
consequences. If
If
resolution of this issue had some practical
practical consequences.
Stovall applied directly to the police, then it bolstered an
interpretation
per se rule prohibiting
prohibiting unnecessarily
unnecessarily
interpretation that created a per
suggestive
identification procedures
suggestive identification
procedures without regard for factors that
might indicate
identification was nevertheless reliable, such as the
indicate the identification
amount of time the witness had to observe the person committing the
crime. On the other hand, if Stovall merely regulated the type of
of
evidence
evidence the prosecutor
prosecutor could introduce, then it would be much
incorporate into the rule these sorts of reliability factors.
easier to incorporate
33 7 Arrayed
Manson v. Brathwaite.
This issue came to a head in Manson
Brathwaite. 337
Arrayed
before the Court were the two choices. As the majority saw them, the
of
advantage of the per se approach was "the elimination
elimination of evidence
evidence of
uncertain
uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and ' 'the
338
of misidentification.
risks of
awful risks
the awful
misidentification. ",338
stated 'fair
'fair assurance against the
The other alternative,
alternative, to permit evidence
evidence of a suggestive
identification if it possessed
reliability," had the
identification
possessed "certain
"certain features of reliability,"
335.
335. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
(1972).
336. Id.
Id. at 691.
337.
337. Manson v. Brathwaite,
Brathwaite, 432
432 U.S. 98 (1977).
(1977). The Court
Court also considered this issue earlier, in Neil v.
Biggers,
(1972), and indicated
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972),
indicated that the majority would not accept a rule that did
not take into account factors that might make an unnecessarily suggestive identification
identification reliable. But
Biggers
identification, and the opinion hinted that a different result might be
Biggers involved a pre-Stovall identification,
appropriate for post-Stovall
post-Stovall situations. Neil,
Manson, 432
appropriate
Neil, 409 U.S. at 199; see also Manson,
432 U.S.
U.S. at 107 ("One
perhaps might argue that, by implication,
implication, the Court suggested that a different
different rule could apply postStovall.").
Stovall.
").
Manson, 432
338. Manson,
432 U.S. at 110.
110.
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attraction of serving
serving "to
"to limit the societal
societal costs
costs imposed
imposed by
by a sanction
sanction
attraction
that excludes
excludes relevant
relevant evidence
evidence from consideration
consideration and
and evaluation
evaluation by
by
that
339
the
trier
of
fact.
,,339
While
the
majority
recognized
that
the
per
se
the
recognized
While
fact."
the trier
approach would
would be a better
better vehicle for shaping
shaping police
police behavior
behavior in the
approach
unnecessarily suggestive
suggestive identification
identification
direction of avoiding unnecessarily
34
0
procedures,340 its view of the audience
Process
audience to whom the Due Process
procedures,
Clause was directed dictated
dictated its choice:
Clause
warrantless search,
search, a suggestive
suggestive preindictment
preindictment
Unlike a warrantless
identification procedure
procedure does not in itself
itself intrude
intrude upon
upon a
identification
constitutionally protected
considerations urging
urging
protected interest. Thus, considerations
constitutionally
evidence deriving from a constitutional
constitutional violation
the exclusion of evidence
United States
bear on the instant problem. See United
ex rel.
rei.
do not bear
34 1
1975).
7
(CA
406
397,
F.2d
510
Sturges,
F.2d 397, 406 (CA 7 1975).341
Kirby v. Sturges,
The cite to the Seventh Circuit case
case was from an opinion that Justice
joined the Court. In it, he explained:
Stevens wrote before he joined

[A] showup does not itself violate any constitutional right of the
warrantless search, which may violate a
suspect. Unlike a warrantless
of
constitutionally protected
constitutionally
protected interest in privacy, the identification of
a suspect-whether
unfair--does not necessarily affect
suspect-whether fair or unfair--does
interest of the suspect. The due
protected
any constitutionally
constitutionally
process clause applies only to proceedings
proceedings which result in a
deprivation
deprivation of life, liberty or property. The due process issue,
showup--or
therefore, does not arise until testimony about the showup-or
at the
offered
showup-is
of
the
perhaps obtained as a result
criminal trial. If that evidence
evidence is unfairly prejudicial, the trial
constitutional obligation to exclude it, or
judge may have a constitutional
possibly to mitigate its impact by an appropriate cautionary
constitutional violation results
instruction to the jury. But if a constitutional

Id.
339. /d.
at 112.
340. Id.
Id.at
340.
at 113 n.13.
341. Id.
Id.
341.
at
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in the courtroom, not in the police
from a showup, it occurs in
342
342
station.
Justices Marshall
Marshall and Brennan were the only dissenters. They
They
conditional rule. As they saw it:
clearly did not want a conditional

Stovall...
Stovall
... established
established a due process right of criminal suspects to
be free from confrontations
confrontations that, under all the circumstances,
circumstances, are
unnecessarily suggestive. The right was enforceable
enforceable by exclusion
at trial of evidence of the constitutionally
constitutionally invalid
34
3433
identification.
Brathwaite
Brathwaite thus made Stovall a conditional
conditional rule. The police
themselves
themselves could not violate it. They merely
merely set the table for what a
prosecutor
prosecutor might do. Aside from affecting the contour
contour of the rule
itself, as in Brathwaite,
Brathwaite, there was another practical consequence. This
characterization of the rule means that a suspect who has been
characterization
wrongfully
wrongfully convicted
convicted on the basis of an impermissibly suggestive
identification procedure the police arranged
arranged cannot
cannot sue the police for
constitutional rule
a civil rights violation, since there is no underlying constitutional
344
344
police.
the
regulating
regulating the police.
5. The Due Process
Process Right of a Defendant
Defendant to Present
Present Exculpatory
Exculpatory
Evidence at
at Trial
Trial
Evidence

The Sixth Amendment is the part of the Bill of Rights that appears
to be the most relevant to the question of what limitations
limitations a judge
defendant's efforts to place
may place on a defendant's
place evidence before
before the jury.
On its face, the Amendment's
Amendment's Confrontation Clause looks like the
provision that should govern any dispute over the the scope of the

rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1975).
1975).
342. United States ex rei.
343. Manson,
Manson, 432 U.S. at 120; see also id.
id. at 122
122 ("Where the prosecution
prosecution sought to use evidence of a
identification, Stovall
Stovall required its exclusion, because
questionable pretrial identification,
because due process had been violated
by the confrontation,
confrontation, unless the necessity
necessity for the unduly suggestive
suggestive procedure outweighed
outweighed its potential
for generating
generating an irreparably
irreparably mistaken identification.").
identification.").
2007).
344. See, e.g., Wray
Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189
189 (2d Cir. 2007).
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cross-examination
cross-examination of prosecution
prosecution witnesses. 345 And if an issue arose
about the relevance
on
relevance of questions a defense attorney could ask on
direct examination, one would think the judge should tum
turn to the
Amendment's
Amendment's provision dealing with the right to compulsory process
347 however, the Court
for an answer. 346 In Chambers
Mississippi,347
Chambers v. Mississippi,
confronted
confronted a case presenting a combination of these two problems
and concluded that taken together, they amounted
amounted to a violation of the
Due Process Clause. In reaching
reaching this result, the Court relied on a
conditional
conditional rule that depended on the coexistence of two events, one
of which followed the other.
Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer. Key to his
defense strategy
strategy was presenting
presenting the jury with evidence that someone
McDonald had admitted
admitted the crime to
else, McDonald, did it. 348 McDonald
Chambers's attorney
attorney but later disavowed
disavowed the confession, saying he
was cajoled into it by a promise
promise that he would be able to share in the
proceeds
Chambers would bring against the
proceeds of a civil suit that Chambers
349
349
town.
However, he also repeated the confession to several other
35
witnesses. 35o
At trial, the prosecution did not present McDonald
McDonald as a
witness, since he did not purport to have anything relevant to say
about why the jury should convict Chambers. It was the defense that
called McDonald to the stand, and through him introduced his
confession to the attorney into evidence. However, on cross
examination, McDonald
McDonald repudiated
repudiated the confession. When
Chambers's attorney asked the trial judge to permit him to examine
McDonald on redirect as a hostile witness, the judge refused, relying
on a Mississippi
Mississippi evidentiary
evidentiary doctrine,
doctrine, the "voucher"
"voucher" rule, which
3511
her.35
or her.
him or
impeaching
from
witness
a
of
proponent
the
prevented
prevented
proponent a witness from impeaching him
This ruling effectively
effectively prevented Chambers from confronting
confronting
345.
345. U.S. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend. VI ("In all criminal
criminal prosecutions, the accused
accused shall enjoy the right...
right ... to be
him.").
confronted with the witnesses against him.
").
346. Id.
ld. ("In all criminal prosecutions,
prosecutions, the accused
accused shall enjoy the right ...
. . . to have compulsory
process for obtaining
obtaining witnesses in his favor.").
347.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 284.
347. Chambers,
348.
348. Id.
ld. at 289.
349. Id.
aftermath of the melee that resulted
ld. at 288. Chambers
Chambers had been
been shot in the aftermath
resulted in the police
officer's killing.
350. Id.
ld. at 292.
351.
Id. at 295.
351. !d.
295.
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McDonald with the incriminating statements he made to other
352
confession. 352
the confession.
of the
renunciation of
his renunciation
witnesses or challenging his
Chambers was also thwarted in his effort to present the testimony of
of
three of the witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted shooting the
officer. The judge sustained an objection to this testimony on hearsay
grounds, since Mississippi recognized only statements against
353
exception. 353
as an
interest as
an exception.
pecuniary, not penal,
penal, interest
Chambers's
The Supreme Court found that what had happened in Chambers's
354
354
of
trial violated the Constitution. But it was not the parts of the Bill of
Rights that most narrowly
addressed
the
two
problems
about
which
narrowly
Chambers complained, his inability to cross examine McDonald
McDonald or to
present the testimony of his three witnesses. The Court did not rely
on either the Confrontation Clause or the Compulsory
Compulsory Process Clause
as the basis for its decision. The reason was that Chambers had never
preserved a federal claim in the state court system on either of these
two grounds. The only federal claim that he did properly present to
conviction
the Supreme Court was a post trial assertion that his conviction
denied him the fundamental
fundamental fairness guaranteed
guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Fourteenth
355 It was, in other words,
words, a general
general due process claim.
Amendment.355
Given
Given the context
context in which the federal question came
came to the Court,
[the] rulings in
the Justices
Justices had to consider "the
"the cumulative
cumulative effect of [the]
frustrating
[Chambers's]
frustrating [Chambers's] efforts to develop an exculpatory
exculpatory
3 56 This had
defense.
defense.,,356
the effect of making the claim
claim a conditional
conditional
one, because
because it could only have been
been raised
raised after the conclusion
conclusion of all
357
357
evidence.
of the evidence.
The Court did separately
separately discuss what was wrong with the two
types of
rulings
the
trial judge
of
judge made. It called
called the voucher
voucher rule
358 and
"archaic
and
irrational,"
rejected the state's
state's argument that
"archaic and irrational,,,358 and rejected
352.
352. Id.
Id. at
at 291.
291.
353.
353. Chambers,
Chambers, 410
410 U.S.
U.S. atat 292.
292.
354. Id.
Id. at
at 285.
285.
355. Id.
Id. at
at 290
290 n.3.
n.3. The
The Court's later
later views
views of
of the
the Due
Due Process
Process Clause
Clause make
make itit very
very unlikely
unlikely that
that itit
would
concerns such
would use
use itit asas aa vehicle
vehicle for
for addressing
addressing concerns
such as these.
these. See Dowling
Dowling v.v. United
United States,
States, 493
493 U.S.
U.S.
342,
342, 352
352 (1990)
(\990) ("Beyond the
the specific
specific guarantees
guarantees enumerated
enumerated in the
the Bill
Bill of
of Rights, the
the Due
Due Process
Process
Clause
Clause has limited
limited operation.").
operation.").
356. Chambers,
Chambers, 410
410 U.S.
U.S. atat 290
290 n.3.
n.3.
357.
357. Id.
Id
358.
358. Id.
Id. at
at 296
296 n.8.
n.8.
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359 However,
McDonald's testimony
testimony was not adverse
adverse to Chambers.
Chambers?59
However,
McDonald's
the opinion
opinion never took the
the final step of
of declaring
declaring that the trial judge
judge
violated the Constitution at the time he made the ruling
ruling limiting
limiting the
violated
"We need not decide,"
decide," Justice Powell
questioning of McDonald. "We
questioning
alone would occasion
this
error
for
the
Court,
"whether
wrote
"whether
occasion
wrote
reversal
process rests on the
reversal since Chambers's
Chambers's claimed
claimed denial of due process
with the
of that error when viewed
viewed in conjunction
conjunction
ultimate impact
impact of
ultimate
360
witnesses."
other
call
to
him
permit
to
refusal
trial court's refusal
to call other witnesses.,,360
trial
It was harder
harder for the Court
Court to condemn
condemn as severely
severely the
the trial
trial judge's
judge's
ruling
ruling preventing
preventing Chambers
Chambers from calling
calling the witnesses
witnesses who
who would
would
McDonald confess
have
have testified
testified that they overheard McDonald
confess to the crime.
That ruling was based
based on the hearsay doctrine,
doctrine, in particular
particular the
evidence law that refused to recognize
recognize an
feature of Mississippi evidence
361
361
At the time that
exception for statements
statements against
against penal interest.
of
Chambers came to the Court, federal law, on the authority of
Chambers
this
hearsay
States, also refused to recognize
United States,
Donnelly v. United
recognize
hearsay
362 Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the Chambers
Court concluded
concluded that the
exception. 362
Chambers Court
"provided
statements before
before it "provided
circumstances
circumstances of the hearsay statements
363
and that "the hearsay
hearsay
considerable
reliability,"
assurance of their reliability,,,363
considerable assurance
of
rule may not be applied mechanistically
mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice.,,364
non-conditional
justice. '364 But yet again, it refused to announce a non-conditional
rule:

conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled
We conclude
permit Chambers to cross-examine
cross-examine
with the State's refusal to permit
McDonald, denied
denied him a trial in accord with traditional
traditional and
fundamental standards of due process. In reaching this judgment,
we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does
our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally
traditionally
implementation
accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation
accorded

359.
360.
361.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id.at 297.
Id.
Id. at 298.
298.
Id.
Id.at
at299.
/d.
299.
(1913).
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,
243, 273-74
273-74 (1913).
Chambers,410 U.S. at 300.
Chambers,
Id.at 302.
302.
Id.
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of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold
under the facts
and circumstances
circumstances of this
this case
quite simply that under
facts and
365
5
rulings of the trial
trialcourt
court deprived
Chambersof afair
the rulings
deprived Chambers
afair triai.
trial.36

Chambers depended
As the holding in Chambers
depended on the conjunction of two
events, it is hard to see how the rule could be anything but
conditional. The opinion went out of its way to say that neither of the
two state court rulings that it considered independently violated due
process. Since trials are sequential affairs, whichever ruling comes
first, one has to wait for the other shoe to drop in order to say that
first,
Chambers condemns
condemns what has happened.
Chambers
II. EVALUATING
EVALUATING CONDITIONAL
CONDITIONAL RULES

A. The Negative Side of
ConditionalRules
o/Conditional
1. The Effect in Shaping
1.
Shaping Behavior
Conditional
Conditional rules are difficult to apply before all of their
constituent events have taken place. Chambers
Chambers v. Mississippi
Mississippi
3
6
366
6
illustrates
The case gives little guidance
illustrates this conundrum.
guidance to trial
judges
evidence the
judges and lawyers
lawyers who have to know
know in advance what evidence
Constitution renders admissible
admissible despite
despite the existence
existence of state
evidence
evidence prohibitions.
prohibitions. Lower
Lower courts have
have differed over whether
whether
Chambers
Chambers contains
contains two nonconditional
nonconditional rules that trial judges
judges can
can
apply in advance
attempt to introduce evidence
evidence (in ruling on the
advance of an attempt
367 or
admission of statements
against
penal
interest,
statements
penal interest,367
an attempt by
by a
368) or a
proponent
proponent of
of aa witness to impeach
impeach his or her credibility
credibility368)
365. Id.
Id at
at 302-03
302-{)3 (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
366. See
U.S. 284
See Chambers,
Chambers, 410
410 U.S.
284 (1973).
(1973).
Court
367. See
See Skillicom
Skillicom v.v. Luebbers,
Luebbers, 475
475 F.3d
F.3d 965,
965, 970 (8th
(8th Cir.
Cir. 2007)
2007) ("In
("In Chambers,
Chambers, the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
held
right to
statements, that
held that
that aa defendant
defendant has
has aa constitutional
constitutional right
to proffer
proffer exonerating
exonerating statements,
that would
would otherwise
otherwise
be
be hearsay,
hearsay, ifif they
they were
were made
made under
under circumstances
circwnstances providing
providing 'considerable
'considerable assurance
assurance of
of their
their
reliability."')
Mississippi, 410
reliability."') (quoting
(quoting Chambers
Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S.
U.S. 284, 300
300 (1973);
(1973); Washington
Washington v.v. Renico,
Renico, 455
455
F.3d
F.3d 722,
722, 734-35
734-35 (6th
(6th Cir.
Cir. 2006);
2006); Su
Su Chia
Chia v. Cambra,
Cambra, 360
360 F.3d
F.3d 997, 1006 (9th
(9th Cir.
Cir. 2004);
2004); United
United States
States
v.
F.3d 738,
v. Camuti,
Camuti, 78
78 F.3d
738, 743
743 (1st
(1st Cir.
Cir. 1996).
1996).
368.
th Cir.
368. Cikora
Cikora v.v. Dugger,
Dugger, 840
840 F.2d 893, 898
898 (11
(11th
Cir. 1988) ("[The
("[l1he Supreme
Supreme Court
Court held
held in Chambers
Chambers
...
... ,,that
that aastate
state trial
trial court
court denied
denied Chambers
Chambers due
due process
process when
when itit refused
refused toto allow
allow Chambers
Chambers toto show
show toto
the
the jury
jury that
that another
another person
person had
had repeatedly
repeatedly confessed
confessed toto the
the crime.
crime. The
The state
state trial
trial judge
judge excluded
excluded this
this
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contextually based
contextually
based ruling that combines
combines the effect of the excluded
excluded
36 9
case.
his
present
to
fairly
defendant
evidence on the ability of the
the defendant fairly to present his case. 369
The confusion is understandable. One ordinarily thinks of Supreme
Court decisions as useful vehicles for providing
providing guidance on how to
concomitantly, an
avoid a similar problem
problem in the future. There is, concomitantly,
inevitable pressure
to
try
to
find
in
any
decision
a
rule that one can
pressure
can
Chambers used a
actually apply. However, if one recognizes that Chambers
conditional rule, it has little value as a guide to behavior useful to a
trial judge. It is perhaps this difficulty
difficulty that led Professor
Professor Peter
Westen, a prominent evidence
scholar
and
the
lawyer
evidence
lawyer who
37
0
represented Chambers
Court, to write shortly after
represented
Chambers in the Supreme COurt,370
the case came out that "it is difficult to derive a clear standard from
from
371
Chambers,,,371 and led Justice Scalia
Scalia to express
express doubt that one could
could
Chambers,"
372
372
case.
the
holding from
any holding
meaningfully extract any
from the case.
revealed
What made Chambers
Chambers v. Mississippi
Mississippi such a difficult case revealed
one of the reasons that an appellate court may prefer to announce a
conditional rule. If a court wanted
wanted to reverse a conviction without
having to create a precedent
precedent for how state actors should exercise
exercise
power
power in the future, incorporating
incorporating a prejudice requirement
requirement into the
373
Westen 373
how
is
fact,
in
This,
it.
rule is a good way to do it. This, in fact, is how Professor
Professor Westen
374 have portrayed Chambers.
and Justice
Scalia 374
Justice Scalia
portrayed Chambers.
testimony because Chambers had called that person
person as his witness,
witness, and Mississippi
Mississippi rules of
of evidence did
not permit
permit defendants
defendants toto cross-examine their
their own witnesses.");
witnesses."}; Sharlow
Sharlow v. Israel, 767 F.2d 373, 376 (7th
1985).
Cir. 1985).
369. See United
United States v.v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229,238
229, 238 (9th Cir. 1973).
Compulsory Process
370. Peter Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause,
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv.
REv. 71,151
71,151 n.383 (1974).
(I 974}.
371. Id.
Id.at 151;
Unearthing
371.
151; see also Janet C.
C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause:
Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process,
Process, 2002
2002 Wis.
WIS. L. REv. 1275,
1275, 1301 (2002)
(2002) ("[O]ne
("[O]ne would
would be hard-pressed
hard-pressed to locate aa
single
Chambers as
single case that
that cites
cites Chambers
as precedent for its holding. Chambers
Chambers also offered no
no solid
solid advice
advice on
the method aa court could
could use for tackling the
the clash of
of the
the Constitution and
and evidentiary rules."); David
Robinson,
Jr., From
From Fat
Fat Tony andMatty the Horse
Case ofA. T.: Defensive
Defensive and
and Offensive Use
Robinson, Jr.,
Horse to the Sad Case
of Hearsay
Cases, 32
32 Hous.
929-30 (l995)
(1995) (the
Chambers rule
rule
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal
Criminal Cases,
Hous. L. REv. 895,
895, 929-30
(the Chambers
remains unclear).
unclear).
Montana v.
v. Englehoff,
U.S. 37,
37, 53
(1996) ("[T]he
("[T]he holding
holding of
Chambers-ifone
one can
can be
372. See Montana
Englehoff, 518
518 U.S.
53 (1996)
of Chambers-if
discerned
discerned from
from such
such aa fact-intensive case-is certainly
certainly not that aa defendant isis denied 'a fair opportunity
to defend
defend against
against the
accusations' whenever
whenever 'critical
'critical evidence'
evidence' favorable
favorable to
him is
excluded, but
but
to
the State's
State's accusations'
to him
is excluded,
rather
erroneous evidentiary
evidentiary rulings
rulings can,
can, in
in combination,
combination, rise
rise to
to the
level of
of a
a due
due process
process
rather that
that erroneous
the level
violation.").
violation.").
373. Westen,
supra note
370, at
("[T]he Court
may simply
have meant
meant that
deciding the
373.
Westen, supra
note 370,
at 152
152 ("[T]he
Court may
simply have
that itit was
was deciding
the
case
on its
uncertain and
limits its
its
case on
its facts.
facts. The
The Court,
Court, when
when itit enters
enters uncertain
and unexplored
unexplored territory,
territory, frequently
frequently limits
judgment
facts under
permits it
to indicate
indicate what
to be the
judgment toto the
the particular
particular facts
under consideration.
consideration. This
This permits
it to
what itit believes
believes to
the
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why
Rules, however, serve as more than vehicles
vehicles for justifying why
courts can reverse criminal
criminal convictions.
convictions. They also act as a
mechanism to guide the behavior
behavior of those who are their target.
Indeed, the primary purpose of a rule has to be to affect behavior,
375
otherwise it is not a rule. 375
Whether a rule limits the way a police
otherwise
individual on the street,
officer exercises her authority to seize an individual
requires a judge to allow a defendant to litigate in the absence of the
jury the issue of whether the defendant's confession was not
voluntary, or directs an appellate
appellate court to automatically
automatically reverse a
conviction
defendant was denied the right to have a lawyer
lawyer
conviction if the defendant
represent him at trial, it must provide
some
meaningful
guidance
on
provide
meaningful
on
government authority.
how to exercise power under a grant of government
However, conditional
conditional rules, to put it simply, are lousy at guiding
behavior. Indeed, when legislative bodies, administrative agencies,
agencies, or
or
advisory groups promulgate
rules
to
guide
the
behavior
of
promulgate
behavior of
government
conditional format. The
government actors, they do not put them in a conditional
professional responsibility that govern prosecutors do not
rules of professional
incorporate
incorporate a prejudice
prejudice requirement
requirement in describing the obligation to
reveal exculpatory evidence. 376 Court
severance do
Court rules dealing with severance
not instruct judges
Bruton problem
problem to withhold
withhold
judges facing a potential Bruton
judgment because in the latter stages of the trial the codefendant
codefendant who
confessed
confessed may take the stand and eliminate
eliminate the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause
377 And police manuals do not instruct officers to
problem. 377
officers draw their
guns on suspects without any reason to believe
committed
believe they have committed
378
submit.
than
rather
away
run
will
a crime, hoping that the
the suspect
suspect will run away rather than submit. 378
correct
correct result without
without committing
committing itself to a definitive rule for unforeseen
unforeseen variants of the immediate case
....").
374. Englehoff,
correction.").
Englehoff, 518 U.S. at 52 ("Chambers
("Chambers was an exercise
exercise in highly case-specific
case-specific error
error correction.").
375.
& Emily Sherwin,
Natureof
375. See Larry Alexander &
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature
ofRules, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
REv. 1191,
1191,
1194
(1994) ("[A]
("[A] 'rule'
'rule' is a prescription
1194 (1994)
prescription for conduct, applicable to a range
range of actors, which is designed
designed
to promote
promote an end or protect a right, but does
does not simply recite
recite its objective."); Margaret Jane Radin,
Radin,
Reconsidering
REV. 781,
(1989) (stating that rules must be capable of
of
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv.
781, 786 (1989)
being
Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal
being understood
understood and followed by those to whom
whom they are addressed); Lawrence
Rules and
and the Process
Process of Social
Change, 19 STAN. L. REv.
REV. 786,
(1967) ("All rules are directed
Social Change,
786, 788 (1967)
...").
toward
").
toward conduct ....
376. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8{d)
3.8(d) (2006).
PROF'L CONDUCT
377. FED. R. CRIM.
CRIM. P. 14(b).
378.
(2003) ("Officers shall not
378. See BOSTON
BOSTON POLICE DEP'T RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 303,
303, § 5 (2003)
point
persons except when reasonably
reasonably justified
justified under the circumstances.").
circumstances. ").
point firearms
firearms at persons
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Conditional rules
rules do
do not make
make sense in these contexts
contexts because
because they
they
Conditional
the people
people who look to
to the rules
rules for guidance
guidance how to act at
do not tell the
the time they must make decisions
decisions about
about their behavior. Nor do they
they
the
Constitution. Those
Those sections
sections of the Bill of
of
sense as part
part of the Constitution.
make sense
regulate the criminal justice
justice system
system were
were the
the result of a
Rights that regulate
379
3
7
the potential
potential misuse of government
government power. 9 The
The Bill of
of
fear of the
Rights, and in particular
particular the
the Due Process
Process Clause,
Clause, was a direct
descendant of that mother of all constitutional
constitutional limits
limits on the exercise
exercise
descendant
38
0
criminal law, the Magna
Magna Carta,
Carta,380 a document
document with
of force that is the criminal
educated people in 18th century
century America would have been
been
which all educated
381 The Magna Carta was both a political
political manifesto and a
acquainted. 381
statement
rules that the King had to obey to ensure
ensure that he would
statement of rules
3382
82
This notion that an
abusive behavior
behavior in the future.
an
not engage in abusive
was
to
of
rights
declaration
important function of a fundamental
fundamental declaration
important
guide the future behavior
behavior of those with the power
power to threaten
threaten those
guide
rights would
world-view of the
would naturally
naturally have been part of the world-view
Framers. Clear, easy to apply rules were, in their view, best
best suited to
Framers.
383
383
way
to address
not
an
appropriate
rules
are
Conditional
appropriate
this end. Conditional
this concern.
Rules, of course, are not always easy to apply for the actors who
must look to them for guidance. Questions of interpretation
interpretation are an
inherent problem. Making
Making a rule conditional,
conditional, however, detracts
detracts
significantly
significantly from a rule's ability to affect the behavior of those to
whom it is directed. And that is true whether you think that the
aspirations or
people the rules are designed
designed to limit view them as aspirations
hindrances.
REV. 197,
MARY L. REv.
FourthAmendment, 35
Central Meaning
Meaning of the Fourth
379. Tracey Maclin, The Central
379.
35 WM. && MARY
of the
Amendment is distrust of police power and
meaning of
(1993) ("[T]he
("[Tlhe central
central meaning
201
the Fourth
Fourth Amendment
201 (1993)
the Fourth
the Nature
Nature of the
Proposals on the
Ronald J. Bacigal,
discretion."); Ronald
discretion.");
Bacigal, Some Observations
Observations and Proposals
Fourth
REV. 529,
529, 558
46 GEO.
GEO. WASH.
Amendment, 46
WASH. L. REv.
558 (1978)
(1978) ("Sensitivity
("Sensitivity to
to the
the dangers of unchecked power
preceding the American Revolution.").
in the
the years
years immediately
immediately preceding
arose in
and
and totalitarianism
totalitarianism arose
("The ancestry
REV. 941, 948
380. Robert
Robert E. Riggs,
380.
Riggs, Substantive
Substantive Due Process
Process in 1791, 1990 Wis.
WIS. L. REv.
948 ('The
.
. ").
to chapter
chapter 39 of the Magna Carta ....
universally traced to
due process
clause is
of the
the due
of
process clause
is universally
381. See
Seeidat969.
381.
id. at 969.
Id. at
at 949.
949.
382. 1d.
U.
FirstAmendment, 63 U.
Vision of the First
Future Property-Based
Property-BasedVision
and Future
0. McGinnis,
383.
John o.
McGinnis, The Once and
383. John
n.1 17 (1996)
CHI.
REV. 49,
CHI. L. REv.
49, 77 n.1I7
(1996) ("[T]he Framers were practical thinkers who understood
understood that the
the
to draw
draw clear
clear distinctions capable of fairly mechanical application even if these
Constitution had
had to
Constitution
complexity of
of each
each individual situation.").
not capture
capture the
the complexity
distinctions did
did not
distinctions
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conditional rule looks
looks from
from the vantage point
point of
Imagine how a conditional
of aa
government official
official who
who does not internalize what she understands to
to
her power. When faced
faced with
with a choice
be the constitutional limits on her
act in a situation governed by a rule, she
she simply makes
about how to act
a utilitarian calculation about whether the benefit she will receive,
if she
she violates the rule, outweighs
either institutionally or personally, if
outweighs
the potential disadvantage of whatever sanction a rule violation
entails. The negative consequence that this Holmesian "bad
official" 384 must take into consideration depends, of course, not only
official,,384
on how much she wants to avoid it but also on the probability that it
385 By
will ever come to pass.385
By adding into the definition of the rule
consequence that may never occur, by necessity
some future consequence
necessity it lowers
the probability that a sanction will be imposed.
Take, for example, the conditional
conditional rule dealing with the
prosecutor's obligation to reveal exculpatory
exculpatory evidence. How does the
rule
affect
type of prosecutor?
this
prosecutor? Perhaps she has
conditional Brady
Brady
exculpatory information, say the fact that a
in her hands a piece of exculpatory
key witness was the beneficiary
beneficiary of a promise
promise to drop pending charges
against him in return for his testimony, that she does not want to tum
turn
over to the defense. The existence
of
a
prejudice
requirement
as
existence
prejudice requirement part
of the rule means that the incentive
incentive to disclose
disclose the information
information is
is
diminished, in some proportion,
proportion, by
by the degree
degree to which she foresees
the defendant's being unable
to
establish
prejudice.
unable
prejudice. The correlation
correlation
386
may be
not
proportional,
but
it
is
certainly
positively
correlated.
be
proportional,
certainly positively correlated.386
There
There are a lot of ways that this prosecutor
prosecutor could realistically
realistically
believe that the
establish prejudice.
the defendant
defendant would
would ultimately fail to establish
384.
384. See
See Justice
Justice Oliver
Oliver Wendell
Wendell Holmes,
Holmes, The Path
Path of the Law,
Law, 10
10 HARv.
HARv. L. REV.
REv. 457,
457, 462
462 (1897)
(1897)
("The
("The duty
duty to
to keep
keep aa contract
contract at
at common
common law
law means a prediction
prediction that
that you
you must
must pay
pay damages
damages if
if you
you do
not keep
it-and nothing
nothing else.").
keep it-and
385.
385. Cf
Cf Walter
Walter F.
F. Dellinger,
Dellinger, Of
Of Rights
Rights and Remedies:
Remedies: The Constitution
Constitution As
As aa Sword,
Sword, 85
85 HARV.
HARv. L.
L.
REV.
REv. 1532,
1532, 1563
1563 (1972)
(1972) ("In
("In the
the absence
absence of
of the
the exclusionary
exclusionary rule,
rule, the
the law
law enforcement
enforcement officer
officer and
and the
the
public
as Justice
Justice Holmes'
Holmes' 'bad
'bad man'
man' viewed
viewed the
the obligation
obligation
public generally
generally are
are enticed
enticed to
to view
view the
the Constitution
Constitution as
of
ofcontracts.").
contracts.").
386.
386. See
See United
United States
States v.
v. Agurs,
Agurs, 27
27 U.S.
U.S. 97,
97, 117
117 (Marshall,
(Marshall, J.,
J., dissenting)
dissenting) ("[T]he
("[T]he [majority's]
[majority's] rule
rule
reinforces
of the
the prosecutor
prosecutor to
to overlook
overlook evidence
evidence favorable
favorable to
to the
the defense,
defense, and
and
reinforces the
the natural
natural tendency
tendency of
creates
creates an
an incentive
incentive for
for the
the prosecutor
prosecutor to
to resolve
resolve close
close questions
questions of
of disclosure
disclosure in
in favor of
of
concealment.");
I1,History's
for the Right
ILL. L.
concealment."); George
George C.
C. Thomas
Thomas 1lI,
History's Lesson
Lessonfor
Right to
to Counsel,
Counsel, 2004
2004 U.
U.ILL.
L. REV.
REv.
543,
543, 544;
544; Michael
Michael E.
E. Gardner,
Gardner, Note:
Note: An
An Affair
Affair to
to Remember:
Remember: Further
Further Refinement
Refinement of
of the
the Prosecutor's
Prosecutor's
Duty
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory
Exculpatory Evidence,
Evidence, 68
68 Mo.
Mo. L.
L. REV.
REv. 469,
469, 479
479 (2003).
(2003).
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likely is
is if
if the defendant
defendant pleads guilty, as do ninety percent
percent
The most likely
of all
all those charged
charged with
with a crime. If the case
case is pled out, a
or so of
common view
view of Brady insulates
insulates the
the prosecutor
prosecutor from any sanction
sanction
common
withholding the information:
information:
for withholding
Because a Brady violation
violation is defined
defined in terms of
of the potential
potential
Because
effects of undisclosed
undisclosed information
information on aa judge's
judge's or jury's
jury's
effects
assessment of guilt, it follows that the
the failure of a prosecutor
prosecutor to
assessment
disclose exculpatory
exculpatory information
information to an individual
individual
waiving his
waiving
disclose
387
trial is not a constitutional
constitutional violation.
violation?87
right to trial
Even if the case
case goes to trial, the conditional
conditional nature
nature of the rule
makes it difficult
difficult for the defendant
defendant to establish prejudice. In the
relatively rare
rare likelihood
likelihood that the defendant
defendant is acquitted, there is
violation about which to complain. Since Brady's
literally no Brady violation
prejudice requirement looks to the probability
probability of a more favorable
outcome
exculpatory evidence, a
prosecutor not hidden the exculpatory
outcome had the prosecutor
defendant who benefits
benefits from the most favorable outcome possible
cannot point to a better
better result. The venal prosecutor's
prosecutor's effort
effort may have
been in vain, but at least the loss at trial insulates
insulates her from
any charge
388
388
rights.
constitutional
defendant's
the
violated
defendant's constitutional rights.
that she violated
common event that the trial ends in conviction, the
In the more common
psychological
phenomenon known as hindsight bias makes it difficult
psychological phenomenon
Hindsight bias is the tendency
tendency to view something
something
to prove prejudice. Hindsight
89 Since
already happened
happened as having been inevitable. 3389
that has already
resolving a claim of a Brady violation can realistically only take
inevitable
convictions are the inevitable
place after the trial has occurred, convictions
context in which these decisions are made. When judges are called
upon to decide whether a Brady violation has occurred after a
2000); see also McKune v. City of Grand
Cir. 2000);
353, 361-62
361-62 (5th
387.
Johnson, 201
(5th Cir.
201 F.3d
F.3d 353,
v. Johnson,
387. Matthew
Matthew v.
Brady violation where charges were dropped);
1988) (no
(no Brady
(6th Cir.
Cir. 1988)
F.2d 903,
903, 907
Rapids,
907 (6th
dropped); Nygren v.
Rapids, 842
842 F.2d
Supp. 1083, 1087 (D. Colo. 1986) (no Brady violation where charges
Predovich, 637
Predovich,
637 F.F. Supp.
charges were
were
dismissed).
dismissed).
Brady violation
(10th Cir.
1307, 1310 (10th
166 F.3d
F.3d 1307,1310
388. See Morgan
Morgan v.v. Gertz,
Cir. 1999) (no Brady
violation where
where defendant
Gertz, 166
acquitted).
acquitted).
Criminal
ofTunnel
Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Dimensions of
The Multiple
MultipleDimensions
S. Scott,
Scott, The
& Michael
Michael S.
Keith A.
A. Findley
Findley &
389. See Keith
L. REv. 291, 317.
2006 WIS.
Wis. L.
Cases, 2006
Cases,
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conviction, they already
already know the result of the trial. It is difficult to
get a judge to agree that there was a reasonable probability that a
guilty verdict would not have occurred if only the prosecutor
prosecutor had
390
way.
timely
a
in
information
exculpatory
the
revealed
exculpatory infonnation in a timely way.390
Even from the perspective
prosecutor who wants to abide by
perspective of a prosecutor
the restriction of the Brady rule, its conditional nature creates an
environment
information is
environment that fosters instances where exculpatory
exculpatory infonnation
39
withheld.
Brady is defined ex post,
withheld.39I' While
While Brady
post, prosecutors
prosecutors have to
make decisions about how to avoid Brady violations ex ante.
ante. By
By
giving them the responsibility
responsibility for identifying the occasions on which
which
they must limit their own power, the Brady rule puts them in a
position of doing a job which sets them at cross purposes
purposes with
themselves.
law-abiding prosecutors
prosecutors would try to convict someone
Few, if any, law-abiding
whom they believed innocent. That being the case, every time a
prosecutor
turn over Brady
prosecutor has to make a decision about whether
whether to tum
Brady
material,
stake is doing what the Constitution may require
material, what is at stake
increasing the chance that a defendant who deserves to
at the cost of increasing
be punished will be acquitted. Despite the universal platitude after
after
every not guilty verdict
verdict that the prosecutors'
prosecutors' office seeks only justice
and justice is served by acquittals as well as convictions, losing is
never in the real interest of a line prosecutor. Since the Brady
Brady
doctrine requires prosecutors
prosecutors to evaluate
evaluate not only the way that a jury
information but the overall
of
might be affected
affected by a piece of infonnation
overall impact
impact of
information in the context
prosecutor
that infonnation
context of the entire case the prosecutor
expects to present, it is easy to see how the significance of something
exculpatory on its face may fail to receive an
that is marginally exculpatory
objective evaluation. No social psychologist
psychologist would be surprised
surprised to
learn that prosecutors are no better than anyone else in avoiding the
phenomenon of cognitive
mechanism
cognitive dissonance, the psychological
psychological mechanism

id. at 322.
390. See id.
391. Cf Daryl
Daryl J. Levinson,
Essentialism and Remedial
Remedial Equilibrium,
Equilibrium, 99 COLuM.
391.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism
COLUM. L. REv.
REv. 857,
911 (1999)
(1999) (noting
while aa government official's
911
(noting that
that while
official's view of the requirements of a constitutional
constitutional rule
plays aa role
role in
in compliance,
respect for
is less
less likely
when remedies
remedies are
are lacking).
plays
compliance, respect
for individual
individual rights
rights is
likely when
lacking).
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significance
that downplays the 392
significance of information
information that conflicts with a
392
opinion.
preexisting opinion.
preexisting
Justice Marshall
Marshall illustrated
illustrated this point in his dissenting opinion
opinion in
Bagley, as support
support for his criticism of the majority's making the
393
Brady rule conditional.393
Justice Marshall
Marshall recounted an incident
incident five
of
opinion became
became law, when a large group of
years after the Brady opinion
New York state prosecutors
prosecutors was asked if they would reveal to
eyewitness to a bank robbery
defense counsel the fact that one eyewitness
robbery had
were five
definitively said the defendant was not the culprit if there were
other witnesses who made a positive identification. Now, at the time
this group was asked their opinion, it was not at all clear that the
Brady rule was conditional. Agurs had not yet been decided and it
prejudice. However, even in
was Agurs that recast the rule to require prejudice.
that environment,
only
two
prosecutors
environment,
prosecutors indicated that they would turn
tum
394
defense. 394
the defense.
over to
the information over
to the
Even without the effect of cognitive
cognitive dissonance, putting a rule in
in
conditional form makes it harder for the actors who are subject to its
conditional
mandate to determine
determine exactly what they may and may not do.
Whether they have to make a judgment about the potential prejudicial
effect of their decisions, or anticipate the reaction of the person
implicated by them, or predict how they or others
whose rights are implicated
with whom they act in concert
concert will behave in the future in light of the
decision they make in the present, there is another layer of
of
complexity
outcome are
complexity involved. Actors with a stake in the
395
395
assessment.
this
make
to
candidates
particularly poor candidates to make this assessment.
Even trial judges, who presumably do not have an interest in the
outcome, are more likely to engage in behavior that is subject to a
conditional rule than one put in a non-conditional
non-conditional format. Justice
and Constitutional
Constitutional Mirages:
392. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen
Fallen Superheroes
Superheroes and
Mirages: The Tale of Brady
Brady v.
Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE
McGEORGE L. REv.
REV. 643,655
Maryland,
643, 655 (2002).
J., dissenting).
393. See United States
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985)
(1985) (Marshall, 1.,
394. Id.
Id. at 697.
DifferentiatingGatekeepers,
CORP.FIN. &
& COM.
COM. L.
395. Arthur B.
B. Laby, Differentiating
Gatekeepers, I BROOK. J. CORP.
L. 119,
\19, 121 n.9
(2006) ("[S]ubtle but powerful psychological factors skew the perceptions
perceptions and judgments
...
judgments of persons ...
who have
have aa stake
stake in the outcome of those judgments.")
who
judgments.") (quoting Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements,
Securities Act Release
Independence
Requirements, Securities
Release No. 7919,
7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76008,
76008, 76016 (Dec. 5,
5,
2000)).
2000».
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White apparently thought so. In his concurring opinion in Delaware
White
Delaware
396
v. Van Arsdall,
v.
Arsdall,396 he agreed with the government's contention that
the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause rule that prevents
prevents judges from prohibiting
prohibiting
cross examination
designed
to
show
the
bias
of
a
prosecution
witness
examination designed
witness
"outcome
should be a conditional one that incorporates
incorporates an "outcome
397
determinative"
determinative" prejudice requirement. 397 His rationale for wanting the
conditional was the effect he thought it would have on the
rule to be conditional
behavior
non-conditional, he
behavior of trial judges. Making the rule non-conditional,
believed, would "undermine [their] authority ...
. . . to restrict crossArsdall
examination.,,398
non-conditional rule that Van Arsdall
examination." 398 The non-conditional
propounded,
propounded, in Justice White's view, would, in close cases, influence
influence
of
trial judges to "permit the examination
examination rather than risk being guilty
of
3 99
trial.q,,399
fair trial.
requirements of
constitutional requirements
misunderstanding the constitutional
misunderstanding
of aa fair

2. Vehicles for Ex Ante Prevention
2.
Prevention
Conditional rules are not only ineffective
ineffective as instruments
instruments to control
control
behavior. They also present a barrier to a court's using the rule as a
basis for action designed
designed to avoid violations in the future.
The conditional
conditional rules where this phenomenon
phenomenon arises are the ones
incorporate a requirement
requirement of prejudice. The Strickland
Strickland rule is a
that incorporate
00
good example. 44oo
A defendant cannot
cannot establish a violation of the rule
requiring effective assistance
assistance of counsel
counsel unless he raises a reasonable
reasonable
complains adversely
probability that the shortcoming
shortcoming about which
which he complains
adversely
affected
affected the result. Given the contextual judgment
judgment that the rule
requires, the only practical
practical way to apply it is after the fact. But that
does not mean it is impossible
impossible to spot in advance
advance institutional
structures and individual practices that are highly likely to result in
violations of the rule when it comes time to make the post hoc
evaluation. The conditional
Strickland rule, however,
conditional nature of the Strickland
makes it difficult to ask a court to entertain
entertain an ex ante claim.

396.
396.
397.
397.
398.
398.
399.
399.
400.
400.

473
(1985).
473 U.S.
U.S. 667 (1985).
Id., 473 U.S.
U.s. at 685 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id.
Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
Strickland
466 U.S.
U.S. 668,686 (1984).
(1984).
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defendant in the middle of your trial and you believe
Say you are a defendant
that your defense
defense attorney's performance
performance has failed to meet the
constitutionally
examples
constitutionally mandated standard. In all but the rarest examples
where
shortcoming will inevitably and
where it is clear that the lawyer's
lawyer's shortcoming
fatally taint the verdict, your complaint
complaint will have to wait until you are
convicted. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals put it in
holding that Strickland
Stricklandclaims must await the conclusion
conclusion of the trial:
The problem with applying the Strickland
Strickland test in the middle of an
ongoing
"result" or "outcome"
"outcome" of the proceeding
ongoing trial is that the "result"
proceeding
has yet to be determined. Thus the trial court would be required
to assess prospectively
counsel's
prospectively the likely prejudicial
prejudicial effect of counsel's
alleged
alleged errors before it has had an opportunity
opportunity to hear all the
evidence
in
the
case,
and
before
the
jury,
if
there is one, has even
evidence
ifthere
401
4
°
begun to deliberate. '
Defendants
Brady as the source for having a court
Defendants seeking
seeking to use Brady
order the prosecution
to
deliver
material
prosecution
material that is facially exculpatory
exculpatory
prior to trial will encounter a similar problem. In the Second
Second Circuit,
government to
for example,
example, a District Judge may not order the government
produce
Brady material
material upon request by the defendant, because the
produce Brady
conditional
nature
of the rule does not create the opportunity for the
conditional
requirement of
of
judge to enforce a constitutional
constitutional mandate before the requirement
prejudice
prejudice is met:

401.
401. Johnson v. United
United States, 746 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C.
(D.C. Cir. 2000). A
A related problem
problem can arise when
a defendant,
conclusion of the case, seeks
seeks to have the trial court
court supply some remedial relief
relief
defendant, prior to the conclusion
for the defense attorney's ineffective representation
representation in plea negotiations. See Thomas v. Reyes, 153 P.3d
P.3d
1040
1040 (Ariz. 2007). For example, in Thomas, defense counsel failed to convey a plea offer to her client in
time
time to meet the prosecutor's deadline. The defendant discovered
discovered this lapse prior to trial and sought to
have
have the judge
judge apply a state law remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations
negotiations that
required
required the prosecutor
prosecutor to reoffer
reoffer the plea. The court concluded,
concluded, however,
however, that the defendant could not
establish
establish that his right to effective
effective assistance of counsel had been
been violated prior to trial since it was
possible that he would eventually
eventually be acquitted
acquitted or receive
receive a sentence
sentence no less favorable
favorable than the plea
plea offer.
See also
also United States v. Gray, 382 F. Supp. 2d 898, 910 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
2005) (stating that a claim of
of
"conviction
ineffective assistance
assistance of counsel relating
relating to plea negotiations, is "grossly premature"
premature" before
before "conviction
and sentencing").
sentencing").
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Although the government's
government's obligations under Brady may be
constitutional duty arising before
thought of as a constitutional
before or during the
of a defendant, the scope of the government's
government's constitutional
trial ofa
duty-and, concomitantly, the scope of a defendant's
defendant's
constitutional
right-is ultimately
ultimately defined retrospectively,
retrospectively, by
constitutional right-is
of particular
reference to the likely effect that the suppression
40 2
402
trial.
the
of
outcome
the
on
had
evidence
evidence
on the outcome ofthe trial.
.• . . It is not feasible or desirable to specify
specify the extent or
timing of [the] disclosure
disclosure Brady and its progeny require, except
in terms of the sufficiency, under the circumstances,
circumstances, of the
defense's
defense's opportunity
opportunity to use the evidence when disclosure is
40 3
made. 403

conditional nature
The conditional
nature of a rule not only makes it difficult
difficult for a
ante; it also stands
court to address the problem
problem in a particular case ex ante;
as a barrier
barrier to claims for institutional reform. For example, the way
that some jurisdictions have structured the provision of defense
services for indigent defendants
services
defendants in criminal cases raises serious
doubts about its ability to meet the constitutional
of
constitutional standard
standard of
reasonably effective
effective counsel. Jurisdictions that starve their defender
programs
resources and overload their attorneys are likely to
programs of resources
Strickland prejudice
prejudice test after the
spawn cases that would meet the Strickland
fact. But, prior to a conviction, criminal defendants
defendants facing pending
pending
Strickland as the basis for asking a court
charges lack standing to use Strickland
to order
order the changes necessary
necessary to avoid the risk. As one court
explained:
Here, [a criminal defendant
defendant facing a pending charge]
charge] seeks to
enjoin
enjoin the Marion
Marion County public defender system
system because it
effectively
effectively denies indigents the effective
effective assistance of counsel.
However, a violation
of
a
Sixth
Amendment
Amendment right will arise only
only
violation
prejudiced by an unfair trial.
shown he was prejudiced
after a defendant has shown
402. United States
States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
2001).
403. Id.
100 (2d Cir. 2001».
2001)).
Id. at 142 (quoting Leka v. Portundo, 257 F.3d 89, \00
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This prejudice
prejudice is essential
essential to a viable Sixth Amendment
Amendment claim
of
and will exhibit itself only upon a showing that the outcome of
the proceeding was unreliable. Accordingly,
the
claims
presented
Accordingly,
presented
here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we have
404
analysis. 404
from which
proceeding and outcome from
no proceeding
which to
to base
base our
our analysis.

3. Misleading
MisleadingMessages
Messages
Conditional
Conditional rules send a misleading message to the public about
what sort of protection they can
can expect
expect when dealing with officials in
the criminal
sophisticated observers
criminal justice system. All but the most sophisticated
of the Supreme Court are likely to come
come away with the impression
impression
that it is the predicate
predicate behavior
behavior itself that the Constitution prohibits
prohibits
and not the predicate plus whatever future event serves to complete
the violation. That was part of the difficulty with Chambers,
Chambers, where
the audience
audience construing
construing the message consisted of appellate judges.
The problem is much more severe when it is the general public.
Consider, for a minute, the one rule in constitutional criminal
procedure that likely has the most widespread
widespread currency
procedure
currency in popular
culture, the Miranda
conclude that most people think
Miranda rule. It is fair to conclude
that Miranda
Miranda is a direction
direction to the police that when they interrogate a
suspect in their custody, they have to deliver the familiar four-part
4°5 However, now that the Court has made the privilege
warning.
waming. 405
against self-incrimination
self-incrimination conditional, if the public is truly to
Miranda'seffect on the police, they have to be aware that
understand Miranda's
Miranda
Miranda violations don't occur in the police
police station but in the
courtroom.
courtroom.

357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied sub nom, Platt
404. Platt v. State,
State, 664 N.E.2d
N.E.2d 357,363
Platt v. Indiana,
520 U.S. 1187 (1997);
(1997); see also People
El Paso County, 761 P.2d 206, 209, 211
People v. District Court of EI
211
(Colo. 1988)
1988) (holding that it was error for trial judge
judge to rule prior to trial that low fees paid to appointed
counsel
counsel denied
denied defendant the right to effective assistance
assistance of counsel
counsel since the defendant had no way of
establishing
e.g., Luckey
1012, 1Ol7
1017 (lith
(11th Cir. 1988), cert.
cert. denied,
denied,
establishing prejudice). See e.g.,
Luckey v. Harris,
Harris, 860 F.2d 1012,
495
(1990), rev'd
rev'd on abstention
Strickland standard [is]
495 U.S. 957 (1990),
abstention grounds
grounds sub nom ("[T]he Strickland
inappropriate
prospective relief.");
(11 th Cir.
inappropriate for a civil suit seeking
seeking prospective
relief."); Luckey
Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th
1992).
405. My
years' experience
My thirty-five years'
experience as a defense attorney have exposed
exposed me to many clients
clients who
were
Miranda is a rule directed to the police that they were irate at not
were so ingrained
ingrained in the concept
concept that Miranda
being
being given
given a Miranda
Miranda warning, despite never
never being
being questioned.
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one's
The full implication of the misleading nature of talking about one's
Miranda rights was made clear in a case the Court decided the year
Miranda
40 6
United States
States v. Patane.
In Patane,
Patane,the Court refused
after Chavez, United
Patane. 406
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine and suppress a
to apply the "fruit
pistol the police
police found as a result of interrogating
interrogating a suspect without
°7 While
giving him a complete Miranda
Miranda warning.4407
While conceding that the
defendant's
statements
were
not
admissible
at trial as a result of the
defendant's statements
Miranda
Miranda violation, the prosecutor
prosecutor did propose to introduce the pistol
408
4
°
8
into evidence.
Justice Thomas, the author of Chavez, wrote for the plurality
decision that held the introduction
introduction of the pistol would not violate the
Constitution:
Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and
Constitution: "The Miranda
Miranda rule, for
police do not violate the Constitution (or even the Miranda
4
09
that matter) by mere failures to warn.,,409
warn.,
The statement in the
parenthesis
parenthesis is startling in its implication. It means that even deliberate
decisions by the police to question a suspect without obeying
Miranda's
Miranda's dictate do not, under this view, violate the Miranda
Miranda rule.
all," Justice Thomas continued in
"Potential violations
violations occur, if at all,"
Patane,
Patane, "only upon the admission
admission of unwarned
unwarned statements into
evidence at trial.'.410
trial." 410
Now, it would be unrealistic to expect
expect members
members of the public to
understand
Mirandais a prophylactic
prophylactic rule or
understand the debate over whether
whether Miranda
one that the Constitution directly requires. But it is certainly fair to
conclude that a casual
casual observer
observer of the criminal justice system would
Miranda means something more than just a direction to the
think Miranda
prosecutor
prosecutor about when the state may admit statements
statements that resulted
resulted
from custodial
custodial interrogation.
Consider how this will appear to someone taken into police
Miranda warnings.
custody who has a layman's familiarity with the Miranda
It is unlikely that he will know that Patane
Patane has given the police
police the
imprimatur
According to Patane,
Patane, police can
imprimatur to ignore Miranda.
Miranda. According
406. See generally United States v. Patane, 542
(2004).
542 U.S. 630
630 (2004).
407. Id. at 631-32.
407.ld.at631-32.
408. ld.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 637.
409. ld.
637.
410. ld.
Id. at 641.
641.
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Miranda warning, and
question a suspect without giving him a Miranda
presumably they are just as free to question someone who has
received
to assert his right to remain
remain
received one but who says that he wants
411
411
present.
lawyer
a
have a lawyer present.
to have
silent or right to
How would we expect a conscientious police officer to react if a
interrogation by asserting what we now
suspect sought to end an interrogation
know is inaccurately called one's Miranda
Miranda rights? Since continuing
the interrogation violates neither the Constitution nor the Miranda
Miranda
rule, it would be foolish to stop. Stopping ensures the police end up
with neither a statement nor a lead to any physical evidence. So, the
reasonable,
reasonable, and legitimate,
legitimate, thing to do is to continue.
of
Well, to a suspect who is not versed in the conditional nature of
Miranda,
Miranda, it can only appear that the police who control
control the
environment in which he finds himself are lawless. The police will
know that they are staying
staying within the limits of a conditional rule. The
"acoustic
suspect almost certainly will not. One may defend this "acoustic
'
'
12
separation
separation,,412
on the ground that it is socially desirable for police to
gain access to physical evidence
evidence that a suspect
suspect has committed
committed a
crime. But, it can only be gained
gained at the cost of deception. It says
justice if a doctrine
doctrine
something about
about our system
system of criminal justice
individuals is designed
designed to be effective by
by
describing the rights of individuals
hiding
dimension
hiding from those whom it is supposed to protect, the true dimension
of the protection.
Conditional rules can be misleading
Conditional
misleading not just for outsiders,
outsiders, but for
for
insiders also. Criminal
Criminal trial lawyers
lawyers talk about Brady material prior to
trial, when the concept must act as a guide
guide to what the prosecutor
prosecutor
must
without realizing that until
until the trial
trial is over, in a
must actually
actually do, without
prosecutor
strictly accurate
accurate sense
sense there
there is no such thing. As a result, a prosecutor
may
material despite
despite knowing that the state has
has in
may deny
deny having
having Brady material
its possession
information
that
is
exculpatory
on
its
face,
so long as
possession information
exculpatory on
the
prosecutor
does
not
believe
that
the
information
the prosecutor
believe
information would be
be
significant enough
evidence to affect the
significant
enough in the overall context
context of the evidence

411.
411. Id.
Id.
412.
412. See
See generally
generally Meir
Meir Dan-Cohen,
Dan-Cohen, Decision
Decision Rules
Rules and Conduct Rules:
Rules: On
On Acoustic
Acoustic Separation
Separation in
Criminal
Criminal Law,
Law, 97
97 HARv.
HARv. L. REV.
REv. 625
625 (1984).
(1984).
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result. This may seem to be a metaphysical distinction that only the
congenitally hyper-technical
congenitally
hyper-technical or deceptive
deceptive may use. But it is a
perfectly
perfectly legitimate way to translate
translate the Court's doctrine into
practical
practical terms. At least, that is what Justices Thomas and Scalia
413
Dretke.413
would have us believe,
believe, from their dissent in Banks v. Dretke.
One of the questions
questions the Court had to resolve in Banks was
defendant had sufficient
whether the defendant
sufficient cause to excuse his failure to
present his Brady claim to the state courts. Banks's ability to offer
evidence in federal court to support the Brady claim depended
depended on
evidence
presenting it 414
to the
whether he could establish that the fault for not presenting
414
neglect.
or
laxity
his
with
not
and
State
state courts lay with the
and not with his laxity or neglect.
turn over to Banks prior to
At issue was the prosecutor's
prosecutor's failure to tum
trial information that one of the state's key witnesses was not only a
paid police
police informant
informant but had encouraged,
encouraged, at the behest of his police
masters, a course of action
action that the prosecutor
prosecutor relied on in the penalty
415 In
sentence Banks to die. 415
convince the jury to sentence
phase of the trial to convince
his state collateral
"'upon
collateral attack on his conviction, Banks alleged '''upon
belief that 'the
turn
information and belief'
'the prosecution knowingly failed to tum
'416
over exculpatory
exculpatory evidence
evidence as required by Brady.
Brady.'",416 The state
pursued the
explicitly denied this claim and as a result, Banks never pursued
investigation in this stage of the case that later on led him to discover
discover
the facts about the witness's relationship to the police.
The majority found that the prosecutor's
prosecutor's deceptive answer to
Banks's allegation in his state collateral attack was among
among the factors
conclusion that he established cause for failing to
supporting their conclusion
present
present the new evidence that he wanted the federal court to consider.
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, was far more willing to assume a
prosecutor than was the majority:
semantically fastidious prosecutor
[T]he State could have been denying only that it had failed to
turn over evidence
Brady, i.e.,
turn
evidence in violation
violation of Brady,
i.e., that any evidence
the prosecution
prosecution did not turn over was not material (a position
413.
413.
414.
415.
415.
416.

Banks v. Dretke,
Dretke, 540 U.S.
u.s. 668, 706-11 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 675-76.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id.
263, 281 (1999».
(1999)).
Id. at 682 (quoting Strickler
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,281
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advanced
advanced by the State throughout the federal habeas process)....
process) ....
[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation'
violation' unless
the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability
evidence would have produced a
probability that the suppressed
suppressed evidence
417
417
verdict.
different
different verdict.
Lawyers,
Miranda
Lawyers, like laymen, have to learn to think about rules like Miranda
Brady in conditional
and Brady
conditional terms.
There is another way in which the conditional nature of a rule
contributes to confusion. Greer
Miller 418 illustrates the problem.
Greer v. Miller
Greer was the case that held a prosecutor
prosecutor does not violate a
Greer
examination
defendant's rights simply by asking a question on cross examination
about whether the defendant remained
silent
after
receiving a
remained
receiving
Miranda
Miranda warning, so long as the defendant does not react by
supplying the answer. The Court held that this behavior did not
19
Ohio.4419
violate the rule it had earlier announced in Doyle v. Ohio.
Doyle
was based on a conclusion that it was fundamentally unfair to use as
Miranda warning, in
evidence a defendant's
defendant's invited silence after a Miranda
part because
because the defendant's
defendant's failure to talk to the police was too
ambiguous to serve as reliable proof of guilt.
After Greer
Doyle, it went on to
Greer disposed of the claim based on Doyle,
consider whether, despite the fact that the prosecutor
prosecutor never violated
violated
defendant never answered the question,
the Doyle rule because the defendant
prosecutor's behavior nevertheless
the prosecutor's
nevertheless "so infec[ted]
infec[ted] the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction
conviction a denial of due
'
'42°
42 1 as
process.
As examples
examples of such cases, the Court cited Agurs,
process.'.420
Agurs,421
DeChristoforo,422 a case in which the prosecutor
prosecutor
well as Donnelly v. DeChristojoro,422
deliberately misled the jury in his final argument
argument to convey the false
deliberately
impression that the defendant
had
unsuccessfully
defendant
unsuccessfully tried to plead guilty
423
4
23
In considering
considering this question, the Court posed the
to a lesser charge.
417.
417.
418.
419.
419.
420.
421.
421.
422.
423.

Banks, 540
540 U.S. at 710
710 (Thomas, 1.,
J., dissenting).
Greer v. Miller, 483
Greerv.
483 U.S. 756
756 (1987).
(1987).
Id.at 756-57;
756-57; Doyle v. Ohio, 426
426 U.S. 610,619
610, 619 (1976).
(1976).
/d.
Greer,483
(1974)).
Greer,
483 U.S. at 765 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974».
Greer,
(1976)).
Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (citing United States v. Agurs,
Agurs, 427
427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976».
Greer,483
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639).
Greer,
483 U.S. at 765 (citing Donnelly,
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639.
Donnelly,
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problem
"Although the prosecutor's
problem this way: "Although
prosecutor's question did not
prosecutor
constitute a Doyle violation, the fact remains that the prosecutor
of Doyle by asking an improper question
question
attempted to violate the rule
' 24
jury.
the
of
in the presence
presence the jury.'.424
Consider, for a minute, exactly what the Court is saying the
conceivably
prosecutor did that potentially is so unfair that it might conceivably
have tainted the trial. Why, the Court tells us, the prosecutor
prosecutor
"attempted to violate the rule of Doyle." It is, however, a little
"attempted
disingenuous to talk about the prosecutor's
prosecutor's action as an attempted
Doyle violation. Prosecutors, by themselves, do not have the ability
answers the
to violate Doyle. Violations only occur when the witness answers
prosecutor's question and the judge
prosecutor's
judge allows the jury to consider the
answer
answer as part of the evidence.
evidence. It's a little like charging someone
with an attempt to commit a conspiracy. Such behavior may
constitute
constitute a completely separate
separate wrong, like solicitation, but it
requires some category bending to fit it into the contours of an
425
attempt.425
If the label of "attempted
"attempted Doyle violation"
violation" isn't quite accurate,
accurate, it
does serve a purpose. It makes one think that the Court vigilantly
vigilantly
prosecutor did, while communicating, with a
disapproves of what the prosecutor
wink
wink to those in the know, that not only will no one do anything
defense attorney steps in to prevent
prevent
about it if either the judge or the defense
the tainted answer
answer from appearing but that simply asking the question
does not, by itself,
itself, violate the defendant's constitutional
constitutional rights or any
any
rule limiting the prosecutor's power.
4. The Problem
Problem of Prejudice
Prejudice
There are two additional
additional objections
objections unique to all of the conditional
consequence that identifies
identifies a
rules that rely on prejudice as the consequence
violation of the Constitution. For one thing, the Court has been
component
deciding when prejudice is a component
remarkably inconsistent
inconsistent in deciding
of an underlying
underlying constitutional
constitutional right. For another, they ignore all of
of
Greer,483 U.S. at 765.
424. Greer,
765.
425. Cf Lorenz, Conspiracy
the Proposed
ProposedFederal
Criminal Code:
Code: Too Little Reform, 47 TuL.
TUL. L.
Conspiracy in the
Federal Criminal
1017, !O31
1031 (1973)
(1973) (noting
'attempted conspiracy').
REv. 1017,
(noting the "theoretical
"theoretical conflicts inherent
inherent in an 'attempted
conspiracy"').
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the process
process values
values inherent
inherent in the Constitution, shunning them
them in
the
favor of accuracy.
accuracy.
favor

a.
a. Inconsistency
Inconsistency
426 the
the first conditional
Massachusetts,426
conditional rule case, Snyder v. Massachusetts,
In the
explained that where
where a rule is neither
neither explicitly
explicitly mentioned
mentioned in
in
Court explained
obviously fundamental,
fundamental, one can only
only define
defme the
the Constitution nor obviously
rule in situational
situational terms by looking
looking at the overall
overall fairness of the
the entire
entire
427
427
42
hardly led
led to coherent
coherent
proceedings.
This rationale, however, has hardly
proceedings.
results.
The Supreme
Supreme Court has found in the Due Process Clause a wide
specifically mentioned
variety of freestanding
freestanding rules, not specifically
mentioned in the
Constitution, that are not conditional. Due process is the basis for a
rule that bans the introduction
introduction of evidence that the defendant was
428 prohibits a jury
receiving a Miranda
Miranda warning,
warning,428
silent after receiving
429 requires
instruction that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,
defendant,429
requires
instruction
doubt,430
reasonable
a
application of the standard
standard of
of proof
proof beyond
beyond a reasonable doubt,430
the application
431 mandates
coerced confessions as evidence,
evidence,431
mandates that
bars the use of coerced
432
voluntariness,
confession's
a
of
question
the
determine
of a confession's voluntariness,432
judges first determine
433 insists that discovery
requires judges to be impartial,
impartial,433
discovery in criminal
requires
information to the
cases be reciprocal if the defendant has to reveal information
cases

426.
427.

(1934).
Snyder
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, 291
291 U.S. 97 (1934).
Id.
116-18. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
Id. at 116--18.
416 U.S. 637
637 (1974),
(1974), the Court held that an isolated
unsuccessfully tried to plead
remark in a prosecutor's closing argument
argument suggesting that the defendant unsuccessfully
plead
remark
Id. The
guilty to a lesser charge did not violate due process because
because it did not prejudice
prejudice the defendant.
defendant. Id.
Court
without citing it: "This is not a case in
Court adopted the same reasoning as it did in Snyder, though without
which
specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as
which the State has denied a defendant
defendant the benefit of a specific
(1972) or in which the prosecutor's remarks so
407 U.S. 25
25 (1972)
the right to counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
prejudiced
compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a
prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against compulsory
of
denial of that right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). When specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way
way
respondent's
impermissibly infringes
infringes them. But here the claim
claim is only that a prosecutor's
prosecutor's remark about respondent's
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction
expectations at trial by itself so infected the trial with unfairness
conviction a
denial of due process. We do not believe that examination
examination of the entire proceedings in this case supports
Donnelly, 416
416 U.S. at 643.
that contention."
contention." Donnelly,
428. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618
618 (1976).
702 (1975).
(1975).
421 U.S. 684,
684, 702
429.
429. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
430. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
568 (1958).
(1958).
356 U.S. 560,
431. Payne v. Arkansas,
Arkansas, 356
560, 568
(1964).
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964).
432. Jackson
(1927).
Tumey v.
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
433. Tumey
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435
prosecution,434 and prevents judges from intimidating witnesses.435
prosecution,434
None of these rules incorporates a showing of prejudice. Indeed, in
none of these cases was there even a discussion about this issue,
much less a convincing
convincing
rationale for why cases are sorted into one
43 6
436
another.
or
category or another.
One can see the malleability of the criteria
criteria a Justice can use to
by
determine whether a rule requires a prejudice component or not by
United States
looking at the dilemma Justice Scalia faced in United
States v.
437
Gonzalez-Lopez.
The issue in Gonzalez-Lopez was whether a
defendant who claimed
claimed he had been denied the right to have counsel
appear for the defense also had to show
of his own choosing appear
prejudice. The defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez had the money to hire
his own lawyer, but the trial judge improperly
improperly refused
refused to allow the
lawyer to appear pro hac vice, forcing the defendant to hire a local
lawyer to represent him.
government's brief in the Supreme Court argued that a
The government's
"defendant who claims that he was improperly
"defendant
improperly deprived of counsel of
of
choice must establish prejudice in order to overturn
overturn his
438 In supporting
conviction. ,,438
supporting this contention, the brief quoted from
one of Justice Scalia's opinions, Mickens v. Taylor:
Taylor: "defects
"defects in
assistance
trial's
assistance [of counsel] that have no probable effect upon the trial's
'A 39
violation.
establish aa constitutional
outcome do not establish
constitutional violation.'.439

434.
(1973).
434. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,
470, 475-76
475-76 (1973).
435.
409 U.S. 95,
(1972).
435. Webb v. Texas, 409
95, 97-98
97-98 (1972).
436.
436. Cf
Cf Stacy
Stacy & Dayton, supra
supra note
note 60,
60, at 119 ("[Tlhe
("[l1he Court
Court has not articulated
articulated a convincing
rationale
for distinguishing
rationale for
distinguishing when
when courts ought to define aa right to obtain or
or present
present evidence
evidence at trial
trial in
terms
terms of aa strict outcome-oriented
outcome-oriented prejudice
prejudice test from
from when they
they ought
ought to
to use a lesser
lesser prejudice
prejudice test,
subject
subject to post-trial
post-trial harmless
harmless error review.");
review."); Michael
Michael T. Fisher, Note,
Note, Harmless
Harmless Error,
Error, Prosecutorial
Prosecutorial
Misconduct,
There's More to Due Process
Misconduct, and
and Due
Due Process:
Process: There's
Process Than the Bottom
Bottom Line, 88
88 COLUM.
COLUM. L. REV.
REv.
1298, 1304
1298,
1304 (1988)
(1988) ("Courts
("Courts have
have employed
employed inconsistent
inconsistent approaches
approaches to
to define
defme due process violations
violations that
stem
stem from prosecutorial
prosecutorial misconduct.
misconduct. For some
some types of prosecutorial
prosecutorial misconduct,
misconduct, the
the courts
courts have
have
applied
outcome-determinative analysis;
applied an
an outcome-determinative
analysis; for other
other types of misconduct,
misconduct, courts have applied
applied more
traditional
due process
process violations
violations and
and reserved
reserved outcome-determinative
outcome-determinative
traditional concepts
concepts of fairness to define due
analysis
analysis for
for use
use as
as aa harmless
harmless error
error test. No rationale
rationale has been
been set forth to
to justify
justify the coexistence
coexistence of
of two
two
such inconsistent
inconsistent approaches.").
approaches. ").
437.
437. See generally United
United States
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
548 U.S.
U.S. 140
140 (2006).
(2006).
438.
U.S. 140 (2006)
438. Brief
Brief for Petitioner
Petitioner at
at 8,
8, United
United States
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
548 U.S.
(2006) (No.
(No. 05-352),
05-352),
2006
2006 U.S.
U.S. S.
S. Ct.
Ct. Briefs
Briefs LEXIS
LEXIS 261.
261.
439.
439. Id.
[d. at
at 14
14 (quoting
(quoting Mickens
Mickens v. Taylor,
Taylor, 535
535 U.S.
U.S. 162,
162, 166
166 (2002)).
(2002».
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Justice Scalia
Scalia wrote the opinion in Gonzalez-Lopez, rejecting the
argument that this part of the right to counsel had a prejudice
prejudice
"the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice,
component: "the
not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because
because the
of
deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional 0 showing of
prejudice is required to make the
the violation
violation 'complete.'"4
'complete. ",440
One might well ask why this is so. If the violation of the Sixth
defendant's
Amendment is complete when a judge prevents a defendant's
attorney of choice from appearing
appearing at trial, why is it that in the Sixth
Amendment contexts
that
Strickland and Mickens present
Strickland
present the
contexts
violation is not complete until all of the evidence is in and prejudice
prejudice
rears its ugly head?
head? After all, the right to counsel, unlike the44rule
1
mentioned in
Snyder,
in
announced Snyder, is explicitly
explicitly mentioned
in the
the Constitution.
Constitution. 441
announced
Justice
Justice Scalia's explanation was to find a new way to characterize
characterize
of
the Sixth Amendment's
Amendment's concern for the effective
effective assistance
assistance of
Strickland and Mickens, he said, were both derived from a
counsel. Strickland
442 which first articulated
Richardson,442
due process case, McMann v. Richardson,
the proposition that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.'M3
counsel." 4 3 McMann dealt with the validity of a guilty
contention by the defendant
defendant that the procedure
plea in the face of a contention
the trial court used at the time to determine the voluntariness
voluntariness of a
444
confession
confession had subsequently been
been declared
declared unconstitutional.
unconstitutional. 444
McMann held that so long as the defendant
represented by a
defendant had been represented
lawyer
effective in evaluating
lawyer who was reasonably
reasonably effective
evaluating the admissibility
of the confession, there was no constitutional
constitutional violation in accepting
accepting
44 5
the defendant's guilty plea. 445
Having
concern with
Having traced the first concern
440.

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
Gonzalez-Lopez,
441. In
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
Arsdall, the
44!.
In another
another case based on a specific
specific provision of the Constitution, Delaware
Court
Court rejected the government's
government's argument
argument that there
there should be a prejudice
prejudice component to the rule of the
the
Confrontation
Confrontation Clause that a judge must allow the defendant to cross examine
examine a prosecution
prosecution witness for
bias. The Court's explanation
"on individual
explanation was that the focus of the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause was "on
witnesses"
witnesses" rather than the fairness of the trial as a
a whole. Delaware
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679679(1986) ("It would be a contradiction in terms to conclude
80 (1986)
conclude that a defendant
defendant denied
denied any
any opportunity
opportunity to
to
cross-examine
cross-examine the witnesses
witnesses against him nonetheless had been
been afforded
afforded his right to •'[confrontation]'
[confrontation],
because
because use of that right would not have affected the jury's verdict.").
442. See generally
generally McMann
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
(1970).
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14).
443. Gonzalez-Lopez,
n.l4).
444. McMann,
444.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 766.
id.
n.13.
445. See id.
at 770 n.l3.
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the quality
quality of a lawyer's performance
performance to a due process case dealing
with the validity of a guilty plea, Justice Scalia went on to try to show
its relevance
relevance for a Sixth Amendment
Amendment case about the right to an
attorney of one's choice:
Having derived the right to effective
effective representation
representation from the
purpose of ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also
derived the limits of that right from that same purpose. The
requirement that a defendant show prejudice
prejudice in effective
effective
representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific
element of the right to counsel at issue there-effective (not
"ineffective"
mistake-free) representation. Counsel cannot
cannot be "ineffective"
unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, unless
it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to effective representation
is not
representation
446
446
is
prejudiced.
the
defendant
until
"complete"
"complete" until the defendant is prejudiced.

The rabbit pulled from the hat in this explanation
explanation is the very
second word: "derived."
"derived." If "derived"
"derived" means the Sixth Amendment
Amendment
doctrine
depends
for
its
legitimacy
on
the
earlier
recognition
doctrine
recognition of the
due process principle,
principle, then it makes sense that the limits placed on
on
the latter apply as well to the former. But the Sixth Amendment
Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel exists quite independently
independently of the
Due Process Clause. It isn't so much "derived"
"derived" from the latter as it is
"suggested by"
it. That
That being
there is no reason why the due
being so,
so, there
"suggested
by" it.
process necessity of including
including a prejudice component
component must be
imported into the Sixth Amendment's
Amendment's specific provision of the
assistance of counsel. The values that underlie
guarantee of effective assistance
the Sixth Amendment's
Amendment's guarantee of effective
effective assistance of counsel
exist quite apart from the due process concerns
concerns that underlie
underlie the
defendant's ability to attack a guilty plea
limits that surround
surround a defendant's
conviction.
peregrination seems
Justice Scalia's peregrination
seems to boil down
The end result of Justice
to something like this. Requiring a defendant with money to sit
446. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
446.
548 U.S. at 147
147 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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magnificently infringes
through a trial where her lawyer performed
perfonned magnificently
Amendment value if the lawyer is not the one whom she
on a Sixth Amendment
would have hired except
except for the court's erroneous disqualification.
But, requiring an indigent defendant to sit through a trial where a
performs so poorly that it violates all
lawyer appointed by the court perfonns
professional standards does not offend the Sixth Amendment
Amendment unless
performed in a professionally
some other lawyer would have not only perfonned
professionally
competent way, but likely would have gotten a more favorable result.
b.
NarrowFocus
h. Narrow
Focus
The conditional
conditional rules that rely on prejudice
prejudice are narrowly
narrowly focused
focused
underlying
on protecting only one of the possible values that the underlying
provision might serve. They each presuppose
presuppose the sole reason served
served
by the rule is its effect in assisting the trial process accurately to
identify those individuals
individuals who committed the crimes with which they
are charged. Nothing else seems to matter.
accuracy in the criminal
There is no denying
denying the importance of accuracy
single-minded focus on accuracy of a
trial process. But the single-minded
conditional
conditional rule relying on prejudice
prejudice denigrates other values that one
44 7
provision. 447
might find implicated
implicated in the
the underlying
underlying constitutional
constitutional provision.
This is a theme that was sounded by the dissent in the very first
448
conditional
Snyder. 448
Justice Roberts wrote
wrote for the four
conditional rule case, Snyder.
members of the Court who opposed making the rule governing the
presence of a defendant
defendant at a viewing conditional:
conditional:
[W]here
[W]here the conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not that a just result shall have been
Fourteenth
been
obtained, but that the result, whatever, it be, shall be reached
reached in a
fair way. Procedural
Procedural due process has to do with the manner of
of
the trial; dictates that in the conduct of judicial
judicial inquiry
inquiry certain
certain
fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard
447. For example,
example, the due process right to be free from an undue delay in the indictment
indictment process may
accusation" before the
also protect an individual from "[t]he anxiety
anxiety and concern
concern attendant on public accusation"
formal initiation
(1971) (Douglas,
initiation of criminal charges. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 330-31 (1971)
J., concurring).
1.,
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
(1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
448. See generally
generally Snyder
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
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of those rules, and is not satisfied though the result is just, if the
449
_&'.. 449
· was
unfair.
was Umalf.
hearing
heanng
Fairness
Fairness for its own sake, without regard for the degree of fit
between
between the end result and empirical
empirical truth, not only evinces respect
respect
for the individual dignity
dignity of the defendants whom the state proposes
proposes
state's
beacon of the state's
to deprive of life or liberty. It stands as a beacon
commitment to a certain standard of behavior. Where the reality as
well as the perception of such a commitment
commitment prevails, the system
system can
community that is not
command a sense of legitimacy from the community
not
50
445o
obtainable.
otherwise obtainable.
accuracy
Of course,
course, an appellate
appellate court can preserve
preserve the value of accuracy
without making a rule conditional by taking advantage of the
of
harmless error doctrine. However,
However, by resolving a case on the basis of
a conditional
conditional rule that incorporates a prejudice
prejudice requirement, the Court
harmless error doctrine
renders the hannless
doctrine irrelevant. In any case where
prejudice exists as part of the rule, a determination
detennination that the rule was
violated will by necessity meet the less stringent harmless
hannless error test.
determine the effect on the outcome,
Aside from the standard
standard used to detennine
the fundamental difference
difference between
between a conditional
conditional rule and the
harmless
error
test
is
the
allocation
of
the
burden
of proof.
proof. When the
allocation
hannless error
prejudice inquiry is built into the definition of the rule, the defendant
defendant
4 51 If
If the rule was not
bears the burden
burden of proof on the issue. 451
conditional, and a court looked at the question
question of prejudice
prejudice as part
part of
of

Id. at 137.
449. !d.
450. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,
162, 207 (2009) (Souter,
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right against
against
of
ineffective assistance
assistance of counsel has as much to do with public
public confidence
confidence in the professionalism of
lawyers
(1987)
lawyers as with the results of legal proceedings."); Kentucky
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 751 (1987)
(Marshall, J.,
J., dissenting)
dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476
(1986)) ("[Tlhe right to confront
confront
476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986»
and cross-examine adverse witnesses contributes
establishment of a system of criminal justice in
contributes to the establishment
which the perception as well as the reality offaimess
of fairness prevails.").
prevails.").
451. See Mickens
(defendant has burden of proving attorney's
451.
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002)
(2002) (defendant
attorney's
conflict
adverse effect); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)
(defendant
conflict of interest had an adverse
(1985) (defendant
has burden
disclosed to the
the
burden of proving there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
defense,
would have been different); Strickland
Strickland v. Washington,
Washington, 466 U.S.
defense, the result
result of the proceeding would
(1984) (defendant
668, 694 (1984)
(defendant has burden of proving "a reasonable
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
counsel's
unprofessional
[conduct], the result
unprofessional [conduct],
result of the proceedings would
would have been different");
different"); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,
(1982) (defendant
reasonable likelihood
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
858, 872 (1982)
(defendant has burden
burden of proving
proving a reasonable
that witness' testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact).
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a hannless
harmless error analysis, then the prosecutor
prosecutor would have to establish
establish
452
that the verdict would not have been different.
Relieving
Relieving the
prosecutor of the burden will often foreordain the result of the
453
conditional rule that incorporates prejudice is a way
Using a conditional
case.453
for a court to be able to affirm.
affmn more454convictions
convictions than would be
454
regime.
error
harmless
a
possible
possible under
under a harmless error regime.
B. The Case
Casefor
ConditionalRules
for Conditional
If conditional
conditional rules have such serious drawbacks
drawbacks as means of social
control, institutional reform, and public understanding, what explains
their prevalence
prevalence across such a wide range of constitutional
identify the
provisions? To answer that question, let's try to identify
conditions under which it would make sense to craft a rule in
in
conditional format.
conditional
First, focus on the predicate
you
predicate behavior that triggers the rule. If you
view the behavior by itself as either benign
benign or even socially useful,
the event that it causes some easily
but want to control it only in the'
easily
identified adverse consequence, then it would make sense to make
the rule conditional. Another aspect of the predicate behavior that
would make a conditional rule attractive is if you can't identify with
any degree of precision
precision what it is about the behavior
behavior that you object
consequence that you want to avoid. And,
to but you can identify
identify the consequence
you would prefer a conditional
unwanted
conditional rule if there is some unwanted
collateral
collateral consequence like civil liability or the imposition of an
unbearable drain on existing resources,
associated
unbearable
resources, which would be associated
with the predicate
predicate behavior if it were not subject to a conditional
conditional rule.

452. O'Neal
O'Neal v. McAninch,
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995)
(1995) (prosecutor
(prosecutor bears burden
burden of proof to show
harmless error
18, 24 (1967)
(1967) (same on direct
error in habeas
habeas corpus cases); Chapman
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24
review).
Cf. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
(1992) (Scalia, J.,
453. Cf
467, 503 (1992)
J., concurring)
concurring) ("[A]llocation
("[A]llocation of the
burden of proof
results.").
proof foreordains the results.
").
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 754 (Marshall,
454. See Kentucky
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (requiring
(requiring the defendant
defendant to
show
constitutional deprivation to the
show prejudice
prejudice "unfairly
"unfairly shifts the burden of proving harm from this constitutional
excluded
criminal defendant, who was in no way responsible
excluded criminal
responsible for the error and is least able to
demonstrate
occurred had he been allowed
allowed to attend"); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696
demonstrate what would have occurred
(Marshall,
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (applying harmless error
error rather than making
making the rule conditional is more
protective
protective of the defendant).
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consequences that complete the
Next, think about the future consequences
violation. The easier
easier it is for the actors subject
subject to the rule and the
people whom the rule is intended
intended to protect
protect to identify situations in
advance
consequences will occur, the more attractive a
advance when these consequences
conditional
conditional rule will be. And, the more certain you are that the only
only
reason to condemn
because it results in the
condemn the predicate
predicate behavior is because
in
future consequence,
consequence, the better
better fit you'll have with a rule in
conditional
conditional format.
And last, since the context in which we are considering conditional
rules is that of constitutional
interpretation, the language of the
constitutional interpretation,
Constitution may compel the choice of a conditional
conditional rule.
i.
Utility of the Underlying
Underlying Behavior
i. The Utility
Estelle v.
v. Williams,455
Williams,455 the prison clothes case, California
Californiav. Hodari
Hodari
D.
,456 the Fourth Amendment
Amendment seizure case, United
United States v.
D.,456
4
Valenzuela-Bernal, 57 the compulsory
Valenzuela-Bernal,457
compulsory process case, and Weatherford
Weatherford
45 8
v. Bursey,
the
intrusion
on
the
attorney-client
relationship
case, all
Bursey,458
share one feature. In each, the rule that governed the underlying
underlying
predicate behavior was one that the Court undoubtedly saw as having
the potential to prohibit
prohibit behavior that the Court thought socially
Estelle made the assumption that many defendants
useful. Thus, Estelle
jury's
prefer to appear
appear in court in prison clothes
clothes in order to garner
gamer the jury's
459
sympathy.
sympathy.459
In Hodari
Hodari D., Justice Scalia editorialized
how
editorialized on how
beneficial it was to an orderly society for everyone
cooperate with
beneficial
everyone to cooperate
460
a police officer's direction to stop.
Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court
stop.460 In Valenzuela-Bernal,
stressed
stressed the obligation of the executive
executive to control illegal immigration
and pointed out that prompt deportation is often the most effective
effective
46
1
means of securing
securing the border. 46 I And in Weatherford,
Weatherford, the Court
"recognized
the
unfortunate
necessity
of
undercover
"recognized the unfortunate necessity of undercover work and the
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
460.
461.

Estelle v. Williams, 425
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
California v. Hodari
(1991).
Hodari D., 499
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
United
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
458 U.S. 858
858 (1982).
(l982).
Weatherford
(1977).
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508.
Estelle,
Hodari
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627.
Valenzuela-Bernal,
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
458 U.S. at 864.
864.
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effective law enforcement. We have also
value it often is to effective
desirability
secrecy even
even
recognized the
desirability and legality of continued secrecy
'A62
arrest.
after arrest.',462
In each case, making the rule conditional
conditional has the effect
effect of not so
sanctioning it so long
subtly encouraging
encouraging the underlying
underlying conduct by sanctioning
as the future action that makes it unconstitutional
unconstitutional never comes to
pass.
ii. AA Reluctance
ii.
Reluctance to Specify Rules ofBehavior

The psychologist
psychologist Abraham Maslow
Maslow is credited
credited as the source of the
attractive
insight that if the only tool you have is a hammer, it is very attractive
463
463
to view every problem
you
come
across
as
a
nail.
Well,
if your
nai1.
problem
whole institutional perspective
perspective is to evaluate a process
process after all of the
relevant events have taken place
place and determine if the result is
legitimate or not, the post hoc perspective
perspective that you enjoy may very
legitimate
well color your view of the type of rule you announce to justify
justify your
result.
Supreme Court, every problem
action
For the Supreme
problem that comes to it for action
affirmed or reversed.
presents itself in the form of a judgment to be affirmed
The Court could perform
that
function
without
announcing
perform
announcing any rules
course, that would hardly be a responsible
responsible way for
whatsoever. Of course,
the Court to carry out its institutional role of the constitutional
interpreter of last resort. The Court does write opinions that explain
interpreter
64
the reasoning behind the result.4464
But writing opinions sets two tasks
before the Court. One is to explain why they reached the result that
they did. The other, and harder, task is to explain
explain to those who look
to the Court for guidance
guidance how to avoid the problem in the future.
That requires the Court to know more about the job of being a police
462. Weatherford,
Weatherford,429 U.S. at 557.
557.
Creativity in Law School and
and the Legal
463. See Katherine
Katherine Rosenberry, Organizational
Organizational Barriers
Barriers to Creativity
Profession, 41 CAL. W. L. REv.
(1988) (citing Abraham
Profession,41
REv. 423, 424 (1988)
Abraham Maslow, Famous
Famous People Quotations,
http://quotations.about.com/od/stillmorefamouspeople/a/AbrahamMaslowl.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
11,
http://quotations.about.comlodlstillrnorefamouspeople/aiAbraharnMaslowl.htrn

2009)).
2009)).

announcing the reason for their decisions is one that has an
464. The practice of appellate courts announcing
ancient lineage.
Division of Opinion
Opinion in
in the Supreme Court:
History of Judicial
Judicial
Coun: A History
lineage. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division
Disintegration,44 CORNELL L. Q. 186,
186, 190 (1958).
Disintegration,
(1958). The first
fU"St published opinion of the Supreme Court
was Georgia v. Brailsford,
Brailsford, 22 U.S. 402
402 (1792).
(1792).
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officer, prosecutor,
defense attorney, or trial judge than the Court
prosecutor, defense
comfortable with. And so, it may be attractive to explain the
may feel comfortable
outcome
conditional rule that frees the Court
outcome of a case by applying a conditional
from the job of providing any guidance
guidance for the future.
In both the ineffective
ineffective assistance of counsel cases and the
exculpatory
exculpatory evidence
evidence cases,
cases, the Court's choice of a conditional rule
requiring
requiring prejudice
prejudice is largely a function of the Court's reluctance
reluctance to
identify
the
predicate
behavior
that
would
violate
the
rule.
Strickland
identify
predicate
violate
465
465
v. Washington
Washington bemoaned the infinite number of circumstances
circumstances that
466
4
might define
467
define adequate representation,
representation,4666 and United
United States v. Agurs467
indeterminacy of the standard
standard that prosecutors
stressed the indeterminacy
prosecutors had to use
468
468
to evaluate
the
evidence
evaluate
evidence in their files.
incorporating into the definition
definition of each rule a prejudice
By incorporating
drastically limited the occasions
occasions when it
component, the Court has drastically
would be called upon to make a judgment
judgment about whether the
predicate
predicate behavior triggered
triggered the rule. It can simply deny relief by
concluding
that
the
defendant has not been able to establish
concluding
prejudice. And even in those cases where it concludes
concludes that the rule
categorically
has been
been violated,
violated, it does not have to do so by categorically
condemning the predicate behavior. All it need do is to make a
condemning
contextual judgment from which it may be difficult to generalize.
generalize.
iii.
Considerations
iii. Pragmatic
Pragmatic Considerations
In United
United States
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,469
Valenzuela-Bernal,469 which dealt with the
prosecutor's deporting a potential
potential defense
defense witness, Chavez v.
4
7
0
Martinez,
Martinez,470
the case that held that the privilege against selfself47
1
incrimination
incrimination is only relevant at trial, and in Scott v. Illinois,
Illinois,47 I the
465.
466.

Strickland
Strickland v. Washington, 466
466 U.S. 668
668 (1984).

id. at 688-89, 693
See id.
693 ("No
(''No particular
particular set of detailed
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can

satisfactorily
counsel or the range of
of
circumstances faced by defense counselor
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
legitimate
defendant......
. . Representation
legitimate decisions
decisions regarding how to best represent
represent a criminal
criminal defendant
Representation is an art,
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.").
and an act or omission that is unprofessional
467. United
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
97 (1976).
(1976).
Id. at 108 ("[W]e
468. Id.
("[W]e are dealing with an inevitably imprecise
imprecise standard.").
469. United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal,
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
469.
458 U.S. 858
858 (1982).
(1982).
470. Chavez
Chavez v. Martinez, 538
538 U.S. 760 (2003).
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978).
(1978).
471. Scott v. llIinois,
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misdemeanor counsel case, the Court explicitly referred to
right to misdemeanor
constraints as one factor influencing the choice of a
resource constraints
conditional
conditional rule.
Valenzuela-Bernal, the government argued that a nonIn Valenzuela-Bernal,
conditional rule would create havoc:
unavailability of adequate
Because of budget limitations and the unavailability
detention facilities, it is simply impossible
impossible as a practical matter
transportation or
to prosecute many cases involving the transportation
harboring of large numbers of illegal aliens, where all the aliens
incarcerated for a substantial
substantial period
must be incarcerated
period of time to avoid
dismissal of the charges, even though the prosecution's case may
consequence, many valid and appropriate
be overwhelming. As a consequence,
472
.
fi
foregone.
are
prosecutions
prosecutIOns are oregone. 472
The Court was obviously concerned
concerned about this aspect of the case,
noting that "the detention of alien eyewitnesses
eyewitnesses imposes substantial
financial and physical burdens upon the Government,
Government, not to mention
mention
the human cost to potential witnesses who are incarcerated
incarcerated though
crime. ' 473
charged with no
no crime.',473
charged
In Chavez,
Chavez, Justices Souter and Breyer
concurring
Breyer joined in a concurring
concept that the privilege against self
opinion
self
opinion supporting
supporting the concept
incrimination
establishes a conditional rule, and specifically
specifically referred
referred
incrimination establishes
to another
another kind of resource problem that they saw bound up in the
case before them-the prospect of costly
costly civil litigation:
The most obvious drawback
purely Fifth
drawback inherent in Martinez's purely
Amendment
claim
to
damages
is
its
risk
of
global
application
Amendment
damages
application in
every instance of interrogation
interrogation producing
producing a statement
inadmissible
inadmissible under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment principles,
or violating one of the complementary
complementary rules we have accepted
accepted in
aid of the privilege against evidentiary use. If obtaining

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865 (quoting Brief
for the United
472. Valenzuela-Bernal,
Brieffor
United States at 21-22, United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)
(1982) (No. 81-450)).
81-450».
473. Valenzuela-Bernal,
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865.
865.
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Martinez's statement is to be treated as a stand-alone
stand-alone violation
Martinez's
violation of
of
compensation, why should the same not
the privilege subject to compensation,
be true whenever the police obtain any involuntary selfincriminating
incriminating statement, or whenever the government
government so much as
or
threatens a penalty
penalty in derogation of the right to immunity, or
whenever
whenever the police
police fail to honor Miranda?
Miranda? Martinez
Martinez offers no
limiting principle or reason to foresee a stopping place short of
of
cases.474
such
·
b·l·
.
11
h
474
all
in
liability
Ila I Ity 10 a suc cases.
Scott, the Court was concerned
concerned that requiring counsel
counsel in
in
And in Scott,
misdemeanor cases pursuant to a non-conditional
misdemeanor
non-conditional rule would "impose
unpredictable,
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse
, 75
States.',475
States."
Court's
explain the Court's
Resource constraints
constraints of another type may also explain
4
76
decision in Mickens v. Taylor,
Taylor,476 the case that made the conditional
specifically
rule for attorney conflict of interest cases where no one specifically
representation of the defendant.
objected to the conflicted
conflicted lawyer's representation
Kennedy and O'Connor
Justices Kennedy
O'Connor noted that:

judge's duty would not be
If [the rule] were otherwise, the judge's
limited to cases where the attorney is suspected
suspected of harboring a
conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant
against an ineffective
ineffective attorney, as well as a conflicted one. It
would be a major departure
departure to say that the trial judge must step
in every
every time defense counsel appears
appears to be providing ineffective
ineffective
assistance,
assistance, and indeed, there is no precedent
precedent to support
support this
77
4477
..
proposition.
proposItion.
Given
ineffective lawyers, which
Given the magnitude of the problem of ineffective
would extend not only to those cases that are tried but also to the
vastly larger
larger number that are resolved on the basis of a guilty
guilty plea, itit

474.
475.
476.
477.

Chavez, 538 at 778-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
Chavez,
concurring).
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
373.
Mickens
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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may have been a daunting prospect to require trial judges to become
actively involved in trying to remedy the problem beforehand.
iv. Constitutional
ConstitutionalLanguage:
Language: The Text Made
Made Me Do It
iv.

If the language
language of a constitutional provision were worded so that
the only thing it did was to command the government to respond in a
certain way if one of its agents committed
committed a particular
particular act, then it
would make sense to construct a conditional
conditional rule to implement it. The
Amendment has this character: "nor shall
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
private property
be
taken
for public use, without just
property
compensation. ,.478
compensation.'A78
The Takings Clause imposes two rules on the government, one of
of
which is non-conditional
non-conditional and one which is conditional. 479 In a nonconditional
conditional format, it prohibits
prohibits the government from ever taking
480
property for a private purpose. 48
However, the government may
seize private property
property for any public use without any constitutional
restriction, subject
subject to the future condition that it pay just
just
4481
compensation.
81
This
second
rule
is clearly
clearly conditional. It creates
creates a
compensation.
regime
regime where a government
government official
official may make the decision about
whether
unconcerned with and indeed
whether to take a citizen's
citizen's property
property unconcerned
indeed not
authorized to make payment. Whether
Whether the taking violates
violates the
Constitution
payment
Constitution depends
depends on what happens
happens later on, in the payment
482
stage.482
478. U.S.
u.s. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend. V.
v.
479. See Brown v. Legal Found. of
U.S. 216,
of Wash.,
Wash., 538 U.S.
216, 231-32
231-32 (2003)
(2003) ("While
("While it confirms
confinns the
state's
conditions
of the
the Fifth
Fifth Amendment
Amendment imposes
imposes two
two conditions
state's authority
authority to confiscate
confiscate private
private property,
property, the text of
on
use' and
on the
the exercise
exercise of
of such
such authority:
authority: the
the taking
taking must
must be for aa 'public
'public use'
and 'just compensation'
compensation' must be
paid
paid to the owner.").
480.
Gas Corp.,
v. Consol.
Conso!. Gas
Corp., 300 U.S.
U.S. 55,
55, 80
80 (1937)
(1937) ("[O]ne
("[O]ne person's property
property may
may not be
be
480. Thompson
Thompson v.
taken
of another
another private
private person
person without
without aa justifying
justifying public
public purpose, even though
taken for
for the benefit
benefit of
compensation
compensation be
be paid.").
481.
(1987)
481. See First English
English Evangelical
Evangelical Lutheran
Lutheran Church v. County
County of
of L.A.,
L.A., 482
482 U.S.
U.S. 304,
304, 314-17
314-17 (1987)
("[A]s
of private
private property,
property, but
but
("[A]s the Court
Court has fiequently
frequently noted,
noted, this provision
provision does not prohibit
prohibit the taking of
power. ").
instead places
places aa condition
condition on the
the exercise
exercise of that power.").
482. One
One could recast this rule
rule into a non-conditional
non-conditional format
fonnat regulating
regulating the
the primary
primary behavior
behavior of the
official
official who
who took the property. The Takings
Takings Clause could
could have
have said, "No private property
property shall be
be taken
for
for public
public use
use unless
unless the state has paid
paid its owner
owner reasonable
reasonable compensation."
compensation." In
In this
this form,
fonn, itit would be
reasonable
of reasonable
reasonable compensation
compensation in
in advance
advance of
of the
the
reasonable to create
create a legal regime
regime that required
required payment
payment of
taking,
taking, or
or at
at the
the very
very least
least would
would impose
impose some obligation
obligation on
on the government
government official
official who took the
property
property to ensure
ensure that
that reasonable
reasonable payment
payment was
was forthcoming.
forthcoming.
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It is possible to view the Due Process Clause in the same way.
It
way.
Carefully parsing the phrase ''No
"No person shall
shall...
... be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law,,483
law 'A 8 3 might lead one to
conditional rule that simply focused on
conclude that it created only a conditional
the consequence
consequence of government action, but left the government's
government's
agents free to do what they wished so long as their behavior
behavior did not
result in the loss of someone's
someone's life, liberty or property. In fact, such
reductionist view of the Due Process Clause is not
an extreme reductionist
484 is
Zahrey v. Coffey,
Coffey,484
altogether uncommon. A Second Circuit case, Zahrey
an illustration.
Zahrey was a Section
Section 1983 case against an Assistant United States
Attorney
Attorney who allegedly conspired
conspired to fabricate evidence that he used
to prosecute
conspiracy to commit
prosecute the plaintiff, a police officer, on conspiracy
485
485
robbery
robbery and other charges.
The ultimate source of the right the
plaintiff relied on was the Due Process Clause, the basis for the
Supreme Court's cases holding that a prosecutor may not knowingly
486 The problem for the
use false evidence to obtain a conviction. 486
plaintiff, though, was that he was not trying to set aside a guilty
verdict, since his trial ended
ended in an acquittal. He was suing for a
violation
violation of his civil rights. But where was the violation
violation if at the end
of the trial he walked away a free man?
In
answering this question, the Zahrey
Zahrey court reasoned
In answering
reasoned that
whatever
the
Due
Process
Clause
requires,
it
does
not
rise
to the level
whatever
Process
of a constitutional
command until someone
constitutional command
someone loses his or her life, or is
incarcerated
incarcerated or fined as a result of what had happened:
The
'in and of itself,'
... does not
The manufacture
manufacture of false evidence, 'in
itself,' ...
not
impair
anyone's liberty, and therefore
impair anyone's
therefore does not impair anyone's
anyone's
constitutional
If, for example,
constitutional right ....
.... If,
example, a prosecutor
prosecutor places in
evidence
evidence testimony known to be perjured
perjured or a trial judge makes a
racially
disparaging
remark
about
a defendant, no deprivation
racially disparaging
deprivation of
483.
483. U.S.
U.s. CONST.
CONST. amend.
amend. V.
484.
484. Zahrey
Zahrey v. Coffey,
Coffey, 221
221 F.3d
F.3d 342
342 (2d Cir. 2000).
2ooo).
485.
485. Id.
Id at
at 346.
346.
486.
486. Napue
Napue v.
v. Illinois,
lllinois, 360
360 U.S.
U.S. 264,
264, 269
269 (1959);
(l959); Pyle
Pyle v.
v. Kansas,
Kansas, 317
317 U.S.
U.S. 213,
213, 215-16
215-16 (1942);
(1942);
Mooney
Mooney v.
v. Holohan,
Holohan, 294
294 U.S.
U.S. 103,
103, 112
112 (1935).
(1935).
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liberty occurs unless and until the jury convicts and the
defendant is sentenced
defendant
sentenced . . . . If the trial was aborted before
before a
verdict, it could be said . . . that no constitutional
constitutional right was
87
. I ate.
d 4487
violated.
VIO

Under this view of the Due Process Clause, everything
everything it requires of
of
government officials is conditional, subject to a defendant losing the
government
property.488
trial and eventually
eventually suffering a loss of life, liberty or property.488
Could it be that the Constitution would tolerate
tolerate a trial process that
completely ignored all of the rules that emanate
emanate from the Due Process
completely
Clause so long as the result was something other than a conviction?
There is a historical precedent for a system
system that comes close to this:
trial de novo. In early America, this method of handling minor
minor
criminal
cases
was
a
feature
of
the
criminal
justice
systems
in
all of
criminal
justice
of
489
489
the New England states as well North Carolina. It was a way of
of
providing rough justice administered
administered by a local magistrate, often not
formally trained in the law, whose decisions to convict could be
nullified by a defendant's
defendant's choice
choice to have a trial de novo in front of a
49o0 Trials in the first tier of a de novo
circuit riding professional
professional judge. 49
system were not expected
expected to provide all of the trappings of due
process. If defendants wanted the panoply of protections
protections the law
also Landrigan v. City of Warwick,
(1st Cir.
487. Zahrey,
Zahrey, 221
221 F.3d
F.3d atat 348, 350;
350; see also
Warwick, 628 F.2d
F.2d 736, 744 (lst
Cir.
1980) ("We do
do not see how
how the
the existence of aa false police
police report,
report, sitting
sitting in aa drawer
drawer inin a police station,
by
by itself deprives aa person of aa right
right secured by the Constitution and laws."). The Zahrey court
court was
was
uneasy about refusing to label the type of unseemly action
action the complaint alleged as
as constitutionally
constitutionally
unobjectionable
unobjectionable in
in the absence of aa deprivation of
of liberty. ItIt finessed this
this problem
problem by
by referring toto a
prosecutor
standards of due
prosecutor fabricating evidence in her investigative
investigative role as
as something
something that "violates
"violates the standards
process,"
process," id.
id. at 356
356 (emphasis added), and calling aa resulting
resulting loss of liberty "a denial of aa constitutional
constitutional
right."
a standard. If the court
right." Id.
!d. The opinion never explained what itit means to violate a
court meant that
of
standards were
were requirements,
requirements, then it is hard to
to reconcile
reconcile with
with its
its reliance
reliance on
on language
language from one
one of
Justice Scalia's concurring
concurring opinions
opinions that
that there
there is "no
"no authority
authority for the
the proposition
proposition that the mere
preparation
preparation of false evidence, as opposed
opposed to its use in aa fashion that deprives someone of aa fair
fair trial or
otherwise
Constitution." Id.
Id. (Scalia,
otherwise harms him, violates
violates the Constitution."
(Scalia, J.,
1., concurring) (quoting Buckley v.
v.
Fitzsimmons,
(1993)).
Fitzsimmons, 509
509 U.S.
U.S. 273, 280 (1993)).
488. It is possible for criminal
criminal defendants
defendants to suffer a loss of liberty
liberty prior to
to trial, as a result
result of being
held
Zahrey and it was the pretrial confinement that gave the
held on bail. This, in fact, is what happened in Zahrey
plaintiff
Zahrey, 221 F.3d at
plaintiff the
the factual
factual predicate
predicate on which
which to base his
his due process
process claim. Zahrey,
at 348.
348.
Appeal": The History
American Criminal
CriminalCourts,
489. David
David Rossman,
Rossman, "Were There No Appeal":
History ofReview in American
Courts,
81 J. CRIM.
CRIMINOLOGY 518,
518,539
811.
CRIM. L. && CRIMINOLOGY
539 (1990).
(1990).
COMMITTEE ON JURIES
DISTRICT COURT
490. REPORT
REpORT OF THE COMMITIEE
JURIES OF SIX TO THE
THE CHIEF
CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT
DEPARTMENT,
TRIAL DE
11 (1984).
DEPARTMENT, ELIMINATION
ELIMINATION OF THE TRiAL
DE Novo SYSTEM IN
IN CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL CASES II
(1984).
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provided, they could
could simply appeal for trial de
de novo where they
they
the law.
law. It
It was, in
in essence, aa
would get all of the formal protection of the
system based on an idea very similar to the conditional rules that the
system
Zahrey court thought embedded in the Due Process Clause.
Zahrey
While the analogy to trial de novo is appealing on its
its face, it
ignores history. The federal system never adopted trial de novo.
novo. In
controversy over the ratification of the Constitution
fact, a point in controversy
anti-federalists raised that Article Ill's
was the possibility the anti-federalists
III's grant of
of
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court might allow it to hold a
49 1
trial de novo in criminal cases. 491
Even more telling is the way that
the Court has dealt with arguments over the years that constitutional
limitations do not apply in the first tier of a system of trial de novo
simply because the state eventually
eventually offers the defendant a trial that
contains the protection missing from the original proceeding. In the
nineteenth century, Callan
Callan v. Wilson considered whether
whether the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury applied
applied to the first tier of the
Amendment's
492
trial de novo system in the local courts of the District of Columbia.492
The government argued
argued that so long as the defendant
defendant was given free
access to a jury in the second
second stage of the de novo process, the
District was free to shape the first tier trial free of this particular
93
constitutional
restraint. 4493
The Court rejected
constitutional
rejected the argument
argument out of
of
94
4494
hand.
Callan, of
Callan,
of course,
course, did not rest on the Due Process
Process Clause.
Therefore,
conditional interpretation
interpretation of
of the right to a
Therefore, its rejection
rejection of aa conditional
jury does not directly address
address the point on
on which
which the Zahrey court
rested its view:
language of
specifically
of the Clause
Clause specifically
view: the
the fact that
that the language
491.
491. Rossman,
Rossman, supra note
note 489,
489, at
at 554.
554.
492.
492. Callan
Cal1an v.
v. Wilson,
Wilson, 127
127 U.S. 540,
540, 548
548 (1888).
(1888).
493. Id.
Id.
494.
494. Id.
Id. at
at 556
556 ("[A]
("[A] judgment
judgment of
of conviction,
conviction, not based
based upon
upon aa verdict
verdict of
of guilty
guilty by
by aa jury,
jury, isis void.
void. To
To
accord
accord to
to the
the accused
accused aa right
right to
to be
be tried
tried by
by aa jury,
jury, in
in an
an appellate
appel1ate court,
court, after
after he has
has been
been once
once fully
ful1y tried
tried
otherwise
otherwise than
than by
by aa jury,
jury, in
in the
the court
court of original
original jurisdiction,
jurisdiction, and
and sentenced
sentenced to pay
pay a fine or be
be
imprisoned
imprisoned for
for not
not paying
paying it,
it, does
does not
not satisfy
satisfy the requirements
requirements of
of the
the Constitution.").
Constitution."). Ludwig
Ludwjg v.
Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, 427
427 U.S.
U.S. 618
618 (1976),
(1976), upheld
upheld the
the Massachusetts
Massachusetts trial
trial de
de novo
novo system
system against
against aa similar
similar
claim,
claim, but
but left
left Callan
Callan in
in place
place for
for two
two reasons.
reasons. The
The first was
was because
because the
the right
right to
to aa jury
jury in
in federal
federal court
court
had
m11,
which
in Article
Article ill,
which did
did not
not apply
apply to
to the
the states,
states, as
as well
wel1 as
as in
in the
the Sixth
Sixth Amendment.
Amendment. The
The
had aa basis
basis in
second
second was
was because
because the
the Massachusetts
Massachusetts system
system allowed
allowed aa defendant
defendant to
to circumvent
circumvent the
the first
first trial
trial by
by
admitting
admitting to
to sufficient
sufficient facts
facts to
to support
support aa guilty
guilty finding.
finding. Id.
Id. at
at 629-30.
629-30.
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refers to deprivations
deprivations of life, liberty
liberty and property
property rather
rather than to the
refers
means by
by which the state
state might accomplish
accomplish those ends. However, the
means
Court revisited this issue under
under the rubric
rubric of the Due Process
Process Clause
Court
495
495
of Monroeville.
Monroeville.
Ward dealt with whether
whether the
in Ward
Ward v. Village of
village mayor
mayor could act as the
the judge
judge in the local criminal
criminal court
court in
village
court collected
collected formed a major
major part
light of the fact that the fines the court
of the village's
village's income. Whatever
Whatever restrictions
restrictions the Constitution
Constitution placed
placed
judge with a stake
stake in the
the outcome
outcome of a criminal
criminal case
case
on the use of a judge
496
4
96
directly from the Due Process
Process Clause.
Clause. The government
government raised
raised
stem directly
Callan-that the prospect
prospect of a trial de novo
the same argument
argument as in Callan-that
meet the demands
demands of
of
in front of an impartial judge was sufficient to meet
497
Constitution.
The Court again summarily
summarily rejected the
the Constitution.
suggestion: "[The]
procedure [is not]
"[The] State's trial court procedure
suggestion:
acceptable simply because
constitutionally acceptable
because the State eventually
eventually offers
constitutionally
is entitled to a
impartial adjudication.
adjudication. Petitioner
a defendant an impartial
4 98
instance.'
first
the
in
judge
detached judge in the first instance. ,.498
neutral and detached
Although
Although these two Supreme
Supreme Court decisions do not spell out the
rationale for rejecting
rejecting a conditional view of the constitutional rules
rationale
that apply to the system of trial de novo, the results the Court reached
conceived
Constitution likely conceived
fit with the way that the Framers
Framers of the Constitution
of the nature of the rights they enshrined in the first ten
499 The parts of the Constitution that regulate
regulate the
amendments. 499
Viii. ofMomoeville,
of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
495.
495. See Ward v. Vill.
U.S. 57, 58 (1972).
(I 972}.
U.S. 510
5\0 (1927)
process for a judge to have a
(1927) (It is a violation of due process
496. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
outcome of the trial.).
trial.).
financial stake in the outcome
(1972) (No. 71-496),
Monroeville, 409 U.S.
14, Ward
Respondent at 14,
Ward v. Viii.
ViII. of
ofMomoeville,
U.S. 57 (I972)
71-496), 1972
497. Brief for Respondent
Monroeville respectfully submits that the existing right to a trial de
WL 136240 ("Respondent Village of Momoeville
guarantee for any defendant
defendant who
novo in a county court or a municipal court is a sufficient fair trial guarantee
individual case was not fairly tried in mayor's court.").
believes that his individual
U.S. at 61-62.
Ward,409 U.S.
498. Ward,
61-62.
understanding of the Due Process Clause was very likely more
the original understanding
499. In particular, the
than a contextual
consistent with a focus on specific rules that the government
government had to follow, rather than
contextual
as
assessment
concluded. "The gist of the Due Process Clause, as
assessment of the fairness of the process after it had concluded.
those cornmon-Iaw
common-law
Government to follow those
understood
understood at the founding and since, was to force the Government
or property."
property." Hamdi
traditionally deemed necessary
procedures traditionally
procedures
necessary before depriving
depriving aa person of life, liberty, or
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted historian Leonard Levy wrote,
shows that it did mean trial by jury and many of the other traditional rights
"The history of due process shows
of accused persons that were specified separately in the Bill of Rights. Its framers were in many respects
enumerated particular rights associated with due process and
careless, even haphazard, draftsmen. They enumerated
reinforced guarantee, and a
then added the due
probably as a rhetorical flourish, a reinforced
clause itself, probably
due process clause
LEONARD
genuflection
usage going back to medieval reenactments of Magna Carta." LEONARD
genuflection toward traditional usage
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criminal justice system were the result of a deep mistrust of the
500 The Bill of Rights was designed to limit the
central government.500
new federal entity the Constitution created. It was much more
congenial
congenial to this objective, and to the notion of rights that was
common
common at the time, for the Constitution to regulate government
government
behavior rather than simply guard individuals against illegitimate
Anglo-American conception of rights was more
results. The Anglo-American
concerned
government power rather than
concerned with the limitation of government
vindicating individual
individual injuries: "In the eighteenth century ....
. . many
authorities would still have held that the primary holders of rights
were not individuals but rather the collective
collective body of the people. The
tyranny.' 50 1
people
the
protect
to
real issue was..,
was ...
the people at
at large
large from
from tyranny.,,501
Even under a conception of rights that focuses on the individual,
however, the Zahrey
Zahrey model of due process creates a problem. It
essentially treats the Due Process Clause as a collection
collection of liability
rules, allowing government actors, like the village judge in
Monroeville,
Monroeville, to ignore the protections
protections the rules announce so long as
the government
is
willing
to pay a price
government
price later on, for example by
by
66 (1972).

W.
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
W. LEVY,
LEVY, JUDGMENTS:
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS
ESSAYS ON
ON AMERICAN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 66 (1972). This view
view of
of the
the

Due
Process Clause
Clause is
is also consistent
Due Process
consistent with the way the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court interpreted
interpreted it in the first case
applying
in the
516
applying itit in
the context
context of
of the
the criminal
criminal process.
process. See generally
generally Hurtado
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
(1884). In Hurtado,
Hurtado, the Court had to decide
decide whether the Due Process Clause
Clause of
of the Fourteenth
Amendment
criminal proceedings
Amendment required
required the
the states
states to
to initiate
initiate criminal
proceedings with
with a grand
grand jury
jury indictment. Id.
/d. at 520.
520.
In the
the pre-incorporation
pre-incorporation era,
era, cases
cases like
like Hurtado
Hurtado imposed on
on the states only
only those rules so
so fundamental
fundamental
that
in the words Justice Cardozo
that they
they represented,
represented, in
Cardozo first used
used in
in Snyder,
Snyder, the "immutable
"immutable principles
principles of
of
justice."
Snyder v.
U.S. 97,
justice." Snyder
v. Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, 291 V.S.
97, 108
108 (1934).
(1934). As
As a result, Hurtado
Hurtado recognized
recognized that
that the
Due Process
Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, which
which is directed to the states, imposed the same
same
limitations
Due Process
limitations on
on the
the exercise
exercise of
of government
government power
power as
as did
did the
the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which
federal government.
Hurtado, 110
which constrains
constrains the
the federal
government. Hurtado,
110 U.S.
V.S. at 535-36.
Although
Although Hurtado
Hunado concluded
concluded that the
the requirement
requirement of a grand
grand jury
jury indictment
indictment was not a part
part of
of
due
explain something
due process,
process, it
it did
did explain
something about
about what
what the concept
concept meant. See id.
id. at 536.
536. ItIt prohibited
prohibited specific
specific
exercises
exercises of government
government power,
power, not
not just procedures
procedures that
that in retrospect
retrospect were
were not
not fair:
fair: "acts
"acts of attainder,
attainder,
bills
of pains
pains and
and penalties,
penalties, acts
acts of
of confiscation,
confiscation, acts
acts reversing
reversing judgments,
judgments, and acts
acts directly
directly transferring
transferring
bills of
one
man's estate
estate to
to another,
another, legislative
legislative judgments
judgments and
and decrees,
decrees, and
and other similar
similar special,
special, partial
partial and
and
one man's
arbitrary
of power
arbitrary exertions
exertions of
power under
under the
the forms of legislation."
legislation." Id.
[d. Due process,
process, Hurtado
Hurtado said, "refers
"refers to
certain
fundamental rights
.... If
certain fundamental
rights ....
If any
any of
of these
these are
are disregarded
disregarded in
in the proceedings
proceedings by
by which
which a person
person is
is
condemned
'due process
of
condemned to
to the
the loss
loss of
of life,
life, liberty,
liberty, or
or property,
property, then
then the
the deprivation
deprivation has not
not been
been by 'due
process of
law."'
concrete rights.
law. '" Id.
[d. That
That is
is not
not language
language describing
describing aa generalized
generalized guarantee
guarantee of fairness. It talks
talks of concrete

500.

159-62 (1988)

500. LEONARD
LEONARD W.
W. LEVY,
LEVY, ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL INTENT
INTENT AND
AND THE
THE FRAMERS'
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION 159-62 (1988)

(stating
that Anti-Federalist
Anti-Federalist insistence
(stating that
insistence on
on aa Bill
Bill of
of Rights
Rights stemmed
stemmed from fear that federal government's
govemment's
power would
would be used
used to invade
invade personal
personal rights).
501.
501. JUDD
JUDD RAKOVE,
RAKOVE, DECLARING
DECLARING RIGHTS:
RIGHTS: A
A BRIEF HISTORY
HISTORY WITH
WITH DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENTS 22
22 (Elizabeth
(Elizabeth M.
M.
Schaaf
Schaafed.,
ed., 1998).
1998).
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giving the
the defendant
defendant an
an impartial
impartial judge
judge at
at aa trial
trial
giving

539

de novo. However,
However, aa

system which
which essentially
essentially allows
allows the
the government
government to
to purchase
purchase the
the
system
ability to
the limits
limits on
on its
its exercise
exercise of
of power
power is
is fundamentally
ability
to ignore
ignore the
fundamentally
liberty. 50 2

to secure
designed to
rights designed
of rights
notion of
with the
inconsistent with
inconsistent
the notion
secure liberty.502
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Until aa phenomenon
is given
given aa name,
name, itit often
often goes
goes unrecognized
Until
phenomenon is
unrecognized
5503
°3 So it is with conditional rules. Because up to now
So it is with conditional rules. Because up to now

and unexamined.
and
unexamined.

no one
one has
has pointed
pointed out
out the
the similarity
similarity among
among cases
that announce
announce
no
cases that
conditional rules,
rules, neither
commentators has
able
conditional
neither the
the Court
Court nor
nor commentators
has been
been able
to assess
assess in
in aa systematic
systematic way
the use
use of
of this
device.
to
way the
this device.
Taking
rules cases
as aa whole
whole does
does not
reveal any
any
Taking the
the conditional
conditional rules
cases as
not reveal
insight
that the
has aa coherent
coherent philosophy
of when
when they
insight that
the Court
Court has
philosophy of
they are
are
appropriate and
when not.
not. This
This is
is not
not surprising
surprising given
given the
failure to
appropriate
and when
the failure
to
recognize
what
cases
as
disparate
in
time
and
doctrine
as
Snyder
v.
recognize what cases as disparate in time and doctrine as
v.
5°6
5 °5 and Estelle v. Williams- 506
04
Massachusetts,504
Martinez,505 and Estelle v. WilliamsMassachusetts, Chavez v. Martinez,
502.

See Jules
YALE L.J. 1335,
Jules L. Coleman
Coleman &
& Judy Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of
ofLegal Rights, 95 YALE
1335,
(1986)
secure liberties,
liberties, then it is hard to see how liability
(1986) ("If rights
rights entail or secure
liability rules
rules protect
protect them
....
... the
.... Because
Because liability
liability rules neither
neither confer
confer nor respect aa domain
domain of lawful
lawful control ...
the very idea
idea of a
'liability
liability rule, is inconceivable.");
'liability rule entitlement,'
entitlement,' that is of
of a right secured by a liability
inconceivable."); James
James Boyd
Boyd
ForgottenPoints
"ExclusionaryRule"
Debate, 81 MICH.
1273, 1278
(1983)
White, Forgotten
Points in the "Exclusionary
Rule" Debate,
MICH. L. REv.
REv. 1273,
1278 n.21 (1983)
(stating that damages
"would be a kind of forced
violation of a constitutional
constitutional right "would
forced exchange, and
and
damages for violation
however appropriate
appropriate that
that may be in a commercial
commercial context
context where
where all things are in principle
principle exchangeable,
it would be incompatible
incompatible with the idea
idea of a right specifically
specifically against the government,
government, and
and with the
supranote
note 385, at 1563
1563 (though liability
liability protection
protection might be
reasons why such
such rights exist"); Dellinger, supra
appropriate for private law rights, "it is inconsistent
inconsistent with a constitutional system").
503. Cf Judith
Psychology: Revolution or Evolution?,
Evolution?, 571 ANNALS
Judith Worell,
Worell, Feminism
Feminism in Psychology:
ANNALS AM. ACAD.
ACAD.
POL. &
& SOC. SC.
SCI. 183,
183, 189
189 (2000)
(2000) (giving a label to date rape
rape and sexual harassment led to their
their
recognition as a societal
societal problem).
problem). The confusion that results from not recognizing
recognizing that there is such a
recognition
thing as aa conditional
conditional rule was illustrated
illustrated in the Supreme
Supreme Court oral argument
argument on
on November
November 4, 2009 in
in
the case
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee,
case of
ofPottawattamie
McGhee, No. 08-1065.
08·1065. Pottawattamie
Pottawattamie was
was a § 1983
1983 action against
against aa
prosecutor
allegedly having
having fabricated
fabricated evidence
evidence that led
led to the defendant's
defendant's conviction
conviction and
and
prosecutor for allegedly
incarceration.
incarceration. The same
same prosecutor
prosecutor also
also presented
presented the case
case at
at trial. The question
question before
before the
the Court
Court was
complicated
the fact that
that Imbler
Imbler v. Pachtman,
Pachtrnan, 424 U.S. 429
429 (1976),
(1976), provided
provided absolute
absolute immunity
immunity for
complicated by the
the prosecutor
prosecutor from liability
liability concerning
concerning any
any actions
actions he took in
in the trial
trial stage
stage of
of the prosecution.
prosecution.
Questions
bench and
and answers
answers by the
the lawyers
lawyers who
who argued
argued the
the case
case showed
showed aa struggle with the
Questions from the bench
problem
prosecutor actually
actually violated
violated the
the Constitution-and
Constitution---and the view of the
the issue was as
as if
if it
problem of when the prosecutor
presented
would be
be at the
the time the
the prosecutor
prosecutor fabricated
fabricated the evidence.
evidence. The
The other
other
presented only
only two options. One would
would be the time
time when the prosecutor
prosecutor presented
presented the fabricated
fabricated evidence
evidence at
at trial. No one
one ever
ever explicitly
explicitly
recognized
recognized that
that the
the rule
rule was
was a conditional
conditional one,
one, making
making the time that the violation
violation occurred
occurred prior to trial
but with the benefit
of hindsight.
hindsight. Transcript
Transcript of Oral Argument,
Argument, Pottawattamie
Pottawattamie County
County v. McGhee,
McGhee, No.
benefit of
08-1065,
2009).
08-1065, pp.
pp. 4-16 (U.S. argued
argued Nov. 4, 2009).
504.
504. Snyder,
Snyder, 291
291 U.S.
U.S. at 97.
97.
505.
505. Chavez
Chavez v. Martinez,
Martinez, 538 U.S.
U.S. 760
760 (2004).
(2004).
1339-40
133~0
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to choose just one conditional rule case from each category-all
category-all have
in common. At times, the Court adopts a conditional
conditional rule without any
50 7 And in
'Neil. 507
in
recognition of what it is doing, such as in Nelson v. o
O'Neil.
either
the eleven cases in which the Court discussed whether to adopt either
an aggregation
recognized
aggregation or liability-type conditional
conditional rule, it never recognized
that it had chosen a rule that shared
shared its conditional nature with rules
50 8
stemming from other provisions
It is only in
provisions in the Constitution. 508
the ten cases where the Court explicitly considered whether
whether prejudice
prejudice
should be an element of the underlying rule that one finds any
discussion that refers to cases dealing with other parts of the process
where there was a similar question. But even there, the Court has not
been consistent in applying the reason why it says that prejudice
prejudice must
50 9
509
rule.
the
of
be a component of the rule.
However, some things do stand out when you consider
consider all the
conditional rules cases together. Conditional rules almost always
5 10 They allow state actors to
individual. 51o
favor the state over the individua1.
(1976).
506. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
501 (1976).
(1971); see discussion
l.B.iii.
402 U.S. 622 (1971);
discussion supra
supra Part
Part I.B.iii.
507. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
recognizing in these eleven cases that it has adopted a
508. The only example of the Court's recognizing
conditional rule elsewhere
Patane cites Martinez,
Martinez, aa
Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Patane
conditional
elsewhere is in United States
States v. Patane,
case the Court decided the year before, which also raised the question of whether the privilege against
self incrimination
incrimination could be the basis for civil liability on the part of police officers who acted prior to the
initiation of a formal criminal case. Patane,
Patane, 542 U.S. at 641 (recognizing that Chavez, 538 U.S. 760
Miranda warnings does not, by itself,
suspect's
itself, violate a suspect's
established that "a mere failure to give Miranda
constitutional rights").
constitutional
ll.A.iv.a.
509. See discussion supra
supra Part U.A.iv.a.
510. It is not surprising, therefore,
therefore, that their opponents
opponents on the Court come from the Justices who are
most sympathetic
sympathetic to claims based on individual
individual liberties in criminal
criminal cases while their supporters
supporters come
from those who view
view state power with a less jaundiced
jaundiced eye. Of the Justices who have sat on five or more
cases presenting
adopt a conditional
conditional rule, Justices Marshall, Brennan,
Brennan, and Stevens
presenting an issue of whether to adopt
are the only
only ones who voted against
against adopting a conditional
conditional rule more than
than half of the time, while
Justices Stewart, White, and Burger
Burger were
were the most receptive, favoring them in over nine out often cases.
See appendix B infra.
infra. The chart below shows how frequently those Justices who sat on at least five
cases
cases in which adopting a conditional rule was discussed in one of the opinions favored the adoption of a
conditional
conditional rule.

Justice
Stewart
White
Burger
Rehnquist
Powell
Scalia
Blackmun

Total Cases
8
16
16
12
15
12
7
14

Favored
Conditional Rules
Favored Conditional
100%
94%
92%
92%
87%
87%
83%
83%
81%
81%
79%
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exercise power more freely, make the constitutional
constitutional basis for
institutional reform harder, and they make it easier to uphold
convictions. Conditional rules also contribute
contribute to a lack of clarity and
transparency in government. They make it harder
transparency
harder for those who
exercise government power to know what they can and cannot do,
exercise
incentive for them to avoid abusing their power,
remove much of the incentive
and they make it harder for the rest of us to understand when they
cross a line drawn by the Constitution.
Other than in some of the more obscure areas in the worlds of
of
of
regulating soccer, baseball,
baseball, and football, it is hard to find examples of
other regimes
regimes where conditional
conditional rules are attractive enough
enough to be
adjudication
worth adopting. Their use in the realm of constitutional adjudication
is not worth the cost they bear.

O'Connor
O'Connor
Stevens
Brennan
Marshall
Marshall

10
15
13

14
14

70%
70%
40%
36%
27%
27%
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There
There are twenty-one cases in which the Supreme Court has either
adopted a conditional rule or explicitly discussed
discussed whether to do so.
They are listed here in two fashions. In the first, they appear
appear in
chronological
chronological order. After each case is a description of the
conditional rule that the Court adopted or that was discussed in one of
of
conditional
the concurring
concurring or dissenting opinions. In the second list, they are
grouped according
conditional rule applicable to the
according to whether the conditional
case was a prejudice rule, an aggregation
aggregation rule or a liability rule.
1. Chronological
Chronological List of Conditional
1.
Conditional Rule Cases
(1934) (excluding
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
(excluding the
defendant
defendant from a view only violates due process if the defendant was
prejudiced) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United
(1971) (pre
(preindictment
indictment delay
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)
only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971)
(1971) (a prosecutor's introduction
introduction
inculpatory statement by a codefendant
codefendant only
only
into evidence of an inculpatory
violates the Confrontation
codefendant does not
Confrontation Clause if the codefendant
eventually testify) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
(1973) (denying a defendant
defendant
Chambers v. Mississippi,
exculpatory evidence
evidence only violates due process if
if
the right to present exculpatory
the defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional
rule
adopted
by
the
(Conditional
Court)
(1976) (ordering
(ordering a defendant to
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
clothing only
appear in front of the jury wearing distinctive prison clothing
violates due process if the defendant
objects)
(Conditional
rule
defendant objects)
adopted by the Court)
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United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(1976) (a prosecutor's
prosecutor's
exculpatory evidence
evidence only violates due process if the
withholding exculpatory
defendant was prejudiced)
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
prejudiced) (Conditional
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)
(1977) (a state agent who
Weatherford
deliberately overhears a privileged
deliberately
privileged conversation
conversation between a criminal
defendant and defense
counsel
Amendment's
defense
only violates
violates the Sixth Amendment's
eventually
prosecutor eventually
guarantee of the assistance of counsel if the prosecutor
conversation) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by
learns the content
content of the conversation)
the Court)

Manson v. Brathwaite,
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)
(1977) (an unnecessarily
unnecessarily
suggestive pretrial
identification procedure
pretrial identification
procedure only violates due process
if it results in an identification
identification by a witness who eventually
eventually testifies
testifies
in a criminal trial) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted
by
the
Court)
adopted
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978)
(1978) (refusing
(refusing to appoint a lawyer
lawyer
for an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor only violates
the Sixth Amendment
of
Amendment if the defendant is sentenced to a term of
incarceration)
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
incarceration) (Conditional
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
(1982) (a
prosecutor's deporting
a
potential
defense
witness
only
violates
due
deporting
process ifthe
if the defendant
defendant was prejudiced)
prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by
the Court)
Strickland
attorney's
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
(1984) (a defense attorney's
inadequate
Amendment's
inadequate performance only violates the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel if the defendant was
prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
(1985) (a prosecutor's
prosecutor's
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
exculpatory evidence
withholding exculpatory
evidence only violates due process
process if the
defendant
defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted
adopted by the Court)
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(1986) (denying a defendant
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)
the opportunity to cross examine a witness to show bias should only
violate the Confrontation
Confrontation Clause if the defendant was prejudiced)
(Conditional rule, proposed by the dissent, not adopted by the Court)
(Conditional
(1987) (a prosecutor's asking a
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
defendant on cross examination
defendant had remained silent
defendant
examination if the defendant
after receiving a Miranda
Miranda warning only violates due process if the
defendant
(Conditional rule adopted
defendant answers the question) (Conditional
adopted by the
Court)
Kentucky
defendant
(1987) (excluding
(excluding the defendant
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)
competency hearing for a prosecution
from a competency
prosecution witness only violates
violates
(Conditional rule
defendant was prejudiced)
prejudiced) (Conditional
due process if the defendant
adopted by the Court)
(1987) (a prosecutor's
prosecutor's
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)
codefendant that does
statement by a codefendant
introduction into evidence of a statement
not explicitly mention the defendant
defendant should violate the Confrontation
Confrontation
evidence the prosecutor
prosecutor subsequently
subsequently introduces
Clause if other evidence
statement inculpatory
prejudices the defendant
defendant by making the statement
inculpatory as to
the defendant) (Conditional
(Conditional rule, proposed
proposed by the dissent, not adopted
by the Court)
California
(1991) (a police officer who
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
tries to restrain a suspect
suspect by a show of force only comes under the
Amendment if the suspect complies)
restriction of the Fourth Amendment
(Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)

(even where
where a defense
defense
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (even
attorney's
apparent to the judge who appoints
attorney's conflict of interest is apparent
the attorney to represent the defendant, it only violates
violates the Sixth
Amendment's
guarantee
of
the
assistance
of
counsel
if the conflict
Amendment's guarantee
affected the attorney's
attorney's subsequent performance)
performance) (Conditional rule
adopted by the Court)
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Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)
(2003) (a government official who
uses compulsion to extract
an
incriminating
statement
extract
incriminating testimonial statement
from an individual only violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege
incrimination if the state eventually
eventually uses the statement
statement in
in
against self incrimination
a criminal trial) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)
(2004) (a government
government official
who uses compulsion to extract an incriminating testimonial
statement from an individual
individual only violates the Fifth Amendment's
Amendment's
self
incrimination
if
the
state
eventually
privilege
against
uses the
privilege
incrimination
statement in a criminal
criminal trial) (Conditional
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (if a judge,
without a valid reason, denies the defendant the right to hire an
defendant's choice, it should only violate
attorney of the defendant's
violate the Sixth
Amendment's
defendant
Amendment's guarantee
guarantee to the assistance
assistance of counsel if the defendant
was prejudiced) (Conditional
(Conditional rule proposed by the dissent not
adopted by the Court)
2. Conditional
Conditional Rule Cases By Type of Rule
(i) Prejudice
Prejudice Rules

U.S. 97 (1934)
(1934)
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
United
U.S. 307 (1971)
(1971)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
United
U.S. 97 (1976)
(1976)
United States
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
United States
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
U.S. 858 (1982)
(1982)
Strickland
v.
Washington,
466
U.S.
668
(1984)
(1984)
Strickland
(1985)
United States
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
U.S. 667 (1985)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
U.S. 673 (1986)
(1986)
Delaware
(1987)
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
U.S. 730 (1987)
U.S. 162 (2002)
(2002)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)
United States
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
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Aggregation Rules
(ii) Aggregation
(1973)
Chambers
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
(1977)
Weatherford
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)
98
(1977)
432
U.S.
v.
Brathwaite,
Manson
(1977)
(1978)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978)
Richardson
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)
(1987)
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)
(2003)
Chavez
(2004)
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)
United States
(iii) Liability Rules

Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971)
(1971)
(1976)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
(1987)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
(1991)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
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APPENDIX
B
APPENDIXB

This list indicates the vote of each Justice on every case in which
conditional
conditional rules were either
either adopted or discussed. Opposed means
that the justice wrote or joined
joined an opinion (either a dissent or a
concurring
specifically rejecting
concurring opinion) specifically
rejecting the use of a conditional
conditional
rule, rather
rather than writing or joining a dissenting opinion that reached
reached a
result different from the majority, but on other grounds. Supporting
Supporting
means that the justice
justice either wrote or joined an opinion (either a
majority, concurring
advocating
concurring or dissenting opinion) specifically advocating
the use of a conditional
conditional rule.
For those Justices who participated
participated in five or more cases, the last
last
column
column indicates
indicates the percentage
percentage of these cases in which the Justice
favored the conditional rule.

Name
Name of
of
Justice
Cardozo
Van Devanter
Hughes
HUJihes
McReynolds
McReynolds
Stone
Stone
Roberts
Roberts
Brandeis
Brandeis
Sutherland
_
Sutherland
Butler
Butler
Scalia
Souter

Opposed
Opposed
Conditional
Rule in
Rule in

Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Richardson;
Richardson;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Mickens;
Mickens;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez

Supported
Supported
Conditional
Rule in
Rule in
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Snyder
Sny-der
Snyder

%
% Favoring
Conditional
Rule
Rule

Greer; Stincer;
Hodari D.;
Mickens;
Mickens; Chavez
Hodari D.; Chavez

81%
81%
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White

Scott; Bagley;
Bagley;
Van Arsdall;
Greer; Stincer;
Stincer;
Hodari
Hodari D.;
Mickens;
Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Richardson

Burger
Burger

Van
Arsdall
VanArsdall

Stevens
Stevens

Stewart
Stewart

Blackmun

Van Arsdall;
Greer;
Richardson
Richardson

Douglas
Dou~las

Donnelly
Estelle; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
ValenzuelaValenzuelaBernal; Bagley;
Van Arsdall;
Greer; Stincer

Brennan
Brennan

[Vol. 26:2
[Vol.

Bursey;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland;
Richardson

40%

Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Bagley;
Strickland;
Van Arsdall;
Greer; Stincer;
Hodari D.
Marion; Nelson;
Nelson;
Chambers;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Bagley;
Strickland; BagJey;
Marion;
Marion; Nelson;
Chambers;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson;
Manson; Scott;
Marion;
Marion; Nelson;
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson;
Strickland; Bagley;
Stincer; Hodari
Hodari D.
Marion; Chambers
Chambers
Marion; Chambers;
Agurs; Strickland;
Richardson

94%
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79%
79%

36 %
36%
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Marshall

Black
Harlan
Powell

Estelle; Bursey;
Manson;
Manson; Scott;
ValenzuelaValenzue1aBernal;
Strickland;
Bagley;
Bagley; Van
Arsdall; Greer;
Msdall;
Stincer; Hodari
D.
Do

Van Msdall;
Arsdall;
Richardson
Richardson

Rehnquist

Van Msdall;
Arsdall;
Richardson
Richardson

O'Connor

ValenzuelaValenzuelaBernal;
Bernal; Van
Arsdall;
Msdall;
Richardson
Richardson
Chavez
Chavez

Kennedy

Ginsburg
Breyer
Breyer
Thomas
Roberts
Roberts
Alito
i\lito

Mickens;
Mickens;
Chavez;
Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-LoFez
Mickens;
Mickens;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez

Marion; Chambers;
Agurs; Richardson
i\gurs;Richardson

Nelson
Nelson
Chambers; Estelle;
Estelle;
Agurs;
i\gurs; Bursey;
Manson;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Greer;
Stincer
Stincer
Estelle; Agurs;
i\gurs;
Bursey; Manson;
ValenzuelaScott; ValenzuelaBernal;
Bernal; Strickland;
Bagley;
Bagley; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari D.;
Do;
Mickens;
Mickens; Chavez
Chavez
Strickland; Bagley;
Greer;
Greer; Stincer;
Hodari
Do;
Hodari D.;
Mickens;
Mickens; Chavez
Chavez
Hodari
D.;
Hodari Do;
Mickens;
Mickens;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez

549

27%

83%
83%

87%
87%

70%
70%

Chavez
Chavez
Mickens;
Mickens; Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Gonzalez-Lopez
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